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This special issue aims to take the first step towards an inter-paradigmatic debate in the study of European 
Union trade politics. In this introduction we highlight the importance of trade as an EU policy domain that is 
currently undergoing radical changes. We also give a brief overview of the literature on EU trade politics, 
pointing to the fragmentation of different theoretical approaches. Furthermore, we suggest that more dialogue 
between different paradigms may be fruitful. We conclude by situating the contributions to this special issue in 
terms of their theoretical and ontological perspectives. 
Paradigms; trade policy; IR; EU 
 
 
 
Different, often contending and perhaps even conflicting theories have tried to explain 
the European Union (EU) in general and EU external trade policies in particular. This 
special issue aims to take the first step towards an inter-paradigmatic debate in the 
study of EU trade politics. The common commercial policy is one of the oldest common 
policy domains of the EU and also the most powerful area of its foreign policy. The 
political importance of EU trade policy has considerably increased over the past twenty 
years. The conduct of trade policy has equally become more and more contested by 
politicians and non-governmental organizations (Young and Peterson 2006). The coming 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, which upgraded the role of the 
European Parliament in trade policy-making and extended the EU’s competences to 
‘behind the border’ issues such as investment, intellectual property rights and services, 
has further reinforced these trends. Since the negotiations at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) have been stalled, the EU has embarked on an ambitious agenda of 
bilateral free trade agreements. Since the end 2000s EU preferential trade agreements 
are no longer exclusively directed at developing or neighbouring countries: industrialized 
trading powers such as South Korea (signed in 2010), Japan, Canada and the United 
States are the new priorities for the EU’s bilateral trade agenda. The launch of the 
negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the US in 
July 2013 was a remarkable achievement in itself. The issues on the negotiation table 
are wide ranging and will continue to spark public debates in the years to come. The 
European Commission argues that a transatlantic trade agreement would stimulate 
economic growth in Europe and thereby contribute to solving the economic crisis. In 
addition, the EU-US trade talks have a geo-political dimension, not at least in reaction to 
the emergence of China and the proliferation of trade agreements in Asia. More closely 
to its own borders, the EU has also started trade negotiations with countries such as 
Ukraine (initialed in 2012), Moldova and Georgia. While these markets are less important 
for the EU from an economic perspective, the geopolitical relevance of the trade 
arrangements as part of Europe’s wider Neighbourhood Policy cannot be underestimated. 
In short, EU trade politics are undergoing fascinating changes. The involvement of new 
actors within the EU (e.g. the European Parliament), the bilateral negotiations with new 
trading partners (e.g. the US), the emergence of new venues (e.g. bilateral 
negotiations) and new issues (e.g. investment) within a changing internal (e.g. 
eurocrisis) and international (e.g. multipolarity) context will undoubtedly stimulate a new 
wave of academic research into the politics of EU trade. Understanding and explaining 
these evolutions will require innovative and sophisticated theoretical tools. In doing so, 
scholars can build on a relatively large existing literature. During the last fifteen years, 
academic research on the EU’s external trade policies has expanded rapidly. A once 
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neglected policy domain of the EU caught an increasing amount of attention from 
scholars.  
This has generated an extensive, but at the same time highly fragmented literature. 
There are two characteristics with regard to the resulting research. The first is that the 
analysis of EU trade policy-making has been increasingly refined, starting with questions 
of competence and the resulting institutional dynamics (Meunier & Nicolaïdis 1999) and 
leading to accounts on the resulting trade policy outcomes, and the causal mechanisms 
that mattered in the generation of such outcomes. Factors such as the interaction 
between path dependencies and unintended consequences (Young 2004; Hanson 1998), 
the interaction between majority requirements and policy preferences (Meunier 2000), 
and principal-agent dynamics have been prominently present in these (Delreux & 
Kerremans 2010; Damro 2007; Frennhoff-Larsen 2007; Elsig 2007; Kerremans 2004), 
this with a growing attention for the interplay between the EU-decision-making process 
internally, and the specific external context in which trade policies is being developed 
(the WTO, the context of competitive liberalization) (Sbragia 2010; Young 2007; Dür 
2007; Zimmerman 2007; Billiet 2006; De Bièvre 2006).  
The second characteristic of the analysis of EU trade policy-making has been the 
increasing convergence between rational choice approaches (or scholarly work strongly 
inspired by it) and constructivist insights into the role of ideas, identities and discourses 
(cf. Siles-Brügge 2011; Orbie 2011; Daugbjerg & Swinbank 2009; Richardson 2009; 
Niemann 2004; Van den Hoven 2004; Elsig 2000). In addition, there have been a 
number of studies based on critical theory (De Ville and Orbie 2013; Hurt 2012; Langan 
2011; Storey 2006), although this is still a minority in the EU trade policy literature.  
Most work on the EU’s trade policies is organized on thematic lines. Four relatively recent 
special issues are indicative of this: ‘The European Union and the New Trade Politics’, co-
edited by Alasdair Young and John Peterson (2006); ‘The EU in International Trade 
Negotiations’, co-edited by Andreas Dür and Hubert Zimmermann (2007); ‘The social 
dimension of EU trade politics’, co-edited by Fabienne Bossuyt, Myriam Gistelinck, Bart 
Kerremans, Jan Orbie and Lisa Tortell (2009); and ‘The Politics of EU Trade and 
Development’, co-edited by Maurizio Carbone and Jan Orbie (2014 forthcoming) – 
respectively dealing with the new trade-related issues, the EU’s external trade 
negotiations, the social-trade linkage, and the trade-development nexus.  
Overall however, the attention for different paradigms in the study of the EU’s external 
trade policies has been more implicit than explicit. Only a few authors tend to explicitly 
engage in a debate between different paradigms in their search for an explanation of 
trade policy processes or outcomes in the EU. This is in the first place the case for these 
authors that write outside a rational choice perspective. To be sure, there has been a 
gradual reduction in distance between rational choice approaches and some work that is 
heavily inspired by constructivist thinking. Some of the authors that have been involved 
in this rapprochement are included in this special issue. On the other hand there seems 
to be a continuing (and possibly even growing) distance between mainstream 
approaches to EU trade politics and radical or critical approaches. 
This project has been inspired by a frustration over the fragmentation of the existing 
literature and the near-absence of inter-paradigmatic dialogue. Building on previous 
insights, this special issue attempts to shift the focus towards the theoretical debate per 
se, by engaging in a debate between different theoretical perspectives, including 
theoretical perspectives that are considered to be out of the mainstream, such as critical 
theory and critical political economy. A general feeling behind this special issue is that, 
warranted or not, IR theory and EU studies face a situation of growing mutual insularity 
among authors that write in different paradigms (Walker 2010). Part of this 
fragmentation is understandable. Scholars from different backgrounds publish in 
different journals, tend to read each other’s work only to a limited extent, and 
sometimes entertain biased, or even caricatured perceptions of each other’s work and 
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findings. As different paradigms are often rooted in different ontologies and 
epistemologies, communication among them is far from evident. Indeed, scholars from 
different paradigms seem to speak in different languages. It would be naïve to believe 
that bringing scholars from different paradigmatic strands together will change this. That 
suddenly, they would start communicating in the same language. Such an evolution may 
not even be desirable.  
However, we start from the assumption that there may be potential in fostering a 
dialogue between such diversity of approaches. The distance among these so-called 
‘paradigms’ may be smaller than it seems at first sight. It may also be that different 
paradigms approach the same questions from different, but complementary angles. And 
it may be the case that one paradigm may help another in the formulation and testing of 
alternative hypotheses and expectations, or in the development and use of new 
methodologies; or that it contributes to the sharpening of one’s own arguments and 
assumptions. If that would be the case, a confrontation among different paradigms may 
yield new findings, or may deepen existing ones. There would be an added value then, 
to contention and even conflict. The scientific and practical relevance of our assumption 
on the merits of inter-paradigmatic dialogue will be elaborated in the concluding section 
of this special issue. 
The purpose of this special issue is about bringing people from different strands of 
political science1 together on a common theme with the aim of deepening and refining 
knowledge through debate and dialogue. There are several reasons why EU trade politics 
was chosen as the common theme. First, the EU constitutes a challenging but promising 
area for inter-paradigmatic dialogue. According to the pluralist model, the study of EU 
politics is ‘an inherently multidisciplinary affair’ and ‘benefits from the inputs of work 
from diverse epistemological and methodological standpoints’, since the EU is a ‘new 
type of polity’ (Rosamond 2006: 15). In an institutionally-unique setting such as the EU, 
‘the challenges of knowledge production are substantial and the stakes in reconciling 
work along other dimensions higher.’ (Jupille 2006: 209) Second, we focus on EU trade 
because it closely corresponds to our own research expertise and because we believe 
that it is sufficiently specific to allow for a meaningful dialogue (ensuring that 
contributors talk about the same thing), while also being broad enough to allow for a 
wide variety of perspectives and interpretations. As argued above, trade constitutes one 
of the most important EU policy domains. EU trade policy also situates itself at the 
intersection of European integration studies, comparative politics, international relations 
and international political economy. 
Therefore, we involved scholars from different paradigmatic traditions. In dialogue with 
the authors of this special issue, each contribution is situated on Figure 1 which 
represents the theoretical triangle of realism, liberalism and radicalism on the one hand, 
and the cross-cutting ontological divide between rationalist and reflectivist approaches 
on the other hand. While there are many other possible and more sophisticated ways to 
categorize the various debates between different paradigms, schools of thought, meta-
theories etc., we will use this map as a heuristic device. 
The articles by Gerry Alons and Maria Garcia come closest to a realist reading of EU 
trade policy. Alons stresses that a focus on member state preferences is essential for 
understanding EU trade policy. She illustrates this through her analysis of the 
preferences of Germany in the Uruguay Round negotiations on trade and agriculture. 
Alons uses an interest-based approach, although her analysis includes not only material 
but also ideational factors. Garcia presents the EU explicitly as a rationalist and realist 
trading actor that mainly aims to safeguard its economic interests in the international 
economic order. Her analysis also leaves room for ideational elements. The empirical 
focus is on the different preferential trade agreements negotiated by the EU, including 
bi-regional negotiations. 
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Figure 1: Situating the authors in the inter-paradigm debate (based on Waever 1996: 
165) 
 
Johan Adriaensen and Montserrat Gonzáles-Garibay remain close to the rationalist end of 
the continuum by arguing that the EU’s policies are contingent upon a generic cost-
effectiveness calculation constrained by the internal and external context where 
decisions on labour standards have been taken. Aiming to explain why the EU has been 
reluctant to include enforceable labour rights in trade agreements, the authors react 
against explanations in terms of what they call ‘sui generis’ and ‘normative power’ 
approaches and suggest that rational choice institutionalism may be more suitable. 
On the other side of the spectrum, David Bailey and Fabienne Bossuyt also tend to 
criticize the notion of normative power Europe. From a critical social theory perspective, 
they castigate scholars’ surprise with the discrepancy between the EU’s rhetoric as a 
‘progressive force for good’ on the one hand and the contents of its trade policy on the 
other hand. Instead, drawing on broad claims within the Marxist tradition, Bailey and 
Bossuyt conceptualize the EU as a site of domination. They identify three mechanisms of 
domination which are then applied to recent developments in EU trade policy, in 
particular the Global Europe agenda and the new trade agreements with Asian and Latin 
American countries. Lucy Ford’s article also problematizes ‘conventional’ analyses of EU 
trade policy based on a critical realist approach. More specifically, her approach draws 
from neo-Gramscian theories and global political ecology, which focus the attention to 
respectively mechanisms of hegemony and challenges of sustainability. As such the 
author proposes a more holistic approach to studying EU trade policy. Ford illustrates her 
argument using examples from trade policy debates, such as the discussion on Investor-
State Dispute Settlement disciplines and the extraction of petroleum from tar sands in 
the context of the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. 
The other three articles can be situated more in the middle of the inter-paradigmatic 
debate, even if important differences between the authors also exist. Gabriel Siles-
Brügge develops an innovative constructivist framework in order to explain how the 
European Commission managed to complete the bilateral trade negotiations with South 
Korea despite the financial crisis and the opposition from powerful interest groups. The 
author argues that rationalist approaches in International Political Economy cannot 
explain this puzzle. Just like Alons and Garcia, he also examines the often overlooked 
role of ideas in trade policy; in line with Bailey and Bossuyt, and Ford, he stresses the 
importance of ‘neoliberal understandings of socioeconomic order’ in explaining the 
European Commission’s trade strategies. Ferdi De Ville also starts with a critique of 
rational choice analyses of EU trade policy which he considers to be “a-historical” and “a-
political”. One difference with the previous article is that De Ville emphasizes the time 
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dimension: EU trade policy can only be understood by taking into account the influence 
of past policies and ideas. His theoretical framework constitutes a critical variant of 
historical institutionalism with ‘reactive sequencing’ as a core concept. As opposed to the 
narrower ‘path-dependency’ concept of what he calls ‘conservative’ historical 
institutionalism, reactive sequencing conceives of policy evolutions as chains of events 
produced by reactions and counter-reactions. Empirically, De Ville discusses the general 
strategic evolution of EU trade policy since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the 
Commission’s ‘Trade, Growth and World Affairs’ communication.  
Arne Niemann’s revised neofunctionalist framework does not explicitly aim to provide a 
critical or normative perspective to EU politics, but rather to explain integration 
outcomes. Compared to the original neofunctionalism, this approach comes closer to 
constructivist ontologies concerning the socio-cognitive dimension and the mutual 
constitution of agency and structure. As such, also Niemann argues that rational choice 
dynamics cannot fully explain the outcomes. The ambitions of revised neofunctionalism 
are also more modest than the original version, e.g. by taking into account 
countervailing forces which lead to stagnation of or even opposition against integration. 
Empirically, Niemann applies this framework to the revision of the provisions on the EU’s 
Common Commercial Policy in the Lisbon Treaty. He addresses the puzzle why the 
negotiations leading to the Lisbon Treaty entailed the transfer of competences in areas 
such as services, intellectual property rights and investment, where the previous 
negotiations on the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties largely failed to do so. 
In the concluding article, the editors come back to the question of inter-paradigmatic 
dialogue that inspired this special issue project. In the first part, three questions are 
addressed: (i) Is it possible to engage in inter-paradigmatic dialogue?; (ii) Is such an 
exercise desirable?; and if so, (iii) How should this be achieved? We go back to the 
Kuhnian debate about the so-called incommensurability of different paradigms and argue 
that there is a need for engaged pluralism in political science. In the second part, we 
look at the extent to which a reading of the articles in this special issue indicates that a 
confrontation among different paradigms as well as between different theories can be or 
become a learning experience. We point to a number of commonalities among the 
articles, despite their often-different backgrounds, and reflect on a number of issues on 
which the different articles could dialogue better one to the other, this with reference to 
a causal chain. While this analysis also shows the limits and difficulties encountered 
during such an endeavor, it also makes clear that inter-paradigmatic dialogue may be 
more fruitful than often assumed, and that there is ample room for a more reflexive 
dialogue within the scholarly community. 
 
*** 
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1 We consider the discipline of political science broadly, including comparative politics, international 
relations (IR), international political economy (IPE), and European Union (EU) studies. However, we limit 
ourselves to debates within the discipline of political science. For calls for inter-disciplinarity in studying 
the EU, see e.g. Manners (2003) and Rumford and Murray (2003). 
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In the literature examining European Union external trade policy, the relative influence of the Commission, the 
member states and interest groups are an issue of ongoing debate. This article will argue that member states can 
still play an important role and that a focus on member state preferences is therefore crucial in understanding 
European external trade policy in general. An interest-based explanation of state preferences is proposed in 
which both material (political and economic) and ideational variables are included, whereas material 
explanations alone dominate the current research in the trade policy field. An in-depth case study of German 
preference formation and position taking with regard to the agricultural chapter of the GATT Uruguay Round 
(1986-1993) shows the interplay between material and ideational interest. As well as German preference 
formation being guided by Germany’s trade interests and political interests (particularly when these interests 
were united and governmental sensitivity was high), considerations concerning the Franco-German friendship, 
affecting Germany’s ideational interest, also proved to be a constant in the preference-formation process. 
Germany; European trade policy; GATT Uruguay Round; Agriculture 
 
 
 
This article investigates German preferences with regard to the agricultural chapter of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round (1986-1993) and its 
role in European Union (EU) position taking in these negotiations.1 In the literature 
explaining European trade policy, the relative influence of the Commission, the member 
states and interest groups is an issue of ongoing debate. In this article the position that, 
even though external trade policy is within the exclusive competences of the EU, 
member states still can play an important role during trade negotiations will be 
defended. In order to arrive at full and convincing explanations of EU trade policy in 
general, one therefore needs to take account of member state preferences and how 
these preferences are formed. However, research on ‘the role of individual member 
states in the formulation of EU trade policies’ and on the domestic preference formation 
processes in member states is relatively scarce (Dür and Zimmerman 2007: 777, 783). 
To the extent that trade preferences are theorised, it is often assumed that domestic 
economic variables, such as factors of production (Rogowski 1989), factor specificity 
(Frieden 1991) or the pressure of economic interests (Moravcsik 1998; De Bièvre and 
Dür 2005), are decisive in shaping state preferences on trade liberalization. When it 
comes to agricultural trade, agricultural interests in particular are expected to be 
influential (Keeler 1996). I will argue, though, that an exclusive focus on the material 
domestic sources of trade policy preferences does not only overlook the potential 
influence of external pressure on governments, but also neglects non-material ideational 
sources of these preferences. In this article, it is assumed that, in domestic preference-
formation processes, a government will take account of both its material (political and 
economic) and its ideational interests. 
German preference formation concerning the agricultural chapter of the GATT Uruguay 
Round is in this respect a valuable case to study for two reasons. First, Germany’s 
position in the negotiations is particularly interesting because, compared to the other 
European member states, it had the most internally-split preferences. While the 
industrial sector urged the government to agree to further liberalization of trade (also in 
the agricultural domain), the agricultural sector was keen on protection. Second, apart 
from these domestic pressures, the German government was under contradictory 
external pressure as well. On the one hand, the United States (US) tried to convince 
Germany to plead for trade liberalization during European decision making on the 
Uruguay Round, while, on the other, France sought German support for a protectionist 
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stance on agriculture, appealing to the long-standing Franco-German friendship. This 
article will show how these incompatible pressures and interests, through the domestic 
German decision-making process, resulted in the preferences Germany defended with 
respect to the agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round.  
The study on the German case in itself does not provide an explanatory model of (trade) 
preference formation which is directly applicable to all other EU member states. This 
would require a larger scale comparative case study, which is not feasible within the 
constraint of this single article and would be at odds with presenting an in-depth analysis 
of preference-formation processes. It is particularly the latter that this article aims at, by 
contributing to filling the void of in-depth empirical studies on trade preference-
formation processes. Although this article does not seek to develop a theory of trade 
preference formation by EU member states in general, the German case study shows 
how different variables interact to explain trade preferences and allows the development 
of scope conditions for the relative importance of the different variables. These can 
subsequently be applied to theory formation and theory testing in a larger scale 
comparative case study of EU member state preferences. 
First, the analysis will engage in the wider scientific debate on European decision-making 
regarding external trade and the relative importance of the European Commission, 
member states and interest groups in this process. This will result in the presentation of 
the theoretical assumptions and expectations that inform the analysis of the German 
case study. Second, the article presents the case description, based on several “decision 
moments”, when GATT proposals or Commission proposals concerning the European 
position on agriculture, which needed to be defended in GATT, were on the agenda. It is 
at these moments in the negotiations that member states have to make their 
preferences explicit and the periods leading up to the definition and articulation of the 
national preferences are pre-eminently appropriate to analyse the effects of different 
variables on German preference formation.  
 
EUROPEAN TRADE POLICY AND MEMBER STATE PREFERENCES 
Commission versus member states? 
In the scholarly literature on European trade policy, the relative influence of the 
European Commission, the member states and interest groups are a matter of ongoing 
debate. With respect to the relative autonomy of the Commission as opposed to the role 
of member states, the debate in the 1990s revolved around an intergovernmentalist 
approach emphasising the power of member states (whose preferences were assumed to 
mirror those of domestic economic interest groups) (Moravcsik 1998) versus 
(neo)functionalist explanations focusing on the autonomy of EU institutions (Hayes 
1993). More recently the debate has primarily been couched in terms of a principal-
agent model. According to Kerremans (2004: 364) this model is ‘an instrument to 
understand the interaction between the Commission and the member states in the 
context of multilateral trade negotiations’. Applying the principal-agent model to 
European trade policy, the member states (the principals) delegate decision-making 
power concerning external trade policy to the EU (the agent) and subsequently try to 
keep control over this agent to prevent him from acting with too much autonomy and 
possibly against the interests of the principals (Dür and Elsig 2011: 328). 
Member states delegated the execution of European external trade policy through Article 
113 [133] of the Treaty of Rome which established the European Economic Community, 
giving the Commission the sole authority to negotiate multilateral trade agreements on 
behalf of the member states. Nevertheless, due to the role of the Council of Ministers in 
the policy process ample opportunities exist for control by member states. At the start of 
the policy process, prior to any negotiations, the Commission does not only need 
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authorisation from the Council to engage in such negotiations, but the Council may also 
issue a directive giving the boundaries within which the Commission has to negotiate 
(Kerremans 2004: 368). During the second phase of the policy process, the actual 
negotiations, member states are able to monitor the negotiations closely through the 
Article 113 [133] Committee, consisting of member state representatives (Kerremans 
2004: 369).2 Finally, at the end of the process, the Council has the sole authority to 
adopt international trade agreements — by qualified majority in areas of exclusive EU 
competence and by consensus in areas of mixed competence. In fact the consensus rule 
is applied more often than strictly required, especially when the interests of particular 
member states are ‘severely at stake’ (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 50).3 The 
Commission therefore cannot afford to ignore the preferences and demands of the 
member states during the negotiations and risk losing their support. Although the 
Commission can try to gain leverage over member states by using certain strategies 
such as divide and rule or by proposing package deals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis 
(Woolcock and Hodges 1996; Vahl 1997), agricultural negotiations, the focus of this 
study, tend to be highly politicised both in the European arena and within member 
states, which is likely to enhance the role of member states relative to that of the 
Commission (Orbie 2007: 41-42; Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 77). 
 
The influence of interest groups 
A further issue in the debate on European trade policy is the degree to which interest 
groups influence these policies through lobbying the Commission or member states. 
Irrespective of whether authors explicitly couch their arguments in terms of the 
principle-agent model or not, this debate revolves around those defending the collusive 
delegation argument and their opponents who emphasise interest group influence.4 The 
collusive delegation argument holds that states delegate decision-making authority in 
order to reduce the influence of interest groups on policy making. In this vein, Sophie 
Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis (1999: 480) argue that with respect to trade policy ‘such 
delegation helped insulate the policy-making process from domestic pressures, thus 
promoting a more liberal international order.’5 Furthermore, delegation will enable the 
member states to shift the blame for unpopular policies (Arnold 1990). An important 
assumption underlying the collusive delegation argument is that the domestic policy 
process is usually dominated by protectionist trade interests (Dür 2008: 28). The costs 
of trade liberalization are often concentrated, affecting one or a small number of societal 
interests, whereas the gains are dispersed. As a result the negatively-affected groups 
are likely to mobilise, while the consumers gaining from trade liberalization (confronted 
with a collective action problem) are unlikely to do so. Delegation thus aids member 
state governments by insulating them from domestic interest group pressure for 
protectionist trade policies. 
Those defending the interest group approach share the assumption (also implicit in the 
collusive delegation argument) that domestic politicians wish to be re-elected and will 
therefore reject policies that would result in concentrated losses for specific societal 
groups (Dür 2007: 462; De Bièvre and Dür 2005: 127). However, they repudiate the 
idea that delegation will significantly restrict the influence of interest groups. This 
expectation is simply disproved by studies showing the influence of interest groups on 
EU trade policy making in various cases (see Van den Hoven 2002; De Bièvre and Dür 
2005). Considering the EU’s institutional framework, this should not come as a surprise, 
according to Dür (2008: 30-31), because the Council’s consensus rule is also applied to 
the trade policy field. Lobbying governments will therefore still be effective and the 
Commission will take account of interest group preferences, because it realises that it 
would not be able to get member state approval if it ignored interest pressure.6 Thus, 
Van den Hoven (2002: 23) argues, interest groups in the trade field are not only 
expected to influence member states, but are also regarded as having particular 
influence on the Commission due to their legitimizing role: 
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The Commission’s ability to represent the EU in multilateral negotiations and to 
keep member states united behind its negotiating position, largely depends on 
keeping interest groups satisfied with the concessions that it is giving and 
receiving in the WTO. 
On the level of the state, the international political economy literature often emphasises 
the domestic sources of economic policy, assuming that the preferences of domestic 
economic actors somehow translate into state preferences (see for example Milner 1988 
and Knopf 1988). Some stress factors of production (capital and labour) when explaining 
a state’s openness to trade liberalization (Rogowski 1989), while others focus on factor 
specificity (Frieden 1991). It is important to note, though, that even if one considers 
societal demands to be the primary determinants of trade policy, this does not mean 
these policies will always be of a protectionist nature. Notwithstanding the often 
concentrated losses and dispersed gains of free trade, Dür (2007) found that exporters 
tend to lobby against losses (as in terms of market shares) and will thus mobilise when 
governments propose protectionist trade policies that harm their trading interests. 
Import-competing interests therefore need not always be dominant in domestic politics. 
In the words of Dür (2007: 462), ‘As politicians thus have to find a balance between 
satisfying exporter interests and maintaining protection for import-competitors, the 
relative strength of the two constituencies would determine the extent of the initiative in 
favour of exporters.’ 
 
AN INTEREST-BASED APPROACH INCLUDING IDEATIONAL VARIABLES 
From this discussion of the scholarly debate on the relative influence of the Commission, 
member states and interest groups on European trade policy, we may first of all 
conclude that the influence of member states should not be underestimated, particularly 
in such politicised domains as agricultural trade. Secondly, and this is partly a result of 
the member states’ continued importance, interest groups still have ample opportunity 
to influence their domestic government and also — due to its wish to maintain the 
support of member states — the Commission. 
If these were the only considerations, an analysis of the preferences, mobilisation and 
strength of competing German interest groups should suffice as an explanation for 
German preferences on the agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round. I would argue, 
however, that such an approach would neglect external (i.e. international) and ideational 
determinants of trade policy preferences and, considering the contradictory external 
pressures on Germany and France’s appeal to the Franco-German friendship during the 
GATT Uruguay Round, analysing the potential influence of such variables is crucial in the 
case under study. 
I therefore emphasise the role of governments in selecting a preferred policy option 
within constraints which are not only political in nature (e.g. farm lobby pressure).7 
Instead, I assume that a government will defend the policy option which it deems to be 
most attractive from the perspective of its political, economic and ideational interests. 
The political interest essentially covers the relative power position of a state 
internationally and the wish of the government to remain in office domestically. It is 
because of the government’s consideration of its political interest that interest groups 
are able to influence domestic preference formation and the government will particularly 
be sensitive to their pressure when elections are approaching. As regards the economic 
interest, governments strive to increase national wealth and improve living standards. 
Common explanations of states’ trade policies often are restricted to an analysis of these 
material interests. However, arguments based on political or economic interests 
frequently do not tell the whole story. They overlook the fact that, under conditions of 
imperfect knowledge of the political and economic costs and benefits of different policy 
options, political actors often rely on ideas about ‘how the world works’ and ‘who we 
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are’, also to identify the appropriate policy. Apart from material interests, I therefore 
also distinguish ideational interests, which refers to defending ideas that are central to 
the state and shape the beliefs of the state’s decision-making elite. These ideas can be 
embedded in a state’s national identity or in its policy paradigms (the principles 
underlying its policies). National identity answers the question ‘who we are’. It reflects 
‘shared norms and narratives that sustain we-ness’, distinguishing the “self” from the 
“other” (Banchoff 1999: 268), including through images of a common past or ‘collective 
orientations towards the future’ such as ‘a sense of mission in the world’ (Peters 2002: 
13-14). The national identity shapes the set of policy options deemed appropriate and 
makes some options more attractive than others. By including these ideational variables 
and their effects in the analysis of state preferences, I also respond to a common 
constructivist criticism of rational-choice analysts, which states that their models 
underestimate the influence of non-material factors on foreign policy.8 
While the German political and economic interests during the Uruguay Round can be 
analysed on the basis of the different pressures (domestic and international) that were 
brought to bear on the German government and estimates of the effects of trade 
liberalization on different sectors of the German economy, it is necessary to first identify 
relevant German policy paradigms and identity aspects relating to its position in the 
world, in order to estimate the ideational attractiveness of different policy options. With 
respect to the relevant economic policy paradigm, Germany is generally non-
interventionist and disposed towards trade liberalization. However, the agricultural 
sector is an exception (Weiss 1989). In this sector a comprehensive mix of instruments, 
ranging from subsidies to tax benefits and direct payments, is used to intervene. 
Important principles in this interventionist agricultural policy are the 
Einkommensorientierten Produktpreispolitik (Führer 1996: 22) and the bäuerliche 
Landwirtschaft (Bulletin 25.3.1987). The former emphasises high guarantee prices and 
guaranteed sales quantities, with the aim of safeguarding farm income, while the latter 
indicates the German idea of small-scale farming based on environmentally-friendly and 
animal-friendly production methods. 
Turning to the relevant aspects of German identity, Germany pictures itself as a neue 
Handelsstaat. This is a state that does not prescribe for itself a strong military role in 
international relations, but wishes to be powerful due to its economic accomplishments 
and competitiveness (Rittberger 1992: 223). Associated with Germany’s identity as a 
Handelsstaat is its prioritization of the international extension of free trade principles 
(Markovits and Reich 1991: 59). At the same time however Germany also attaches great 
importance to the Franco-German friendship (Cogan 2003). While for France the amitié 
privilégiée (Delorme 1994: 42) served geo-political goals as it made it feasible ‘to tie 
Germany into European integration by any means possible, and not to allow it to become 
an independent power’ (Haywood 1993: 278-279), the Germans have generally been 
prepared to defer to France’s wishes and hand ‘to their French counterparts the political 
leadership of Europe’ (Cogan 2003: 99). This appears to have been related to the 
German conviction that Selbsteinbindung (in Europe in this case) was necessary in order 
to ‘prevent Germany from reverting to its old ways and to guarantee peace and security 
for Germany and its neighbours’ (Van Esch 2007: 274). In terms of identity construction, 
it is argued in this respect that ‘Germany’s international identity has been constructed 
around a multilateral and European position’ (Bulmer and Paterson 1996: 18). And with 
respect to Germany’s European policy, the Franco-German relationship — and within it 
the close connection between Kohl and Mitterrand — are so essential that the 
relationship is considered an ‘institutional reflex and part of [Germany’s] identity’ 
(Bulmer and Paterson 1996: 29). Although debate erupted within Germany after 
reunification about whether Germany should continue its European and international 
policies as usual or, instead, act more unilaterally based on its potential for European 
hegemony, Germany chose to operate within the context of multilateral and EU 
institutions and continued to value Franco-German cooperation (Janning 1996; Hamilton 
1991).9  
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The Franco-German friendship has quasi-regime-like qualities, in that it entails 
(unwritten) behavioural norms (Cole 2001). With respect to issues that one or other or 
both regard as politically salient (their interests being fundamentally at stake), Germany 
is expected not to support policy options that France opposes because they are 
detrimental to fundamental French interests (even if supporting the decision would serve 
German material interests), and vice versa. In this context, Douglas Webber (1999: 48) 
states that ‘the deference shown by the one government to the other may lead it 
occasionally to adopt positions on (…) issues contrary to those dictated by domestic 
political considerations.’ Apart from influencing the preferences Germany defends in 
negotiations, deference due to the Franco-German friendship may also surface in the 
policy-making process, because the nations may refrain from putting too much pressure 
on each other on issues affecting their vital interests.  
As implicated in the quote from Webber above, it is important to note that the 
behavioural incentives based on different interests do not necessarily strengthen each 
other, but can also be conflicting. If material and ideational considerations coincide, 
ideas strengthen the (un)attractiveness of the behavioural option under consideration 
and provide the government with additional legitimacy for its position of rejecting or 
accepting the option. When ideational considerations and material incentives collide, it 
can be expected that the degree of domestic pressure and the sensitivity of the 
government (Van der Vleuten 2005) will decide whether material incentives trump 
ideational considerations or not. The greater the degree of domestic pressure and 
governmental sensitivity, the more likely it becomes that material interests eclipse 
ideational interests. 
It is this interest-based approach, including both material and ideational interests that 
will guide the analysis of German preference formation regarding the agricultural chapter 
of the Uruguay Round in the next section. As this is not the first scientific study focusing 
on the EU and agriculture in the Uruguay Round, it is important to elucidate how this 
analysis complements and can be contrasted with earlier analyses. Much of the scientific 
work on the Uruguay Round focuses on the proceedings of the talks and the role of the 
prime antagonists, the United States and the European Union, without delving deeply 
into the preference formation in separate member states (see for example Paemen and 
Bensch 1995). The research questions guiding such research instead concerns the 
autonomy of the Commission relative to member states (Vahl 1997) or the link between 
institutions (as decision-making rules within the EU) and negotiating outcomes (Meunier 
2005; Davis 2003). To the extent that these authors touch on member states 
preferences, their analyses tend to be descriptive, without problematising and explaining 
the preferences described. Notable exceptions are Keeler (1996) and Patterson (1997). 
Both authors emphasise the importance of interest groups at domestic level. Keeler 
develops a theoretical argument explaining why farm lobbies in particular are likely to 
influence state preferences on agriculture and agricultural trade. He underpins these 
theoretical claims with empirical illustrations of French and German decision making 
during the Uruguay Round. What the current article adds is an in-depth case analysis, 
partly based on primary archival records, that allows me to draw conclusions on the 
mobilisation and influence of not only agricultural organisations, but also the industrial 
lobby, which defended different preferences. Patterson (1997) aptly argues that, when it 
comes to analysing the behaviour of the EU in international negotiations, a third level 
needs to be added to Robert Putnam’s classic two-level games (1988), in order to 
distinguish between the international, the European and the domestic levels. The win set 
at domestic level would then be the set of all European level agreements that would gain 
the necessary majority in the EU member states. This coincides with the interest-based 
analysis in this article to the extent that I will analyse the preferences of competing 
German interests regarding the agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round. An important 
difference empirically, however, is that my analysis involves preferences concerning the 
GATT negotiations rather than the negotiations over the Common Agricultural Policy, 
which is the topic of Patterson’s article (touching on GATT issues in an indirect manner 
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only). Finally, what the current article contributes to the scientific debate, as compared 
to the other publications referred to, is an analysis of the role of ideas in preference 
formation regarding trade policies. 
 
GERMAN PREFERENCES IN THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND 
1982-1986: Reaching agreement on the launch of a new GATT Round 
The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations was initiated at the beginning of the 1980s, 
during a time of international economic slowdown and increasing protectionism. 
Agriculture figured prominently on the agenda and in particular the US was keen on 
subjecting this sector to stricter GATT discipline (Davis 2003: 272-273). However, many 
GATT partners, among them important EEC member states, were not yet eager to start 
another round of GATT negotiations (Paemen and Bensch 1995: 32; Meunier 2005: 
103). In the early 1980s Germany was positively disposed towards a new round of GATT 
negotiations even though broader support for such negotiations was still lacking in the 
EEC as a whole. Due to the economic crisis at this time, Chancellor Helmut Kohl attached 
great importance to a new GATT round (Bulletin 14 October1982); and given Germany’s 
economic interests as a trading nation with a strong competitive position in the industrial 
sector, this preference seems natural. Liberalization would only be costly for the 
insufficiently competitive agricultural sector. The Deutsche Bauernverband (DBV), the 
agricultural interest group, urged the EEC to be uncompromising and prevent the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) ending up on the negotiating table (Deutsche 
Bauernkorrespondenz November 1982), but they did not oppose a new GATT round 
altogether (Bulletin 19 September 1986). At the same time industrial interests, such as 
the Bund Deutscher Industrie (BDI) and the Bundesverband des Gross- und 
Aussenhandels (BGA), mobilised in favour of a new GATT round and argued that the EEC 
should be willing to put the adverse economic consequences of its agricultural policy up 
for discussion, in order to prevent trade conflicts in other areas that could damage 
German industrial exports (Handelsblatt 5 November 1986).10 
As gains in the industrial sector were likely to outweigh losses in the agricultural sector, 
both economic and domestic political considerations, on balance, favoured German 
acceptance of a new round of GATT negotiations which included agriculture. In the 
international political domain, however, incentives were mixed. On the one hand the US 
had singled out Germany as the subject for their particular pressure, in an attempt to 
convince it to actively seek to steer European decision making towards a more positive 
position on a new GATT Round.11 On the other hand, France tried to convince the EU 
member states to reject a new GATT round and in particular to object to the inclusion of 
agriculture in GATT negotiations.12 German diplomacy and position taking during the 
run-up to the Uruguay Round between 1982 and 1986 reflect these contradictory 
pressures.  
Germany repeatedly expressed its preference for a new round of trade negotiations as a 
necessity in strengthening the multilateral trading system and as a way to restrain 
protectionist tendencies and prevent economic and political confrontations, which 
Germany, due to its dependence on exports, could not afford.13 Nevertheless, in spite of 
its own desire for a new GATT round, Germany seriously took account of France’s 
resistance to EEC participation. At a meeting of the Article 113 Committee in November 
1982 the German minister of economics, Otto Lambsdorff, did not put too much pressure 
on his French counterpart, Michel Jobert, because Germany wished to avert a clash with 
France.14 Even when, by 1984, the Commission and an increasing number of member 
states began to develop a more positive attitude towards a new GATT round, Germany 
remained careful in its attempts to convince the French of the benefits of such 
negotiations.15 Despite US requests, it did not organise a meeting between European 
trade ministers to accelerate decision making on the matter. 
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Apart from influencing German diplomacy towards France, considerations of the Franco-
German friendship also affected the German position, moving it closer to French 
demands. During a Council meeting in March 1985 the member states reached 
agreement on an EEC declaration conveying its willingness to take part in a new GATT 
round. France was able, however, to get an extensive paragraph on agriculture included, 
indicating numerous conditions and reservations on this issue. France could do this 
because it won the support of Germany during the meeting. It is claimed that the initially 
liberally inclined German position moved closer and closer to the protectionist French 
position after telephone calls between Paris and Bonn (interview Frans Engering 20 
February 2004).16 With respect to the G7 conference in Bonn in July 1985, where 
François Mitterrand refused to commit himself to a specific date for the launch of the 
new trade round, Helmut Kohl emphasised that Germany’s relationship with the French 
was particularly amicable (explicitly referring to the deutsch-französische Freundschaft) 
and that Germany and France wanted to operate in tandem.17 German diplomacy 
therefore focused on convincing the French that they, too, in the longer term stood to 
benefit most from a more open world trade system.18 The German preparatory 
documents for Council meetings provided various outlines for speeches by the German 
representative, each geared to responding to a different French position.19 German 
declarations were therefore highly dependent on the position taken by the French in the 
negotiations. 
In September 1986 a GATT Ministerial Conference was planned in Punta del Este, to 
launch the new trade round. During this meeting the EEC became isolated, because most 
of the GATT parties were willing to accept the declarations that had been proposed, while 
the EEC, under pressure from the French, was forced to withhold its support for these 
texts. France was in particular opposed to the emphasis on and explicit reference to 
export subsidies in the text (Vahl 1997: 74; Agra Europe 19 September 1986) and 
threatened to leave the negotiating table if its agricultural interests were not taken 
sufficiently seriously (United Press International 18 September 1986). Germany, for its 
part, was less concerned about the precise formulation of the opening declaration, but 
regarded the launch of a new GATT round as a goal in its own right (Handelsblatt 19 
September 1986, 22 September 1986). It made extensive diplomatic efforts and tried to 
find formulations with the aim of appeasing and convincing the French, in order to 
remove their resistance (Handelsblatt 19 September 1986). Eventually France accepted 
a compromise text, in which export subsidies were no longer explicitly mentioned and 
which included the objective of ‘increasing discipline on the use of all direct and indirect 
subsidies and other indirect measures affecting directly or indirectly agricultural trade.’ 
(Agra Europe 26 September 1986) This formulation met the French demand that 
protectionist policies of states other than EEC members would be part of the negotiation 
as well. According to German negotiators, it was due to German and US pressure that 
France eventually accepted the opening declaration. A tacit agreement existed between 
France and Germany, with the support of Kohl, that the principles of the CAP were not to 
be put up for discussion (interview Lorenz Schomerus 29 March 2007).20 
It is claimed that France eventually agreed to include agriculture in the Uruguay Round 
to prevent a ‘major break with Germany’ (Webber 1998: 37; Paemen and Bensch 1994: 
46). The German government clearly also valued the Franco-German friendship and was 
willing to make immense diplomatic efforts to gain French approval before accepting the 
opening declaration, risking deadlock even when important German economic interests 
were at stake. After the negotiations in Punta del Este, the German Minister of 
Economics, Martin Bangemann, stated in the Bundestag that with respect to agriculture 
‘Franco-German cooperation had fully stood the text’ and that he had kept in close 
contact with the French ministers of trade and of agriculture during the negotiations in 
order to develop compromise formulas.21 
The analysis presented above shows that while political and economic interests 
advocated a preference for a quick start of a new GATT round, ideational considerations 
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regarding the Franco-German friendship affected German diplomacy and position taking. 
From the start Germany made clear that it wanted a new GATT round, a position that 
resonated well with its overall economic interests and the balance of domestic 
mobilization. Nevertheless, it was willing to defend a more protectionist position on 
agriculture to placate the French, even though this could put the launch of new GATT 
negotiations in doubt and thus be detrimental to its own economic interests. During the 
negotiating process, the frequent Franco-German bilateral consultations also seem to 
indicate a collaborative reflex consonant with the Franco-German friendship. For a full 
understanding of the German preferences and diplomatic behaviour, both material and 
ideational interests therefore need to be taken into account. 
 
1990: Breakdown at Heysel 
Once the new GATT round, now referred to as the Uruguay Round, had been launched, 
the actual discussions began in 1987 in fifteen negotiating groups, including a separate 
group for agriculture (Paemen and Bensch 1995). Because of this separate treatment, 
the French and German ministers of agriculture were united in their resistance to too 
great a degree of liberalization in this sector. As long as no differential treatment of 
domestic support (German interest) and export assistance (French interest) was 
foreseen, their interests coincided. During the first half of the Uruguay Round the 
agricultural negotiations mainly focused on the form and modalities of an agreement and 
it was not until 1990 that negotiations started on actual reduction percentages for 
customs duties, domestic support and export assistance (Vahl 1997). The GATT partners 
had committed themselves to tabling agricultural proposals by October 1990. These 
would be the basis for the Heysel conference in December 1990, during which the 
Uruguay Round was originally scheduled to be completed (Paemen and Bensch 1995: 
140-141). In the run-up to this conference, the European Commission put a proposal 
before the Council of Ministers to reduce agricultural support by 30 per cent. A heated 
and protracted debate erupted. 
During this debate the German government was faced with contradictory incentives. 
Domestically, the Deutsche Bauernverband rejected the Commission proposal, which it 
equated with selling out on the notion of the bäuerliche Landwirtschaft and bowing down 
to the demands of the United States (Die Welt 8 October 1990). They argued that to 
support the reductions proposed would endanger the multifunctionality of the European 
agricultural sector and compromise community preference (Deutsche 
Bauernkorrespondenz November 1990). The farm lobby appealed to Chancellor Kohl ‘to 
wield his full power in striving for a solution in GATT that gives farmers a future’ 
(Deutsche Bauernkorrespondenz November 1990; Bulletin 18 October 1990). The 
industrial lobby, however, mobilised in favour of concessions on agriculture, in order to 
conclude the Uruguay Round as soon as possible (Die Welt 18 October 1990; Agra 
Europe 7 December 1990). In the international arena US pressure for a far-reaching 
European proposal was counterbalanced by French insistence on rejection of the 
Commission proposal on the basis of its damaging effects on community preference and 
export potential.22 
In the autumn of 1990, upcoming elections (increasing governmental sensitivity to 
domestic pressure) combined with the fact that the farming population formed an 
important part of the grassroots support for the governing coalition (Keeler 1996: 141; 
Weiss 1989: 80-81), increased the likelihood that farm pressure would decisively 
influence the German government. Elections for the Landtag in Bavaria — where the 
Christlich Soziale Union (CSU), sisterparty of the Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU), 
was highly dependent on the farm vote — and the five East German Länder were to be 
held on 14 October, and the first all-German general elections since reunification were 
scheduled for 2 December. Farmers were aware of their electoral clout and threatened 
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Kohl that he would lose their votes if he did not reject any proposal resulting in farm 
price reductions.23 
Under these contradictory pressures the German government was divided on the issue: 
the Minister of Agriculture, Ignaz Kiechle, vehemently opposed the Commission proposal, 
whereas Helmut Haussmann, the Minister of Economics, welcomed it (Frankfurter 
Rundschau 9 October 1990; Süddeutsche Zeitung 9 October 1990; BMWI 
Tagesnachrichten 17 October 1990). Kohl intervened on the side of Kiechle and it was 
decided that Germany would continue its resistance in the Council and would only accept 
such a proposal if additional measures in the form of direct income support were 
included and if community preference was guaranteed (Agra Europe 19 October 1990). 
It is argued in this respect that Kohl prevented the Ministry of Economics prevailing over 
the Minister of Agriculture, because he was very sympathetic to agricultural interests, 
appreciating not only the economic but also the social value of agriculture (interview 
Feiter 21 May 2001; interview Franz-Josef Schomerus 29 March 2007).24 Kiechle and 
Kohl both agreed that a GATT deal was important for German industry and agriculture, 
but they were unwilling to sacrifice the agricultural sector in order to reach such a deal 
(Bulletin 26 October 1990). The German preference clearly dovetailed with the position 
defended by the farm lobby. Secondary literature and media sources contend that, 
considering the upcoming elections, the CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union of 
Germany and Christian Social Union of Bavaria) could not take the risk of alienating the 
farmers (Davis 2003: 287; Paemen and Bensch 1995: 178; Agra Europa 26 October 
1990; Financial Times 29 November 1990; New York Times 13 November 1990). 
Despite German and French resistance the Commission succeeded in winning the 
support of nearly all other member states by the end of October and the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands began to put pressure on the chancellor’s office and the ministry of 
economics to accept the agricultural proposal.25 At the same time France pressed 
Germany to stand firm — fearing that Franco-German solidarity might falter because the 
Commission had met a number of German demands.26 When a watered-down version of 
the Commission proposal was on the table at the Council on 26 October, Germany 
indeed initially seemed willing to accept the compromise, until the French Minister of 
Agriculture, Louis Mermaz, indicated that the solution did not satisfy France.27 Kiechle 
then explained that Germany was not prepared to accept a proposal that was opposed 
by France (Agence Europe 29 October 1990; Agra Europe 2 November 1990; Frankfurter 
Rundschau 30 October 1990). Again, Germany risked stalemate in the Uruguay Round, 
which would be detrimental to its industrial interest, in order to support France. 
Concerns relating to the Franco-German friendship remained important during further 
European decision making on the Commission proposal. While the state secretaries’ 
committee on European affairs, in preparation for the 5 November Council meeting, 
instructed the German negotiators to accept the Commission proposal even if France 
continued to reject it,28 Kiechle did not do so during the Council meeting, but instead 
supported the French demand for ‘a more precise statement on community preference.’ 
(Vahl 1997: 137) Kohl had apparently overruled the state secretaries’ committee and the 
Frankfurter Rundschau (7 November 1990) stated ‘the directions of the chancellor for 
the German delegation to support France’s demands for protection to the end were of 
critical importance.’ Only after changes in accordance with France’s wishes were made in 
the Council declaration, did both France and Germany accept the Commission package, 
on 6 November 1990. Despite speculation that Germany would soften its stance after the 
parliamentary elections of 2 December (New York Times 10 December 1990), Germany 
held firm in its support for the French and backed its rejection of additional European 
concessions during the Heysel conference (Davis 2003: 292).  
This account shows, first of all, that farm lobby pressure effectively influenced the 
position of the government (under conditions of high governmental sensitivity) and, 
secondly, that Germany, and Chancellor Kohl in particular, valued the Franco-German 
friendship so highly, that it was willing to forego Germany’s wider material interest in 
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order to satisfy the French. It may not only have been Kohl’s personal friendship with 
Mitterrand that influenced his preferences, but it should also be noted that Germany 
needed French approval of the integration of former Eastern Germany in the EEC. 
Germany could therefore not afford to alienate its French friend. The preference 
formation regarding the Commission proposal is a good example of how material and 
ideational considerations can strengthen each other, resulting in German support for 
France and rejection of the Commission proposal 
 
1992: The US and the Commission reach the Blair House Accord 
After the collapse of the talks at Heysel, GATT Secretary General Arthur Dunkel tried to 
get the negotiations back on track by presenting a compromise agreement in December 
1991: the Draft Final Act. This could only be adapted on the basis of proposals that were 
accepted by all GATT partners. The main antagonists, the EEC and the US, now began 
negotiating bilaterally, in order to reach an agreement on agriculture. These bilateral 
negotiations intensified after the EEC reached agreement on the MacSharry reforms of 
the CAP in May 1992 and resulted in the Blair House Accord in November 1992. 
An important development that started in 1991 and continued in 1992 was that both 
within the government and across German society at large the scales began to tip in 
favour of trade liberalization in agriculture. At a cabinet meeting in October 1991 it was 
decided that Germany would now aim for a swift conclusion of the Uruguay Round and 
strive for EEC concessions on agriculture to reach this goal. Although the Minister of 
Agriculture, Kiechle, did not support this decision, he was overruled by the other 
ministers who favoured a more flexible negotiating position, and he no longer enjoyed 
the backing of Kohl, who emphasised that the failure of the Uruguay Round would be a 
catastrophe that should not be allowed to happen (Webber 1999).29 Domestically, 
societal pressure was split between a liberal coalition of industry and business lobbies, 
scientific institutes and the liberal and socialist parties on one side, and the farm lobby 
on the other. Free trade proponents blamed the agricultural sector for the deadlock in 
the GATT talks and demanded that the government overrule the narrow interests of 
German agriculture and defend Germany’s wider export interests (Financial Times 21 
March 1992; Die Welt 10 November 1992). Both the liberal and the socialist parties 
urged Kohl to put pressure on Mitterrand to reach a compromise (Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung 6 November 1992; Financial Times 5 March 1992). In the words of Bundestag 
member Wolfgang Roth, ‘we still have to get our French friends to budge in the next few 
days’ (Deutscher Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 12/112, 14 October 1992). The farm lobby, 
however, continued to oppose any concessions on agriculture, claiming that community 
preference and the multifunctionality of German agriculture had to be defended 
(Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz April 1992; May 1992; Bulletin 18 March 1992). When 
the EEC and the US reached the Blair House Accord in November 1992, the industrial 
lobby urged the government to endorse it and convince the French government to 
compromise (Süddeutsche Zeitung 24 November 1992). The farm lobby, though, argued 
that the German government should follow the French example and say no to the 
compromise (Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz December 1992). 
At this point international pressure came to the fore. While Germany, following the 1991 
cabinet meeting, began to argue for concessions on agriculture, France increased its 
pressure on Germany by appealing to Franco-German solidarity in order to win German 
backing for its own stance. It warned Germany that it would strike at the heart of 
Franco-German relation if it failed to support France.30 When the Blair House agreement 
was reached France immediately rejected it and was counting on the support of its 
German friends. French government officials claimed that, although some in the German 
government wanted to accept the compromise, the Chancellor was far more reluctant 
and sympathetic to France (Libération 14 October 1992). Considering Kohl’s prior 
refusals give in to domestic demands to put Mitterrand under greater pressure – Kohl 
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stating that ‘anybody who knows French politics should know that would be a fatal thing 
to do’ (Financial Times 24 March 1992) – the French expectation of support seemed to 
have some basis.31  
Nevertheless, in the final analysis, Germany gave its wider economic interests priority 
over its ideational interests in terms of the Franco-German friendship. The agricultural 
deal was expected to open the door to a full GATT agreement (including the agricultural 
sector), which would be advantageous to German industrial interests. Moreover, the 
costs for the agricultural sector would probably be limited, because part of the 
reductions could be met by implementing the MacSharry CAP reforms agreed by EEC 
member states in May 1992. Even Kiechle agreed that Germany should accept the Blair 
House Accord, in the interest of a well-functioning trading system. He advised Kohl not 
to reject the agreement as, with respect to agriculture, German and French interests 
differed and the government had to ask itself how far solidarity with France should be 
taken on this issue (Süddeutsche Zeitung 30 November 1992). It should therefore come 
as no surprise that Germany indeed accepted the accord (Bulletin 20 November 1992). 
The analysis above shows how its political and economic interests led Germany to accept 
the Blair House Accord in 1992. While political considerations still resulted in a 
protectionist stance in 1990, the tipping of the domestic balance of interests towards 
liberalization provided the incentive to accept the deal. The farm lobby was alone in its 
demand for rejection and even its preferential access to the governing parties could not 
counterbalance the overwhelming domestic pressure in favour of concessions on 
agriculture. In the end, political and economic considerations therefore outweighed 
Germany’s ideational interest in the Franco-German friendship. 
 
1993: From Blair House to the Final Accord 
The Blair House agreement did not result in a complete GATT deal (covering all 
negotiation domains) as swiftly as had been hoped. The (especially French) resistance to 
the agricultural agreement restrained the Commission from making further commitments 
on other negotiating issues, because a qualified majority would be required in the 
Council to approve the eventual GATT agreement dealing with all negotiating areas. It 
was clear that France was not likely to accept such an agreement unless the agricultural 
deal had been renegotiated. In 1993 Germany was in a difficult situation. On the one 
hand it wanted a swift conclusion of the Uruguay Round, but on the other it also wished 
to preserve the Franco-German friendship and therefore had to take the French demands 
for renegotiation seriously. Economic interests and the balance of political pressure 
provided clear incentives to prioritise the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Industrial 
groups maintained ‘a constant barrage of messages to Kohl’s office, urging him to finish 
the Uruguay Round without further ado’ (Paemen and Bensch 1996: 239). Proponents of 
a GATT agreement increasingly put pressure on the government not to sacrifice German 
interests for the sake of French agricultural interests and the Franco-German friendship 
(Handelsblatt 18 February 1993; 10 March1993). 
When France began to step up its lobbying efforts to renegotiate the Blair House Accord, 
industrial interest groups demanded that the German government resist these demands 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 10 July 1993). The socialist party warned that 
Germany’s reputation as a Handelsstaat was at stake (Deutscher Bundestag. 
Plenarprotokoll 12/190, 2. July 1993, 14613). What is more, all parties in parliament 
agreed that reopening agricultural negotiations would jeopardise the chances of success 
of the Uruguay Round as a whole (Handelsblatt 13 September 1993). The only societal 
interest group supporting France’s demand for renegotiation was the Deutsche 
Bauernverband (Süddeutsche Zeitung 11 September 1993). At international level both 
the US and the GATT Secretary General signalled that the Blair House Accord was non-
negotiable and that December 1993 would be the final deadline for a complete GATT 
Volume 9, Issue 4 (2013) jcer.net Gerry Alons 
 514 
agreement (Swinbank and Tanner 1996: 108-109). If this deadline was not met the 
Uruguay Round would have failed. GATT partners expected Germany to intervene in EEC 
decision making, as Germany was widely seen as the only European member state that 
could convince the French (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2 September 1993; Die Welt 
11 September 1993). Germany’s reputation as a Handelsstaat was therefore at stake. At 
the same time, however, Germany was faced with increasing pressure from the new 
French government to support its demand for renegotiation.32 France also sent a 
memorandum to its European partners, shortly before to the Council meeting in 
September 1993 at which a decision was to be taken on the matter.33 Although its 
government had hitherto been reluctant to make explicit references to any use of the 
veto by France, it became clear in September that a French veto was still considered a 
genuine possibility. If France were indeed to veto the complete GATT agreement the 
result would be disastrous for Germany.34 
Considering its varying interests, the German cabinet agreed that reaching a GATT deal 
should be Germany’s priority and that renegotiation of the Blair House Accord would 
probably not be to its advantage (Bulletin 27 February 1993). Klaus Kinkel, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, argued: ‘When it comes to supporting the French, we have reached 
the limit. We really need to arrive at an agreement now.’35 It was considered that the 
last chance to reach an agreement was in 1993 (BMWI Tagesnachrichten 21 June 1993). 
Prior to bilateral talks between Mitterrand and Kohl in August 1993, Kohl was therefore 
advised not to make any concessions on the GATT issue (Paemen and Bensch 1995: 
239; Handelsblatt 31 August 1993). 
Nevertheless, at the press conference after his meeting with Mitterrand and Balladur, 
Kohl stated that Germany also had problems with the Blair House agreement and that 
cooperation was needed to reach a solution (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2 
September 1993; Der Spiegel 6 September 1993). The German ministers were puzzled 
by Kohl’s statement and immediately emphasised that the German position with respect 
to Blair House had not changed (Agra Europe 27 August 1993). Germany sought to 
distance itself from any suggestion that it might join France in demanding a 
renegotiation of the accord (Agra Europe 3 September 1993). However, both the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chancellor’s office had now become concerned that 
France was prepared to cause a European crisis over the issue. They therefore preferred 
to placate the French as much as possible, without endangering the GATT negotiations.36 
As a result Germany agreed to consultations with France on the matter and called on 
other European member states to take French concerns seriously (Agra Europe 3 
September 1993; Wirtschaftswoche 17 September 1993). In preparation for the Council 
meeting on 21 September the Germans signalled that they would not agree to a 
renegotiation of the Blair House Accord, but were amenable to bilateral talks between 
the US and the EEC on how it was to be interpreted (Agra Europe 10 September 1993). 
At the Council meeting, Germany therefore agreed to authorize the Commission to enter 
into consultations with the US to seek “clarification” of the agreement (which in practice 
entailed renegotiating it) (Webber 1998: 55). Germany was willing to go a long way to 
get France onside, provided that doing so would not endanger the successful conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round (interview Lorenz Schomerus 29 March 2007). Ludewig, one of 
the German negotiators, said that although Kohl did not provide them with actual 
mandates on this matter, those close to him knew his position — ‘be nice to the 
agricultural people, be nice to the French, but do not put the Uruguay Round at risk.’ 
(interview 5 April 2007)37 
An important question then is how we should explain Kohl’s actions in the whole process. 
Some argue that Kohl supported the French in August 1993 because he had become 
convinced that the French government would fall if the Blair House Accord was not 
renegotiated and that the French would rather use their veto in European decision 
making than end up facing a governmental crisis at home (Webber 1998: 52;). Another 
explanation could be that Kohl was responding to pressure from the German farm lobby, 
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which did not like the Blair House agreement either. However, considering the 
overwhelming domestic mobilisation against renegotiation and in favour of a swift GATT 
deal, it is highly unlikely that farm lobby pressure would have been decisive. Officials 
involved in the negotiating process agree that Kohl’s stance can only be explained by his 
wish to do something for the French, because of the value he attached to the Franco-
German friendship and his personal relations with Mitterrand.38 France claimed its vital 
interests were at stake and requested German support. Furthermore, on issues other 
than the Uruguay Round, Germany was in need of French support. A monetary crisis had 
broken out in the European Monetary System in the summer of 1993 and Germany 
needed cooperation from France in the Council of Ministers to push through additional 
support measures benefiting German agriculture.39 It is claimed that the French were 
skilful in connecting the two issues, to put Germany under additional pressure to back 
the French demands over the GATT negotiations (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 10 
September 1993). There was further speculation that Germany had agreed to 
“clarification” of the Blair House agreement in exchange for French support not only 
regarding its agrimonetary concerns, but also its wish to see the European Central Bank 
located in Frankfurt (Agra Europe 24 September 1993; Financial Times 30 September 
1993). 
The new talks between the Commission and the US on the agricultural agreement 
resulted in some (minor) additional concessions by the US on 6 December 1993. A Final 
GATT Accord (covering all the negotiating areas) was subsequently reached on 15 
December and Germany accepted it immediately. Whereas economic and political 
interests had trumped ideational considerations related to the Franco-German friendship 
in 1992, concerns about the latter again figured prominently in German decision making 
and diplomacy in 1993. Considering that clarification in reality meant renegotiations, 
which could jeopardise the Uruguay Round, Germany can be regarded as having taken 
enormous risks for the sake of its friendship with France. This is not to say, however, 
that economic and political interests were ignored altogether. Germany remained 
adamant in its determination to reach a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 
While in 1992 the Germans were convinced that disagreement on agriculture was the 
chief obstacle to a GATT deal and that the Blair House Accord would remove this hurdle, 
in 1993 they came to realise that French resistance to the agricultural deal (e.g. their 
threat of veto) was the main barrier to achieving a deal. Thus, paradoxically, the policy 
option of appeasing the French seemed both a necessary condition for and a potential 
risk in achieving a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round. The combination of its 
political and economic interests and the importance of the Franco-German friendship 
explains how Germany devised a policy of appeasing the French, while at the same time 
attempting to secure a GATT agreement before the December 1993 deadline.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The theoretical discussion and empirical analysis in this article contributes to the debate 
on EU external trade policy in general and the role of member state preference formation 
in particular. Theoretically, it adds ideational variables to the explanation of trade policy, 
in which field material explanations are dominant. Empirically, it complements the 
existing, but relatively scarce, research on the influence of interest groups with respect 
to EU external trade policy, by focusing on how domestic interest group’s influenced 
domestic preference formation in Germany. The case study conducted here, shows how 
an empirical focus on preference formation provides insights into the wider process of 
European trade policy making (and the developments in international trade 
negotiations), which could not have been gained by an exclusive focus on the level of EU 
decision making. The latter would show that France and Germany delayed EU decision 
making, but would not provide a full explanation for why these states defended their 
protectionist preferences. Considering the continued role of member states in EU 
Volume 9, Issue 4 (2013) jcer.net Gerry Alons 
 516 
external trade policy, a better understanding of how member state preferences are 
formed is imperative. 
This analysis provides new insights into this specific process by explaining German 
preference formation through an interest-based approach. It was shown that a 
combination of material (political and economic) and ideational considerations guided 
German preference formation. Where the imperatives, based on the different 
considerations, coincided, concerns regarding the Franco-German friendship 
strengthened the government’s resolve and provided legitimacy for the selected course 
of action. Thus, ideational interests and a balance of domestic interests tending towards 
the position defended by the agricultural lobby explain why Germany opposed the 
Commission proposal in 1990. When ideational imperatives ran counter to its political 
and economic interests in 1992, however, Germany eventually chose to defend its own 
material interests and accepted the Blair House Accord. Once it became clear in 1993 
that France was likely to block a GATT deal if this agreement was not amended, Kohl 
decided it was better to placate the French, not only to maintain the Franco-German 
friendship and French cooperation on other European policies, but also simply to ensure 
that the long-awaited GATT agreement gained approval in the Council of Ministers. It is 
thus only by taking account of both material and ideational interests that the German 
preferences during the Uruguay Round can be adequately explained. 
With respect to the Franco-German friendship, this study shows that it was an ever-
present consideration in German preference formation. Even if it did not influence the 
final outcome of the German preference decisively, then at least deviating from its 
imperatives required explanation during the preference-formation process. Especially 
when a governmental leader, like Kohl in this case, valued or internalised the ideational 
factors considered, these ideas proved to have a decisive impact on the German 
position. As far as the domestic pressure exerted by different interest groups is 
concerned, the case study shows that governmental sensitivity does indeed increase the 
influence of domestic actors, particularly of those actors providing grass roots support 
for the governing coalition, whereas a lack of domestic pressure provides the 
government with more freedom of manoeuvre. These outcomes provide scope conditions 
— applicable to more cases than just the German one – under which certain variables 
may be expected to be more or less influential in a domestic preference-formation 
process. Further empirical research is necessary to establish whether similar explanatory 
logics operate in preference-formation processes in other EU member states. 
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1 In the theoretical section, when referring to the organisation in general, I will use the denomination 
EU, but in the empirical section, describing events before 1993, I refer to European Economic 
Community (EEC). 
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2 It is argued, however, that member state control through this committee should not be overstated, 
because the trade experts on the committee ‘tend to be socialized as an “epistemic community’”, as a 
result of which it operates ‘as a “policy collaborator” rather than a body supervising the Commission’ 
(Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 69, in Orbie 2007: 40). 
3 Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis (1999: 480) as well as Adrian Van der Hoven (2002: 6) also 
point out this practice of consensus decision making in the Council. 
4 The author would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing her attention to this particular 
debate. 
5 The principal-agent literature provides more reasons for why member states have delegated their 
autonomy with regard to external trade policy to the EU. Delegating trade negotiating authority to the 
Commission enables the EU to speak with one voice, strengthening the negotiators’ credibility. 
Furthermore, delegation enables the EU to ‘exploit a market power that is much greater than would have 
been achieved separately by each member state’ (Kerremans 2004: 365). 
6 It is further argued that the collusive delegation hypothesis suffers from theoretical shortcomings. 
First, why would politicians delegate authority with the aim of enabling more liberal policies? The long-
term welfare gains from trade liberalization should be ‘close to irrelevant for their short-term electoral 
success’ (Dür 2008: 30). Second, it is questionable whether politicians consistently share more liberal 
preferences than interest groups, particularly when one takes into account that ‘societal actors can also 
influence the selection of policy-makers’ (Dür 2008: 30). 
7 This also implies that I assume that governments are not merely conveyor belts for the preferences of 
domestic interest groups, but that they have their own interests and preferences. It is important to note 
that this deviates from the assumption, much applied in the interest approach and liberal theories, that 
governments and politicians do not have their own interests and preferences independent of societal 
actors. 
8 See for example, Banchoff (1999), Finnemore (1996) and Katzenstein (1996). I only focus on the 
effects of given state identities on state preferences, without problematising the concept of identity itself 
(Ruggie 1998), and will thus not investigate the prior construction of these identities. 
9 It should be noted here that the Franco-German friendship indeed was not only “constraining” for 
Germany, but also “enabling”, if only because German initiatives in European decision making were 
more palatable if introduced as a Franco-German initiative (Bulmer and Paterson 1996: 28). 
10 BArch. B102: 271993. 7 September1982. Bund Deutscher Industrie. Stellungnahme der Industrie zur 
GATT-Ministerkonferenz im November, 1982; BArch. B102: 271994. 1 October 1984. Bund Deutscher 
Industrie. Stellungnahme zu einer neuen Verhandlungsrunde zur liberalisierung des Welthandels. 
11 BArch. B102: 271991 7 March 1984. Ministry of Economics. Leiterin der Abteilung V. Informelle 
Ministerrunde zur Vorbereitung einer neuen ‘Reagan-Runde’. 
12 Although France was one of the most competitive producers of agricultural goods within the EEC, it 
could not compete in the world agricultural market without the export restitutions (subsidies) provided 
under the CAP (Delorme 1994: 41). While French agriculture was highly dependent on export 
restitutions, the relatively small and inefficient German farms were dependent on high guarantee prices 
and barely needed export restitutions. 
13 BArch. B102 292882 4 June1985. Ministry of Economics. Handelsministerkonferenz Stockholm, 8-10 
Juni 1985. Agrarfragen. 
14 ArchEZ. WA-BEB-55. Ministry of Economics. Verslag van de vergadering van art. 113 (leden) op 12 
November 1982. 
15 Germany focused on bilateral talks with France, during which it tried to convince its partner that a 
new GATT round was also in the French interest. It was only at this level that soft pressure was exerted 
however: during negotiations in the Council of Ministers Germany remained cautious about pressurising 
the French openly. 
16 Frans Engering was Director General for Foreign Economic Relations at the Dutch Ministry of 
Economics and attended these negotiations. 
17 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 10/137. 14 May 1985, 10163. 
18 BArch. B102 292882 1 July 1985. Ministry of Economics. V A 5. Verhältnis EG/USA. Gesprächsziel: 
Frankreich bewusst machen, dass seinen Interessen langfristig am besten durch eine weltoffene 
Handelspolitik gedient ist. 
19 See for example: BArch B 102 292882 1 July 1985. Ministry of Economics. E/IV C. Gespräch von BM 
Dr.Bangemann mit Frau Minister Cresson am 8. Juli 1985 in Paris. Assuming that France would use the 
strained US-EEC relations as an argument for the claim that a new GATT round was not expedient, 
Germany would endorse that these tensions were manifest, but use them as another reason why GATT 
negotiations were indeed important: to counter US unilateral actions. 
20 Dr. Lorenz Schomerus was Director General for Trade Policy at the German Ministry of Economics. 
21 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 10/323 25 September 1986, 17998. 
22 CAC 19930192. 9 October 1990, Communiqué de Premier Ministre; CAC 19920056, 16 October 1990, 
Conseil agricole, Intervention de M. Mermaz. The US was of the opinion that the Commission proposal, 
before a watered-down version of it had even been accepted by the member states, was a ‘non-starter: 
too little too late’. Considering that the US was offering 70 to 90 per cent reductions, this was not 
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surprising (ArchBuZa 26 September 1990. wasi762/19192. Coded message from the Dutch embassy in 
Washington to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
23 CAC. 19920056, art 8, 2 November 1990. Diplomatic telegram from the French embassy in Bonn. 
Objet: UR préparation du conseil du 5 novembre 1990. 
24 Dr. Franz-Josef Feiter was Director General for Agriculture at the Chancellor’s Office. 
25 ArchBUZa. VN/1985-1994: 08640. 24 October 1990. Telex from the Dutch Ministry of Economics to 
the Dutch permanent representation in Bonn. 
26 CAC 19920056, art. 8 24.10.1990. Bernard Vial. Ministry of Agriculture. Note pour Monsieur le 
Ministre. 
27 ArchBuZa. DDI DIE ARA: 1012 26.10.1990. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of International 
Economic Relations. Memorandum: Verslag Landbouwraad. 
28 BArch. B102: 736231. 2 November 1990. Ministry of Economics. V A 2. Sprechzettel. This document 
clearly shows that the French position was of particular importance to Germany, but in the end it 
concluded that it would not be in Germany’s interest to support a continued French rejection of the 
Commission proposal. 
29 The reasons for this change in Kohl’s priorities may be that governmental sensitivity had decreased in 
1991 as no major elections were due in the near future. Further, a successful conclusion of the 
negotiations, and the economic advantages associated with it, became increasingly important as the 
costs of German unification were proving to be far higher than foreseen (Der Spiegel 15 April 1991; 13 
May 1991). 
30 BArch. N1436: 21. 21 January 1992. Telex from the German embassy in Paris to the German Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. 
31 Wirtschaftswoche (13 November 1992) even argued that it was Kohl’s Nibelungentreu an Mitterrand 
that had caused the collapse of the bilateral negotiations in early November, a few weeks before the 
Blair House Accord was reached. The US had also complained that Kohl was prioritizing the interests of 
his farmers and his friend Mitterrand over Germany’s wider economic interests (Financial Times 6 March 
1992; 18 March 1992). 
32 ArchEZ. GATT-UR 1990-1993. Soc 1-199. 3 September 1993. Informal bilateral German-Dutch 
debriefing on high-level Franco-German consultations. 
33 CUEAC 8409/93, GATT 134, AGRICORG 261. 1 September 1993. Note from the French delegation. 
Subject: Blair House Agreement. 
34 It is questionable though whether France would actually have vetoed a final GATT deal, as such a deal 
would not only include agriculture but also other economic sectors. Losses in the agricultural sector 
could be offset by gains in other sectors. It is this package deal character of the final GATT agreement 
and the Commission’s prerogative to refuse voting on separate parts of the overall deal that provided 
the Commission with some freedom of manoeuvre relative to the member states. 
35 ArchBuZa. DDI-DIE ARA: 1763. 4 February 1993. J. Douma. Message from the Dutch embassy in 
Bonn to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
36 ArchBuZa. DDI-DIE ARA: 1763. 3.9.1993 boni 300/15691. 10 September 1993 brei 075/5829. 
Messages from the Dutch Embassy in Bonn to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
37 Johannes Ludewig was Director General for Economic and Financial Affairs at the Chancellor’s Office. 
38 Interviews with Feiter 21 May 2007; Schomerus 29 March 2007; Ludewig 5 April 2007. See also 
Meunier (2005: 118). 
39 ArchBuZa. DDI DIE ARA 1763 8 September 1993. brei 313/15939. Message from the Dutch Embassy 
in Bonn to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The monetary crisis worried the Germans, as it 
endangered the European system of ‘green currencies’ used in intra-European agricultural trade. 
German agriculture profited from this system, because it kept agricultural prices in Germany relatively 
high compared to prices in other member states. 
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This article examines how the EU’s ‘conflicted power’ in trade has played out within its preferential trade 
agreement (PTA) strategies with third parties. It does this by providing an overview of how approaches to the 
EU’s external trade policies have evolved over time, especially since the end of the Cold War. Tracing changes 
in discourse in the EU’s consolidated trade policy demonstrates how the policy objectives have evolved from 
what could be characterised as a soft and even normative power to a much more realist one, attempting to 
safeguard its position in the international economic order. Notwithstanding these changes, explained by a 
combination of international context and ideational preferences, an underlying overall continuity has remained 
in terms of the main economic interests to be realised through trade policy, which presents a portrait of the EU 
as a rational and realist (if sometimes conflicted) actor in the global economy. 
Free Trade Agreements; Global Europe; Interregionalism; Realism; Trade policy 
 
 
 
Trade is one of the earliest “communitarised” policies of the European Union, where 
member states have delegated more sovereignty to the supranational level. 
Supranational prerogatives have increased as mixed competences have been delegated 
to the European Commission, resulting from the broadening of issues in international 
negotiations like the Singapore issues (competition policy, services, intellectual property 
and public procurement) which dominate the EU’s “deep trade” agenda (Young and 
Richardson 2006). As the EU’s first foreign policy area, and one in which the proverbial 
“single voice” (Meunier 2000) has largely materialised, it has become intertwined with 
other foreign policy aims (Smith 2001). Combining these with shifting preferences 
amongst member states (Baldwin 2006), the interests of economic sectors, the 
aggregation of interests at the domestic level and EU level, before defending its positions 
in the international arena, signify that the EU is truly a ‘conflicted trade power’ (Meunier 
and Nikolaidis 2006). 
This article examines how this conflicted power has played out within the area of 
preferential trade agreement (PTA) strategies. PTAs’ importance has increased in recent 
years, given the elusive denouement of the Doha Round at the WTO, and have become 
one of the EU’s trade policy main areas of activity. Moreover, they present ideal case 
studies to analyse shifts in EU trade rationales, as they remain one of the most 
comprehensive foreign policy tools of the EU, given requirements that they encompass 
“deep trade” as well as political cooperation, democracy and governance clauses. They 
are also the most sought after by third parties, as others hope to benefit economically 
from preferential access to the EU’s single market.  
Providing an overview of how approaches to the EU’s trade policies and PTAs have 
evolved over time, since the end of the Cold War; the narrative here addresses the 
question: how can we explain the motivations underlying EU choices in its trade policy? 
This is operationalised by tracing changes in discourse in the EU’s consolidated trade 
policy with regard to PTAs, through an analysis of EU documents, as well as Trade 
officials’ interviews, and triangulating this with developments in negotiations. These 
changes demonstrate how the policy objectives have evolved from what could be 
characterised as “soft” (Nye 1990) and even “normative power” (Manners 2002)-inspired 
motives (extending regional integration model, development), to more “realist” ones 
attempting to safeguard its businesses’ competitiveness and position in the international 
economic order. Notwithstanding these changes, explained by a combination of 
international context and ideational preferences, an underlying overall continuity has 
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remained in terms of the main economic interests to be realised through trade policy, 
which presents a portrait of the EU as a rational and realist (if sometimes “conflicted”) 
actor in the global economy.  
This portrayal offers novel nuances to the literature on EU’s trade policy. Within this 
literature the main debate has been between the collusive delegation camp, which claims 
the institutional arrangement grants the Commission independence (Nicolaïdis and 
Meunier 2002: 175; Meunier 2005: 8-9; Woolcock 2005: 247), and those arguing policy 
is determined by business lobbying for liberalisation (Van den Hoven 2002; Dür 2008; 
Coen and Grant 2005; De Bièvre and Dür 2005). Typically, trade policy has been 
characterised in theoretical terms by the principal-agent relationship between the states 
and European Commission (Dür and Elsig 2011; De Bièvre and Eckhardt 2011; Da 
Conceição-Heldt 2011), which has also been used to explain preferences for multilateral 
or bilateral regulatory venues (Elsig 2007). Alternatively, this article argues that those 
shifting preferences are mediated by the underlying tension between ideational and 
normative-inspired preferences and realist-material preferences, with the later taking 
precedence. In this way, the article further posits the applicability of realist based 
theories to explain EU trade policy.  
Traditionally, given realist theories emphasis on military power and security, they have 
been largely absent from the study of the EU. Recently they have been incorporated into 
EU scholarship, mostly in the area of foreign and security policy (Gegout 2005; Hyde-
Price 2006). With the exception of Zimmerman’s (2007) explanation of the EU’s positions 
on Chinese and Russian WTO accession based on realist considerations of power rather 
than domestic mobilisation of pro-liberalisation interests, realism has been absent from 
studies of EU trade policy. The following sections highlight the explanatory potential of 
realist-inspired approaches in understanding EU trade policy. First, the article presents a 
theoretical framework of what “idealist” and “realist” approaches to trade policy look like. 
Whilst subsequent sections apply these to the narratives of different periods of the EU’s 
PTA policy, characterised each by overlapping objectives: “global presence” (post-Cold 
War); “regional integration promotion” (mostly until 2006); “development and 
multilateralism” (1999-2005); “competitiveness” (2006 onwards). 
 
“IDEALIST” AND “REALIST” APPROACHES TO TRADE POLICY 
International Relations literature has been marked by debates pitting idealist aspirations 
against realpolitik; interest-based rational choice against ideas and value-inspired 
agency and constructivism (Snyder 2004; Thies 2002; Ashworth 2002). Realist and the 
more nuanced neorealist traditions view the international arena as an anarchic structure 
and self-help system where conflict arises from competition between states (Waltz 
1959). States are the principal actors setting the context (Waltz 1979), where their 
actions are determined by strategies seeking to guarantee the security and sovereignty 
of the state (Mearsheimer 2001). Realism assumes states are concerned with their 
power position vis-à-vis competing states (hence the importance of concepts like power 
balancing), and cooperate only if it furthers national interests and guarantees absolute 
or relative gains greater to those afforded to the other parties (Waltz 1979; Grieco 
1993). Although realists perceive states as unitary actors acting within a bounded 
rationality to increase their security, they accept these also act according to second-
order interests ranked below national security; which will be sidestepped, if they conflict 
with core security interests or balance of power logics (Mearsheimer 2001: 46). Realist 
assumptions have been linked to rationalist models of decision-making (Kahler 1998: 
924), where ‘foreign policy is explained by reference to the goal-seeking behavior’ of 
utility-maximising actors (Fearon and Wendt 2002: 54). Realism’s ‘theory of action is 
based on a self-interest which is defined in a predominantly materialist way in order to 
distinguish itself from idealism’ (Guzzini 2004: 536). Such individualistic rational choice 
is defined as: 
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‘The first element is the feasible set, i.e. of all the courses of action which are 
rationally believed to satisfy various logical, physical, and economic constraints. 
The second is (a set of rational beliefs about) the casual structure of the 
situation, which determines what course of action will lead to what outcomes. The 
third is a subjective ranking of the feasible alternatives, usually derived by from a 
ranking of the outcomes to which they (are expected to) lead. To act rationally, 
then, simply means to choose the highest-ranked element in the feasible set’ 
(Elster 1986: 4). 
In a realist rationalist world, international actors are bound to look for power (Guzzini 
2004: 537). However, interests can, and are, defined in economic terms as well, more so 
in the current globalized world (Schweller 1999; Grieco 1990), where states compete for 
resources to enhance economic growth (Gilpin 1987), market shares and investment. As 
Robert Gilpin (2001: 21) argues:  
‘(I)n a highly integrated global economy, states continue to use their power and 
to implement policies to change economic forces favourable to their own national 
interests and the interests of their citizenry. These national economic interests 
include receipt of a favourable share of the gains from international economic 
activities and preservation of national autonomy.’ 
In trade policy, once the internal decision-making processes of bargaining and interest 
aggregation are completed, the EU acts as a unitary entity in international negotiations. 
This justifies an EU-level analysis, and facilitates the application of (neo)realist concepts. 
As the EU’s trade policy becomes increasingly concerned with economic competition and 
balancing against possible commercial advantages negotiated by other parties, 
realist/neorealist approaches, integrating commercial interests, can aid our 
understanding of events.  
A realist EU trade policy, in this sense, would be one where the EU seeks to maximise 
benefits for its economic actors: e.g. milieu-shaping rule adoption, gaining allies for 
multilateral talks, entering a market before competitors, and not just short-term 
increases in trade. Such a turn is salient since the explicitly competitiveness-driven 
‘Global Europe’ agenda (2006), which responded to a more competitive international 
environment. The policy signified a pragmatic and realist (in the common language 
usage) shift. Realist policy in this article, thus, refers to a policy that is both ‘realist’ in 
adapting to the real world and also crucially neorealist in the theoretical sense. As the 
ensuing empirical section demonstrates, although recent trade policy has become overtly 
“realist”, realist considerations underlay the EU’s trade policy since its inception, even if 
at times these have dovetailed with other foreign policy normative aims. 
The materialist and individualist meta-theory on which realism and rationalism is built, 
and the treatment of preferences and interests as exogenous and individualistic have 
been heavily criticised. Explanations emphasising ideas have emerged as rivals to the 
rationalist emphasis on preferences (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 4). Such ‘rivalry 
suggests interests are not themselves ideas but material’, yet even ‘economists have 
noted that nothing in their approach prevents taking desires (or interests or 
preferences), as being informed by or based on norms’ (Fearon and Wendt 2002: 60). 
The interaction of ideas and interests is, therefore, a dynamic tension, as the empirical 
section makes apparent. As Max Weber (1946: 280) suggested: 
‘Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet 
very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been created by ideas have, like 
switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the 
dynamic of interest.’ 
As Robert Keohane and Judith Goldstein (1993: 20) contend, ‘ideas help to order the 
world’ and ‘have a lasting influence on politics through their incorporation into the terms 
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of political debate’, although the impact of particular ideas may be mediated by the 
institutions in which these are embedded.  
Ideas have been crucial in the development of the EU’s foreign policy and its study. 
Characterised as a ‘civilian power’ (Duchene 1972), which uses persuasion and the 
power of attraction generated by others’ admiration of it,1 throughout its history, the EU 
has leveraged its market attraction and its financial aid as a bargaining chip to extract its 
preferences from others. The EU has often linked these rewards (and penalties of 
economic sanctions) to the adoption of core European values (human rights, democracy, 
rule of law). This has led to interpretations of the EU as a “normative power” (Manners 
2002),2 to such an extent that the EU has been critiqued for subjugating its normative 
values to strategic interests such as regional stability (Youngs 2004). However, as Erik 
Eriksen (2006) argues, strategic aims can be compatible with the “normative” power 
argument, given that the norms diffused may very well be considered valid and 
legitimate even though the motives of the EU for diffusing such norms are self-
regarding. James March and Johan Olsen (1998: 952) also highlight that the ‘logic of 
consequences’ (which guides rationalist views of agency) and the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ (which explains agency in ideas-based approaches) are not mutually 
exclusive.3 This interrelationship will become apparent in the narrative of DG Trade’s 
policies on PTAs. Normative components like the promotion of regional integration, 
embedded in a ‘logic of appropriateness’, also followed strategic aims of milieu-shaping 
and market creation, in line with the ‘logic of consequences’, and show how ideas can 
suggest a path for the attainment of realist interests. The ensuing narrative, therefore, 
focuses on how particular policies have been affected by ideas and values held by 
institutional policy-makers, (the ideational component), and provided the avenues for 
the pursuit of material interests. Criteria for “realist” and “ideational” trade policy are 
summarised in Table 1 and it will be shown that it is the dynamic interplay of these 
forces that helps to explain the evolution of the EU’s trade policy in recent decades. 
 
Table 1: ‘Realist’ and ‘Idealist’ Trade Policy 
Policy style Objectives Inspiration 
Realist Material: 
Market creation 
Market opening & access 
Business opportunities 
Competitiveness 
Economic power position 
 
‘Logic of consequences’ 
Profit / power maximization 
 
Idealist Promotion of values: 
Democracy 
Governance 
Development 
Regional integration 
 
‘Logic of appropriateness’ 
Self-perception of European 
identity/identity formation 
 
 
ESTABLISHING A ‘GLOBAL PRESENCE’ THROUGH PTAS 
The EU’s success as a PTA has motivated others to emulate it, affording its ‘soft power’ 
through ‘deference’ and ‘attraction’ (Nye 1990). Given its institutional bias in its 
international negotiations based on its organic experience of market integration reliant 
on legalistic and regulatory regimes (Young and Peterson 2006), the EU has also actively 
promoted regional integration. Traditionally, the EU’s bilateral trade policy lacked an 
overarching plan. It derived from past relations and the uploading of national interests 
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and special relationships into the EU external relations (Lamy 2002a). Prior to 1999, the 
Commission’s Directorates dealing with external affairs were organised geographically. 
Thus, PTA initiatives were promoted as each commissioner sponsored each PTA as a way 
of increasing ‘his patch of power’ (Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 104). Geographic 
initiatives also reflected the nature of the political objectives to be achieved by 
leveraging the EU’s market attraction. This period witnessed an upgrading of political, 
financial and technical cooperation agreements of the 1970s-1980s into agreements with 
trade liberalisation, investment, and political cooperation (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 
67). 
“Third generation” agreements included conditionality clauses furthering the EU’s 
normative values of democracy, human rights and rule of law. Trade was linked to the 
CFSP’s goals: ‘to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Title V Art. 11.1, Treaty on European Union 
1993). Normative aims were tempered by a desire to ensure security and stability 
(Youngs 2004), especially in its near abroad. Agreements were signed with the Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and the Mediterranean Basin. The European 
Agreements, which paved the way for Eastern enlargement, were the most 
comprehensive, and as commentators argue, the most successful in achieving the EU’s 
desired policy transformations given the enticing carrot of membership (Smith 2004). 
The Barcelona Process (1995) aimed at PTAs between North Africa and the EU, in the 
hope of extending some of the internal market aspects to the area and enhancing 
cooperation in migration flows, improving stability and furthering the security aims of the 
CFSP (Gómez 2003). The launch of PTA negotiations with the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) has been regarded as a way of ensuring access to Gulf oil and fostering stability in 
the region using the EU’s market attraction as a means of exchange (Antiewicz and 
Momani 2009; Nonneman 2007). 
Alongside realist-inspired stability/strategic motivated PTAs, the EU also engaged in 
development-motivated PTAs. Relations with former colonies in the Africa Caribbean 
Pacific (ACP) were regulated through the Lomé Conventions and were characterised by 
asymmetry allowing ACP exports preferential access to the EU’s market. These 
harnessed the EU’s institutional bias and ideational belief in trade as a vehicle for 
development (‘logic of appropriateness’, based on its experience), which has been 
criticised especially given restrictions on agricultural exports (McQueen 1998), as well as 
by other WTO members that felt discriminated. This led the EU to eliminate asymmetric 
preferences in the Cotonou Agreements of 2000. The Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) that make up the framework of the Cotonou Agreements have instead been 
critiqued for enforcing neoliberal liberalization on the developing world (Hinkle and Schiff 
2004; Stevens 2006).  
Economically-motivated PTAs were also initiated in the 1990s between the EU and Latin 
America. Commentators agree that the Global Agreement with Mexico (1997) and the 
commencement of negotiations with Mercosur and Chile (1999) were responses to the 
creation of NAFTA in 1994, and subsequent loss of market share in Mexico, and the 
launch of negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (Bessa-Rodrigues, 
1999; Barrau, 1999; Briceño Ruiz, 2001). Officials at the Commission’s Directorate 
General for External Relations conceded that the sudden involvement of the USA in PTAs 
‘raised alarm bells’, and that there was an effort to engage with that part of the world, 
within the broader post-1989 agenda of establishing a ‘global presence’ (DG Relex 
interview 2007). Consequently, the Commission’s 1994 ‘Basic Document on Relations 
with Latin America and the Caribbean’ suggested upgrading relations with this region, 
and extending some form of association to the most advanced economies: 
Mercosur/Chile and Mexico (European Commission 1994b). This would guarantee EU 
access to these markets in the face of a potential FTAA. These PTAs clearly followed a 
‘realist’ logic of balancing against the USA and furthering EU commercial interests. 
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Whilst embedded within the overarching EU trade policy objectives of freeing trade, EU 
PTAs were characterised by heterogeneity and varied rationales (strategic, 
developmental and economic). Furthermore, all negotiations embodied the EU’s new 
normative goals through democratic clauses. The pursuit of certain ideals extended 
beyond the promotion of EU values of human rights, democracy and rule of law 
associated with ‘normative power Europe’ (Manners 2002), and incorporated the pursuit 
of regional integration. This was apparent in all PTA negotiations with the notable 
exception of the agreement with Mexico. Here the economic imperative of limiting the 
trade diversions caused by NAFTA (Barrau 1999) at the behest of EU domestic exporters 
(Dür 2007) hastened negotiations and resulted in this anomaly, which reiterates the 
ever-present material interests underlying EU trade policy as expressed in the Treaties. 
Relations with the CEECs also took on a bilateral approach where the EU was able to 
better exert conditionality, but resulted in successful regionalism with the expansion of 
the EU’s own regional integration eastwards (Smith 2005). Promoting regional 
integration and the development of international relations upon the basis of interregional 
relations was a crucial element of the EU’s external relations and encapsulated its hopes 
for a multipolar world. 
 
EXTENDING THE EU REGIONAL INTEGRATION MODEL THROUGH PTAS 
Interregionalism, relations between regional groupings, became a hallmark of the EU’s 
external relations in the late 1990s (Hardacre and Smith 2010). The underlying logic ‘to 
export the EU’s model of regional integration and governance and to create new alliances 
in order to shape a less asymmetric world’ (Santander 2002: 495) was based on the 
EU’s officials’ belief in the superiority of the EU’s model of economic and institutionalszed 
integration as a basis of stability and development (interviews DG Trade and DG Relex 
and COREPER 2007). Discourses in the Commission’s documents from the 1990s 
onwards betray these ideational preferences: 
‘EMPHASIZING the fundamental importance attached by the parties to 
consolidating and strengthening regional integration, a key factor in the 
development of the GCC Countries and the stability of the Gulf region’ (European 
Community 1989: 3). 
‘To support efforts by Asian countries to cooperate at the regional and 
subregional level such as the ASEAN Regional Forum with a view to enhancing 
peace and security in the region and (...) strengthen the Union's relations with 
regional groups such as ASEAN or SAARC’ (European Commission 1994b: 4). 
‘Cooperation shall provide effective assistance to achieve the objectives and 
priorities which the ACP States have set themselves in the context of regional and 
sub-regional cooperation and integration, including inter-regional and intra-ACP 
cooperation’ (Art. 29 Cotonou Convention 2000). 
‘The European Union believes that regional integration processes are vital tools 
for the attainment of global integration. Its own experience shows that when a 
region has resolved its internal problems, it is better able to integrate itself in the 
global arena, in which, the consolidation of regional blocks entails a greater 
global equilibrium. Mercosur’s integration is a process of great importance to the 
European Union’ (European Commission 2002: 2). 
‘Regional integration is a key element for stability, economic growth and 
investment and for increasing the weight of both regions on the world stage…we 
encourage and strongly support Latin American and Caribbean countries to 
proceed with their respective regional integration processes’ (Declaration of 
Vienna 2006: 11). 
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‘The region also faces the need to further its regional integration agenda, which is 
an essential tool to preventing conflict, consolidating democracy, good 
governance and fostering sustainable development (European Commission 
2007c: 13)’. (author’s italics) 
Integration is, thus, embedded within the EU’s normative aspirations as well as its 
geopolitical interests (security and stability). This dovetailed in the late 1990s with 
developments in regional integration elsewhere (Mercosur, Andean Community and 
ASEAN commitments to create customs unions). EU policy-makers, also shaped by their 
own socialisation within the EU’s system and belief in its success, chose to support these 
regional initiatives by engaging in interregional relations as the Commissioner for the 
developing world, Manuel Marín (2010), and the European Parliament President, Maria 
Gil-Robles (2010), at the time, have admitted. Both also expressed regret that the 
institutionalised EU-style integration that they thought would develop from their 1990s 
initiatives never materialised.  
The EU actively used interregional relations to encourage regional integration elsewhere. 
It facilitated the creation of infrastructure necessary for economic integration (e.g. 
Hidrovía project, Brazil-Buenos Aires and Montevideo-Buenos Aires roads financed with 
EIB loans) (European Commission 1994b: 9), and devoted half of cooperation funds to 
Mercosur to measures to improve institutions (European Commission 2007a). It funded 
activities to enhance institutional capacity by instilling information exchanges, technical 
assistance, and cooperation between the ASEAN Secretariat and European Commission 
(EU/ASEAN Vision Group 2005: 17). Such exchanges also enabled the EU (especially the 
Commission) to act as mentors to other integration processes and attempt to influence 
them to adopt EU style standards furthering the EU’s milieu-shaping preferences.4  
More coercive persuasion, by means of conditionality, has also been employed by the EU 
to further this ideational aim of creating ‘a world of regions open to one another’ (Marín 
2010). The EU has entered into EPAs with ACP regional groupings rather than states, 
although as Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse (2009: 16) note this worked only where 
prior regional integration projects existed. Conditionality was stronger in the cases of the 
opening of negotiations for Associations Agreements with Central America and the 
Andean Community. Despite these countries’ entreaties to the EU to negotiate with 
them, the EU refused for over half a decade in the early 2000s, and conditioned 
negotiations to the higher levels of regional integration: 
‘The Parties recognise that the prospect of Association Agreements should give a 
new impetus for strengthening regional economic integration processes (…) 
This process will start, at this stage, with a joint assessment phase of the 
respective integration processes of the Central American and Andean 
Community’s. The assessment will lead, in due course, to negotiations (…) Any 
future Free Trade Agreement shall be built upon the outcome of the Doha 
Development Agenda and the realization of a sufficient level of regional economic 
integration’ (Guadalajara Declaration 2004: 8). 
A Joint Assessment Exercise was set up for the EU to monitor regional integration 
progress, but it lacked a clear ex ante methodology and developed progressively 
following an agenda set by the European Commission (Adiwasto et al. 2006: 13), clearly 
revealing that the level of integration had to be deemed sufficient by the EU. Similarly, 
the EU rejected Singaporean requests for PTA negotiations in 2003 (interview DG Trade 
2007) and only opened negotiations with Central America, the Andean Community and 
ASEAN, all of them regional groupings, in 2007.  
The normative implications of this are to re-shape the world according to EU lines, 
including the export of its model and its regulations as well as enabling the EU to control 
the agenda of relations and ensuring other regional blocs remain open, leading some to 
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view this as a form of ‘soft imperialism’ (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005). In a 
constructivist reading of interregionalism it is a ‘vehicle to gain international acceptance 
of its (the EU’s) own model of integration’ (Söderbaum et al. 2005: 372), which results 
from the ‘need to forge a common European identity among the people of its constituent 
nations and by a belief in the utility of regions as unit for organizing the global economy’ 
(Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004: 14). Yet, very realist materialism is intertwined with these 
normative aims and recalls the free trade aims of trade policy in the Treaties. From the 
EU’s perspective PTAs with individual Central American states, or Singapore, would offer 
marginal increases in EU welfare. It was economically more relevant to negotiate with an 
integrated grouping which would represent a more interesting market (interview DG 
Trade 2007), whilst offering savings in time and resources in negotiations (Reiterer 
2005: 14).  
 
DEVELOPMENT, WTO DOHA ROUND AND PTAS 
In late 1999, the structure of the Commission’s external relations DGs changed to a 
thematic structure with DG Trade, DG Relex, DG Enlargement and DG Development, 
(Nugent and Saurugger 2002). Although, within the DGs, desks were still distributed 
geographically and both a division for WTO negotiations and one for PTAs continued to 
co-exist, the new structure facilitated overarching Trade initiatives (e.g. Global Europe). 
Pascal Lamy’s leadership of the new DG Trade combined in time with an internal debate 
in the Commission’s in favour of South-South integration (interview DG Trade 2007), 
and the launch of the WTO’s Doha Development Round (DDR) in 2001. Policies under his 
stewardship were influenced by this, as well as Lamy’s preferences for multilateral 
negotiations (interview DG Trade 2007; Woolcock 2007). His significance in shaping the 
ideational direction of trade policy during this period has been highlighted by Sophie 
Meunier (2007), although she acknowledges that steering the policy more in one 
direction or another is only possible in the absence of a conflict with the material 
interests of member states. Encompassing the promotion of integration, Lamy developed 
a doctrine of ‘harnessing globalization’, to guide his DG, whereby: 
‘The European blend of market integration, common rules and social safety net 
mechanisms can serve as an inspiration for many countries in coping with the 
effects of globalization. The European Union is interested in promoting politically 
managed globalization so as to ensure that its potential benefits are shared more 
widely across nations and societies and that social values are prioritized’ (Lamy 
2002b: 1). 
This ‘was a broad and encompassing doctrine that subordinated trade policy to a variety 
of trade and non-trade objectives, such as multilateralism, social justice and sustainable 
development’ and was defended at the WTO (Meunier 2007: 906). Favouring 
multilateralism and influenced by the skepticism of economists concerned with the 
undermining of the multilateral trading system by increasing numbers of PTAs (Thurow 
1992; Baldwin 1993; Bhagwati 2008; Krugman 1991), Lamy enacted a moratorium on 
new PTAs. Given policy lock-ins from past commitments creating path dependency, Lamy 
was forced to continue PTA negotiations that had already commenced with Mercosur and 
Chile (Garcia 2011), the Gulf Cooperation Council and within the Barcelona Process.  
During the late 1990s, the EU’s PTA initiatives responded to challenges of the post-Cold 
War world, a desire to create a ‘global presence’ and carve a role in a multipolar world. 
This was furthered in the early 2000s as the EU sought international leadership within 
the WTO, by supporting the DDR, and pushing its ‘managed globalization’ ideas. Trade 
and development were interlinked at the multilateral level and in the EU’s own policies. 
EPAs are described as a way of bringing the EU’s development regime in line with WTO 
compliance. In 2002, the European Commission published several communications 
explicitly linking its trade and development policies (European Commission 2002a, 
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2002b). It suggested focusing development aid to supporting adaptation to and 
accession to WTO (European Commission 2002a: 6). Imbued in the belief that those 
countries with greater participation in global markets show higher growth rates 
(European Commission 2002a: 8) and the EU’s socialised belief in the economic success 
of its liberalization model (interviews DG Trade and Relex 2007), it supports greater 
liberalization.  
Although developing states could perhaps benefit from more trade, EU measures aimed 
to improve regulatory systems, ensure compliance with TRIPS, standards and safety 
measures (European Commission 2002a: 22), in other words, exporting its preferred 
regulatory system and in essence ensuring developing producers had to face similar 
regulatory constraints as EU producers, and that EU investments would be protected by 
stable legislation (material interests). Betraying its institutional bias and its policy-
makers’ ideational ‘logic of appropriateness’, the Commission stressed the need for 
greater South-South cooperation and regional integration, as a way of gaining 
economies of scale, greater FDI and ensuring stability and security (European 
Commission 2002a: 13).This offers a justification for the continuation of interregional 
negotiations within an ideational regime in DG Trade now leaning towards the WTO. 
Further inconsistencies in the EU’s region-building logic and interregional agenda in PTAs 
appeared in the 2000s in relations with the Mediterranean. The original Barcelona 
Process promoted regional integration, although it aimed at negotiating individual PTAs 
(as opposed to bloc-to-bloc as with ASEAN and Latin American groupings). This 
pragmatic approach was due to the absence of clear regional initiatives in the region, 
and the realist security and stability motivation behind these PTAs. In 2003, with Eastern 
enlargement underway redrawing the EU’s external borders, the Commission launched 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the Barcelona Process became absorbed 
into it. The EU continues to promote regional integration as a way of achieving security 
and stability: ‘[t]he EU must act to promote the regional and sub-regional cooperation 
that are preconditions for political stability, economic development, and the reduction of 
poverty and social divisions in our shared environment’ (European Commission 2003: 3). 
However, the ENP does not provide for any institutionalisation of the regional dimension 
and undermines the previous emphasis on region-building by turning this area into just 
another one within the broader ENP (Börzel and Risse 2009: 21). Compared to the 
Barcelona Process, ENP downgrades the regional dimension to ‘a complementary, and in 
fact optional, element, although the ENP incorporates ‘a much stronger conditionality 
that goes hand in hand with the country-to-country approach that the policy implies, and 
which could be viewed as an indication of the EU's new sense of reality’ (Del Sarto and 
Schumacher 2005: 25). This ‘new sense of reality’ was further heightened within DG 
Trade with the abandonment of the normative aims of region-building in the second half 
of the 2000s as the DDR faltered and its leadership changed. During Lamy’s tenure, 
ideational normative constructs like ‘managed globalisation’, linkages of trade and 
development, and normative support for region-building, co-existed with the pursuit of 
‘realist’ economic interests as well as geostrategic goals of security as can be seen in the 
changes in the ENP. Thus, even in this period where the institutional rhetoric displayed 
more normative underpinnings, there was a tendency for EU material interests to trump 
more idealistic facets of the policy. 
 
COMPETITIVENESS AND INTERESTS IN THE EU’S PTA STRATEGY 
Peter Mandelson (Trade Commissioner 2004-2008), a committed free-trader, was 
unlikely to alter policy in terms of creating a global free trade system. The ‘Global 
Europe’ strategy of 2006 manifests that ‘[t]he WTO remains the most effective way of 
expanding and managing trade in a rules-based system, and a cornerstone of the 
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multilateral system. The Doha Development Agenda remains our first priority’ (DG Trade 
2006: 2). 
However, Mandelson faced a new international situation, where other actors had limited 
faith in the DDR. PTAs had been increasing, especially in Asia and Latin America 
(Fiorentino et al. 2006), prompting others to follow suit as they feared trade diversion 
effects creating a kind of ‘domino effect’ (Baldwin 1993). EU and USA perceived 
predominance in setting WTO rules, and the new PTA wave, encouraged China to 
commence negotiations with ASEAN in 2001 and others (Jiang 2010; Zeng 2010). 
Crucially, US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick pursued a ‘three-dimensional trade 
strategy’ (Schott 2006: 98) abandoning prior preferences for multilateral liberalization in 
favour of simultaneous multilateral, regional and bilateral negotiations so as ‘to exert 
latent pressure on recalcitrant liberalisers by concluding PTAs’ with other states. The 
world was in the midst of a PTA negotiation bonanza, whilst the EU had voluntary 
withdrawn from new negotiations. Faced with this, Mandelson steered the EU’s PTA trade 
policy in in line with what other states were doing. 
‘Global Europe’ presents PTAs as compatible alongside commitment to the WTO, and in a 
departure from Lamy’s era, advocates new PTA negotiations, including with individual 
states. It is symptomatic of the ‘competitiveness’ ideational justification offered, and its 
linkages with the competitiveness-driven Lisbon Agenda re-launched in 2005, that DG 
Trade presents new criteria for choosing PTA partners: 
‘The key economic criteria for new FTA partners should be market potential 
(economic size and growth) and the level of protection against EU export 
interests (tariffs and non-tariff barriers). We should also take account of our 
potential partners’ negotiations with EU competitors, the likely impact of this on 
EU markets and economies…’ 
‘Based on these criteria, ASEAN, Korea and Mercosur (with whom negotiations 
are ongoing) emerge as priorities. They combine high levels of protection with 
large market potential and they are active in concluding FTAs with EU 
competitors’ (DG Trade 2006: 11). 
India, Russia and the GCC are mentioned as potential candidates too, if less urgent, as 
they were not in direct negotiations with the USA. The ‘new competitiveness-driven FTAs 
(DG Trade 2006: 11) focus on furthering the EU’s economic interests by strengthening 
links with markets that will be important in the future (Woolcock 2007: 4). In terms of 
content, they offer continuity with the ‘deep trade agenda’ that Lamy (2002) had 
favoured seeking the liberalisation of services, investment, public procurement and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights (DG Trade 2006: 11, 13). There is also a 
concern with staying on a par with competitors: ‘Where our partners have signed FTAs 
with other countries that are competitors to the EU, we should seek full parity at least’ 
(DG Trade 2006: 11), which accounts for the choice of PTA partners (Korea was 
negotiating with the USA as were Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, and ASEAN was 
negotiating with China) and is reminiscent of the EU’s celerity in negotiating a PTA with 
Mexico in the aftermath of NAFTA, even though it had not contemplated it in the 1994 
strategy for Latin America (European Commission 1994a).  
Despite the new pragmatism, ‘Global Europe’ maintained some of the previous ideational 
normative elements. Although the prior discourses of development, which Mandelson still 
applied in speeches (Mandelson 2005), were absent from the Document, it 
acknowledged the need to address the ‘losers’ from globalization and reiterated: ‘we 
should also seek to promote our values, including social and environmental standards 
and cultural diversity, around the world’ (DG Trade 2006: 5). The latter serves the dual 
purpose of enhancing EU influence and also exporting its standards thus placing its own 
producers on a par with, or even at an advantage over, those from other parts of the 
world. It is, therefore, not bereft of material interests linked to competitiveness. Further 
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continuities are present in the support for region-building through negotiations with 
blocs. Indeed ‘Global Europe’ prioritises negotiations with Mercosur, ASEAN (both 
regional groupings), but also accepts individual states (South Korea), and the 
pragmatism of bilateral negotiations became more apparent throughout the negotiation 
process. 
In May 2007, the EU and ASEAN commenced PTA negotiations, but with difficulties, 
given differences amongst ASEAN members and the EU’s requirements. Concerned with 
not losing competitiveness to the USA and China, in March 2010, on a trip to South East 
Asia, the Trade Commissioner, Karel De Gucht (since 2009), announced the launch of 
bilateral PTAs with Singapore and Vietnam, and, in November, negotiations with 
Malaysia commenced.5 These are the states that had already closer economic ties with 
the EU, and the ones expected to benefit most from PTAs (ECORYS 2009). These states 
were amongst the group of six ASEAN states that had already begun to implement their 
PTA; with China (in January 2010) and Singapore and Malaysia also had PTAs with the 
USA (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Timeline of EU, USA, Chinese FTAs in East Asia 
 
CHINA 
start 
CHINA 
conclude 
USA 
start 
USA 
conclude 
EU 
start 
EU 
conclude 
ASEAN 2001 2007(2010*)  2007  
Hong Kong  2003     
Macao  2003     
Thailand  2003 2004 (suspended 2006)   
Singapore  2008  
2003 
(2004) 
2010 2012 
South Korea   2006 
2007 
(2011) 
2007 
2009 
(2011) 
Malaysia (ASEAN)  
2006 (trade investment 
framework agreement 
2004) 
2010  
Vietnam (ASEAN)    2010  
ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Viet Nam. Dates in brackets represent implementation dates when these differ from the 
conclusion of the negotiations. *2010 for Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, 
Indonesia, 2015 for the others. Sources: European Commission DG Trade website, US Trade 
Representative website, ASEANWEB (2012) 
 
Notwithstanding this pragmatic approach the EU remains intent on a subsequent bloc-to-
bloc FTA with ASEAN: 
‘The launch of FTA negotiations with Singapore, for us, marks the beginning of a 
deeper engagement with Asia, and in particular in our relations with the ASEAN 
region. Although Singapore is the ‘first one in’, our door remains open for other 
ASEAN countries interested in negotiating a comprehensive free trade agreement 
with us. We are not available to do shallow FTAs, but we will be mindful of 
differences in levels of development’ (De Gucht 2010a). 
Although not highlighted as key priorities in the ‘Global Europe’ document, in the early 
2000s Central American and Andean Community states had negotiated PTAs with the 
USA, and asked the EU for negotiations. The EU responded by postponing negotiations 
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until a sufficient degree of integration had been achieved. In 2007 the EU began 
negotiations with the Andean Community and Central America. As with ASEAN, a bloc-
to-bloc negotiation failed. In the case of the Andean Community, Bolivia boycotted 
negotiations and Ecuador withdrew in 2009 over intellectual property clauses. The EU’s 
decision to continue negotiations with Peru and Colombia on an individual basis contrasts 
with the negotiations with Mercosur (see Doctor, 2007). The fact that Peru and Colombia 
had already agreed PTAs with the USA, unlike Mercosur states, and the EU’s new 
competition-driven policy, account for this pragmatic turn.6 Table 3 shows the USA has 
held the initiative in recent years, in contrast to the situation in the late 1990s when the 
EU led in negotiations with the Mercosur and Chile (García 2011: 513).  
 
Table 3: USA and EU Free Trade Agreements with Latin America 
 
USA 
start 
USA 
end 
USA 
implement 
EU 
start 
EU 
end 
EU 
implement 
Mexico 1988 1992 1994 NAFTA 1996 1997  
Chile 2000 2003 06/2003 1999 2002 01/2003 
Mercosur    1999   
Brazil    Strategic Partnership 2007 
Andean 
Community 
   2007 failed  
Peru 2004 2006 2009 2007 2010 Likely in 2013 
Colombia 2004 2006  2007 2010 Likely in 2013 
Ecuador 2004 Stopped 2006 2007 Withdrew 2009 
Central 
America 
2003 2006 2006-2009 2007 2010 Likely in 2013 
Panama 2005 2007  
Incorporated into Central America 
negotiations in 2008 
All of Latin 
America 
FTAA 1994 
Unlikely prospects, stalled 
2005 
   
Sources: DG Trade (2012); USTR (2012) 
 
By contrast, bloc-to-bloc negotiations with Central America, achieved a degree of 
regional integration (Panama’s participation was made conditional on it joining SIECA, 
which it did). This is an area with an overwhelming dependence on the USA and keen to 
diversify, which explains formal acquiescence with EU demands. However, it is worth 
noting that even at the signing of the agreement in May 2010, Commission President 
José Manuel Barroso emphasised, the EU still expected more regional integration, when 
he stated that ‘[w]e hope this agreement between the regions will also contribute to 
strengthening Central American integration and institutional government there’ (EU-LAC 
Summit Press Conference, 19/5/2010). 
Mercosur was highlighted as a priority area in ‘Global Europe’ and is an area where the 
EU still hopes to achieve its interregional objectives, as the agreement has been finalised 
since 2004, pending a final deal on access to the EU’s agricultural market (Doctor 2007; 
Klom 2003; Schneider 2006). In the absence of Mercosur-USA negotiations it seems 
there is less impending pressure to achieve a deal. In the meantime, the EU has taken 
other steps to strengthen its position in the region, within the new paradigm of 
competitiveness. Recognising the significance of Brazil in the world economy and its 
leadership position within the G20 and South America, in 2007 the EU gave Brazil a 
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special status as a ‘strategic partner’. Within the Strategic Partnership the Commission 
(2007: 9) ‘look(s) to Brazil to make a constructive contribution towards the conclusion of 
a balanced and comprehensive EU-Mercosur agreement’, which would offer economic 
advantages to EU service and manufacture industries (IARC 2008). Beyond this desire to 
achieve an EU-Mercosur deal, the document also focuses on a host of trade issues 
(including financial services, intellectual property) in which the EU would like to pursue 
greater access and recognition of standards with Brazil, which would damage the EU-
Mercosur relation, as Brazil would gain exclusive benefits, and which betrays the EU’s 
clear economic interests in this market.  
In the midst of a serious financial and economic crisis, the ‘Trade, Growth and World 
Affairs’ strategy issued in November 2010 follows the line of ‘Global Europe’, and is 
justified with greater appeals to ‘the triple benefits of trade’ opening: ‘economic growth, 
consumer benefits and job creation’ (DG Trade 2010a: 5). It links Trade policy to the 
EU’s 2020 growth strategy aimed at creating smart, sustainable and inclusive jobs and 
growth (just as Global Europe was linked to the Lisbon Agenda). The 2010 Strategy 
continues past trends, it reiterates commitment to the Doha Round (DG Trade 2010a: 
9), prioritises competitiveness-driven FTA negotiations (DG Trade 2010a: 10), and 
focuses on ‘deep trade’ issues of international liberalisation of public procurement and 
regulatory regimes (DG Trade 2010a: 6). It retains some linkages to sustainable 
development, and the overt ‘competitiveness’ language of ‘Global Europe’: ‘We need to 
do more to leverage the effectiveness of internal and external policies and thereby 
enhance Europe’s competitiveness in the global market place’ (DG Trade 2010a: 7). 
The sense of competition with new economic giants is clear when it asserts that trade 
policy needs to pay special attention to the US, China, Japan, Russia, India and Brazil 
(DG Trade 2010a: 10). As these are the largest economies (China, India, Brazil also the 
fastest growing) and the EU’s top trade and investment partners, prioritising these 
seems perfectly rational from a strategic point of view. A purely pragmatic step, yet it 
does represent a shift from the late 1990s-early 2000s greater self-confidence and 
external projection aims (interregionalism, values) pursued by the EU. ‘Trade, Growth 
and World Affairs’ reveal an ongoing ideational belief in the benefits of liberalisation and 
globalization (despite the crisis). A preparatory paper for this Document endeavours to 
stress the benefits of trade: ‘The role of trade will be crucial in ensuring that potential 
market opportunities are translated into additional businesses and jobs’ (DG Trade 
2010b: 26). 
It also raises concerns over the imposition of trade barriers in the aftermath of the crisis, 
especially by non-WTO member Russia (DG Trade 2010a: 21), and posits part of the 
blame for imbalances at the emerging economies’ door, in statements such as ‘[t]he 
ongoing process of macroeconomic adjustment must also include a greater contribution 
to world aggregate demand from those economies (both advanced and emerging) which 
ran large current account surpluses’ (DG Trade 2010a: 24). DG Trade, thus, is putting 
forward a policy clearly aimed at pursuing what it perceives to be EU economic gain. 
However, the difficulty may now lie in persuading partners to acquiesce to EU regulatory 
preferences, at a time when some of its previous appeal may be waning, and when 
economies previously highly dependent on the EU are succeeding in diversifying their 
trade and investment relationships. 
 
CONCLUSION 
From the previous narrative it is clear that the EU’s PTA strategies have been mediated 
through time by the ideational preferences of DG Trade leadership, normative goals, and 
realist economic interests embedded in changing international developments. What is 
significant about PTAs as trade policy tools is the fact that economists broadly agree on 
their limited aggregate welfare effects (Hallaert 2008). Indeed sustainability impact 
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assessments commissioned by DG Trade typically project marginal welfare results for the 
EU (0.2-0.8 percent of GDP) (ECORYS 2008). As with other forms of liberalisation, these 
gains are asymmetrical with the EU’s service sector poised to benefit the most from 
inroads made in the EU’s deep trade agreements aimed at facilitating international 
service provision, high levels of intellectual property rights protection, and harmonising 
regulatory regimes. In so far as all PTAs in some way benefit the EU, even if the 
aggregate economic welfare effects are meager, the strategy could be said to have 
always been a realist pursuit of certain European economic interests.7 ‘Global Europe’ 
brought this to the fore, and abandoned some of the more ideational aspects of previous 
trade policy regarding global governance, EU leadership in shaping such governance, and 
reshaping the world.  
If changes in leadership provided the window of opportunity to effect that change, this 
was informed by exogenous events. As talks at the WTO faltered and the USA launched 
PTA negotiations, others followed suit, especially in Asia (Aggarwal and Urata 2006). The 
EU’s change of heart regarding PTAs in the mid-2000s can be conceptualised within this 
framework, and complements the discourse of ‘competitiveness’ expounded in ‘Global 
Europe’. The choice of negotiating partners is revealing; as they were all engaged in 
negotiations with the USA, and were in negotiations with China or expected to in the 
future (South Korea). ‘Global Europe’ presents a more unambiguously interest-seeking 
rationalist-‘realist’ policy, prioritizing economic interests in other markets and economic 
balancing against competitors.  
‘Growth, Jobs and World Affairs’ continues the ‘Global Europe’ agenda. By remaining 
committed to liberalisation the Commission reveals an internal ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
and consistency affected by its own experience, ideational beliefs beliefs, and also an 
interest-maximising ‘logic of consequences’ towards economic interests (services and 
exporters) set to benefit from liberalisation. By relinquishing more normative aspects 
associated with its trade strategy in the past, the Commission has shown a willingness to 
adapt to the realities of a dynamic and changing international economic environment. 
The challenge will be to reconcile its preferences with those of increasingly powerful 
international partners and competitors, and indeed to balance relations with the other 
major economies in the globe for mutually beneficial outcomes.  
Despite adaptability, throughout time we observe a large degree of continuity in EU 
trade policy, which is perhaps unsurprising given the pro-liberalisation objectives already 
set out in the Treaty of Rome: ‘to the harmonious development of world trade, the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international exchanges and the lowering of 
customs barriers’ (Art. 110 Treaty founding the European Economic Community 1957). 
What has varied is the relative importance of the accompanying idea-inspired normative 
aims that are pursued through trade policy, and the ideational discourses within which 
the material interests in the policy have been couched and legitimised. Commitments to 
regional integration, and a preference for PTAs with regional groups continues, as does 
formal support for the WTO and for furthering development, even if post-‘Global Europe’ 
policy is more explicitly concerned with EU competitiveness and a “realist” pursuit of 
economic interests. It is clear the ideational and realist motivations for policy choices co-
exist, with overall changes being more in format than in deep content. As shown above 
even when more normative in outlook, the EU’s PTA policy faltered in its region-building 
objectives in its neighbourhood in ENP in favour of economic and security interests, 
clearly echoing John Mearsheimer’s (2001) assertion that second-order interests will be 
trumped if they do not facilitate primary interests. In light of this, and of the increasingly 
“realist” trade policy being developed by the EU, economic realist theory offers a 
plausible explanation for, and framework for the analysis of EU trade policy and its 
positioning in the future international economic order. 
 
*** 
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1 These are traits that Nye (1990) ascribes to “soft power”. 
2 For more see Sjursen 2006; Hyde-Price 2006; 2008; Manners 2006; Diez 2004. 
3 Constructivist approaches are the newest version of idealism. Prime amongst them is Wendt’s (1999) 
challenge to rationalism by focusing on how ideas are socially constructed and affect the creation and 
choices available to agents in a system.  
4 For more see García 2012. 
5 An agreement with Singapore was signed in December 2012, and in 2013 negotiations have begun 
with Thailand and with Japan, at their request. 
6 Despite including democracy and human rights clauses, part of the EU’s normative agenda, these 
agreements have been marred by controversy with demonstrators protesting the signing on the grounds 
of Colombia’s dubious human rights record (El Mundo, 19 May 2010), again revealing the competitive 
imperative of the deal. 
7 This article has focused on EU interest as agreed in the Council. Interests vary across states, economic 
sectors, firms, societal groups, EU institutions, and time. They are dynamic, and merit separate 
attention. 
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What explains the European Union’s (EU) reluctance to include a legally enforceable social clause in trade 
agreements? Moreover, what explains the lack of coherence in its linkage policy across the multilateral, bilateral 
and unilateral levels? This article assesses the diversity of EU approaches towards trade and labour and argues 
that the conception of the European Union as a particular normative actor is not fully capable to grasp this 
diversity. Instead, the EU’s policies are contingent upon a generic cost-effectiveness calculation constrained by 
the internal and external context where decisions on labour standards have been taken. At the internal level, 
decision-making rules have sometimes directed trade-labour linkage policies to a ‘lowest common 
denominator’. At the external level, the EU’s decisions have been shaped by the perceptions and market power 
of negotiating partners. To prove its claim, the article explores the EU’s trade-labour linkage at the multilateral, 
bilateral and unilateral settings. 
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What explains the European Union’s reluctance to include a legally enforceable social 
clause in trade agreements? Given the EU’s formidable power in trade, the high degree 
of integration, and the existence of American precedents, one could expect that the EU 
would be prone to the use of sanctions to ensure labour compliance. However, with the 
exception of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and the Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) with the Caribbean countries (CARIFORUM), where a weak form of 
conditionality applies, the EU has so far abstained from consistently using such measures 
and has developed a patchwork of mainly cooperation-based approaches across the 
multilateral, bilateral and unilateral levels. 
Existing scholarship interprets this soft type of conditionality as an emanation of the 
particular style of European foreign policy (Orbie 2011). The EU is portrayed then as a 
sui generis normative power, bent on the dissemination of its own values (in casu labour 
rights). Its preference for dialogue and engagement rather than for enforcement are an 
example of the means through which it seeks to expand its norms (Manners 2008). In 
this article we argue, however, that such a view only presents part of the story and 
leaves the underlying process of the EU’s various approaches towards the trade-labour 
linkage underexplored, thereby obscuring other explanatory features of the EU’s policy 
choices. To emphasise those features, we deviate from the sui-generis approach and 
turn to a rationalist, institutionalist argumentation. 
Focusing on the political processes behind the choice for a hard or soft clause, we 
explain the ambiguous stance of the EU in the trade-labour debate as being the product 
of the internal and external context wherein a policy maker operates. We conceptualise 
this internal and external context in institutional terms. On the one hand, the use of 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), simple majority or consensus influences the ability of 
the member states to attain a common position. On the other hand, the external context 
may validate or delegitimise the EU’s decisions. Across the different fora in which the 
trade-labour linkage debates were held, the trade partners’ perceptions of the linkage as 
protectionism and the relative power of those partners vary, thus influencing the costs 
and desirability of adding teeth to labour-related provisions in a trade agreement. 
This article aims to contribute to the broader literature in three ways. Firstly, it offers an 
alternative explanation of the limited enforceability of the EU’s social clause in trade 
agreements. The focus on the political process, and in particular realist and liberal 
constraints, complements the existing reflectivist approaches not only empirically but 
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also theoretically by cautioning against “false successes”. More specifically, would we still 
consider the EU as a normative power if it did not face such constraints? Second, it 
raises an additional question regarding the coherence of EU foreign policy. Previous 
studies on this topic have focused almost exclusively on coherence between member 
states and European institutions (see e.g. Portela and Raube 2012; Thomas 2012; 
Nuttall 2005). This article is, to our knowledge, one of the first to systematically 
compare and explain the behaviour of the EU in multi-bi-and unilateral (trade) fora. 
Finally, it contributes to the broader IPE literature on trade that, until recently, has only 
devoted scant attention to the social clause even though its political salience is 
considerable as apparent from the discussions on the Colombia and India free trade 
agreements. 
 
FRAMING THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Defining “the” European Position on the trade-labour linkage 
Contrary to countries such as the US or India, which have maintained a strong 
consistency in their trade-labour linkage positions throughout the previous two decades, 
it is hard to pinpoint “the” EU’s position on the issue, even in a snapshot, due to the 
multiplicity of policies adopted at the different levels – unilateral, bilateral, multilateral – 
at which trade-labour discussions have taken place. Labour elements can be found in the 
EU’s trade policy at each of these levels. In the first place labour issues have been 
assessed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) between 1994 and 2001. In general 
terms, the talks pitted the US against the Informal Group of Developing Countries in a 
highly polarised discussion on whether or not to include a labour component in the trade 
regime. Whereas the United States fiercely supported the establishment of a working 
group on labour issues at the WTO, the developing countries rejected that proposal on a 
principled basis by arguing that such a working group would derail in protectionist 
attempts by the developed countries (Haworth et al. 2005; Wilkinson 1999). In this 
context, it is difficult to assess the EU’s position due to the fact that it was itself, 
internally, a replication of the multilateral lack of consensus during the 1990s. The 
Council conclusions on the issue (Council of the European Union 2003), adopted by 
unanimity in July 2003, proposed that the EU focused on achieving coherence in policy-
making in ‘all relevant international organisations, including in the WTO and in the ILO’. 
Furthermore it agreed to pursue the status of observer for the ILO at the WTO,
 1
 and to 
‘encourage discussions (…) on the respect of core labour standards during the review of 
a country’s trade policy in the WTO (…)’. 
Labour provisions are also present at the bilateral level in the EU’s Preferential Trade 
Agreements (PTAs). A division can be made between the Caribbean Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) and the Colombian PTA on the one hand, and other trade 
agreements on the other hand. The bulk of EU’s trade agreements have never included 
any concrete linkage between labour and trade, and often contain cooperation provisions 
on social issues (Euro-Mediterranean Agreements), references to respect for the ILO 
standards in the context of that cooperation (EU-Chile, EU-South Africa) or general 
references to the improvement of labour standards in the preamble (EU-South Korea), 
loose from any trade provisions (European Commission 2010; European Union 2008b, 
2009; Grynberg and Qalo 2006; European Communities 2000). Conversely, the EPA with 
the CARIFORUM (European Union 2008a) and the EU-Colombia PTA (European Union 
2012) contain labour provisions that go beyond the above but still not as far as the GSP. 
The parties to the EU- CARIFORUM EPA engage into cooperation on labour matters, and 
the treaty provides for a limited enforcement procedure. The EU-Colombia PTA 
contemplates similar measures. 
The third level at which concrete EU action on the trade-labour linkage has taken place is 
the EU’s GSP, a scheme of unilateral, non-reciprocal trade preferences designed to give 
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priority access to developing countries’ products to the EU market. Ever since 1994, the 
GSP has featured a component of labour conditionality, containing both sanctions and 
incentives based on compliance with labour standards.
2
 Developing countries can benefit 
from special trade benefits if they ratify and implement a series of international treaties, 
among which the eight ILO conventions containing fundamental principles and rights at 
work.
3
 Nevertheless, these benefits may be withdrawn if the ratification, implementation 
and monitoring conditions are not met (European Union 2008a). 
 
The trade-labour linkage in context 
Even though it is difficult to assess the EU’s approach to trade and labour as a whole due 
to the plurality of arrangements, when looked at it from the outside it is characterised by 
a soft, normative character that favours multilateralism, cooperation and positive 
incentives over sanctions. This is especially the case when the EU is compared to United 
States’ policy, which strikes as a) more sanction-based, both at the bilateral and 
unilateral level and b) less focused on a normative universal conception of labour 
standards, since the US uses its own definition of relevant labour standards aside from 
the ILO’s (Aasen 2009; Grynberg and Qalo 2006). From the above one may wonder why 
the EU at some occasions allowed for trade sanctions whereas it refrains to do so at 
other occasions? Moreover, why is it that the EU has opted for instruments that are not 
legally enforceable? 
Existing studies on the linkage between trade and labour standards do not provide us 
with the appropriate frameworks to deal with the question above. In general, they can 
be divided into two groups. On the one hand, several studies have focused on whether 
trade and labour standards should be linked to one another, either by sanctions or by 
other means. Those studies, which adopt either an economic (Hafner-Burton 2005; 
Brown 2001; OECD 1996; Bhagwati 1995) or a legal (Howse et al. 2006) perspective, do 
not assess the political economy behind the social clause, but rather seek to address the 
prescriptive question whether labour standards should be enforced by using trade 
means. In other words, they do not look into why countries do or do not support a trade-
labour linkage. On the other hand, a smaller group of political scholars have recently 
inquired into the politics behind the linkage. Attention has been devoted to policy 
formation of developing countries in the WTO (González-Garibay 2010) or on the EU’s 
GSP+ (Orbie and Babarinde 2008; Orbie 2006). 
In light of the rising importance of bilateral trade negotiations, recent attention shifted to 
assess the EU’s behaviour across the whole spectrum. In this debate the notion of 
Normative Power Europe gained increasing traction (Orbie 2011; Manners 2009; True 
2009). Two arguments feature prominently to establish the assertion that the EU 
behaves in accordance to the normative ideal-type : first, core labour standards are 
considered a part of the core values around which the EU is built, i.e. respect for human 
rights. Second, the methods by which that norm are diffused rely on dialogue, 
consultation and non-coercive matters. While insightful, such an approach has left a 
large part of the story untold. The reason is related to the type of research questions 
asked. Normative Power Europe, as a critical theory, focuses on what the EU is or should 
be rather than on what it does (Manners 2008). In other words, it seeks to define and 
asses the degree to which the EU’s behaviour and policy choices are conform to an ideal-
type normative power. Such a reflective approach focuses less on concepts of 
intentionality and the process by which policy instruments are chosen (Menon and 
Sedelmeier 2013). This focus is most apparent in the ‘tripartite analytical method’ 
forwarded by NPE-scholars. This method is ‘based on comparing and contrasting what 
the EU “‘is” (its aims and principles); what the EU “says” (its policies and actions); and 
what the EU “does” (its outcomes and impact)’ (Manners 2008: 10). As such it focuses 
more on political rhetoric, policy choices and their consequences than on the political 
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process underlying these decisions. 
To fill this void, a rational choice analysis of the process by which policy instruments are 
selected provides a deeper understanding of the underlying causes behind such a choice. 
We are interested in why the EU behaves this way rather than what the EU is or should 
be. This difference in focus, however, does not imply an outright rejection of the claims 
made by NPE-scholars. Rather the contrary; commensurability not only implies accepting 
the difference in research objectives and the type of questions raised, but also embraces 
the lessons to be drawn from the insights acquired in alternative paradigms. In this 
article we aim to draw from realist insights to indicate the limitations for the impact of 
NPE (see Wood 2011). Liberal approaches on the other hand have emphasised that the 
EU is not a unitary actor and its identity and policy choices are still the emanation of the 
individual member states’ preferences as they are combined according to the procedures 
laid down in the treaties (Balducci 2010).  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE LOGIC OF CHOICE 
Our theoretical framework starts from a canonical rational-choice model. In his theory on 
the ‘logic of choice’, Baldwin (2000) asserts that the use of power harbours an element 
of choice among alternative channels of influence. The logic of choice focuses on the 
efficiency of policy decisions, indicating a calculation of the costs associated with certain 
policy options vis-à-vis their effectiveness in obtaining the desired policy changes. For 
the study of the trade-labour linkage, the only relevant means between which the EU 
can choose are economic coercion (hard law in the form of trade preferences coupled to 
labour standard compliance, either in the form of incentives or sanctions) and symbolic 
or soft power (soft law, cooperation). 
However, we have to acknowledge that these choices are constrained by the highly 
institutional setting which characterises the EU-policy making system. Any 
conceptualisation of the European Union as a sui generis entity in international relations 
implicitly draws upon and yet overlooks the presence of such institutional constraints 
that limit the availability and effectiveness in the use of certain power resources. 
Whether it is the absence of a noteworthy military or the inability to apply coercive 
measures, the EU is severely constrained in its international operations due to the 
institutional context within which it operates. 
By applying a rational-choice institutionalist approach (Shepsle 2006), we bring these 
constraints to the forefront and elucidate how institutions affect the policy choices of the 
EU on the trade-labour linkage. The first part of this section applies the logic of choice 
model to the linkage debate. The second part elaborates on how such a choice is 
constrained by the internal as well as external institutional setting. In so-doing we seek 
to combine a liberal, institutionalist approach focusing on domestic political processes 
with a realist approach by giving due attention to the relevance of power differentials in 
foreign policy. 
 
The baseline model 
Assessing the effectiveness of enforceable labour standards versus a softer cooperative 
approach re-opens the long-standing debate on the effectiveness of economic sanctions.
 
4
 Can countries be coerced into compliance? While opinions diverge, we follow the 
argument that it is the threat rather than the actual sanction that leads to compliance 
(Drezner 2003). Empirical research confirmed that cases where sanctions were imposed 
never led to significant concessions, but the threat of sanctions was successful in 57 per 
cent of the cases investigated (Elliot 2000). The effectiveness of a soft, coordinative 
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approach is lower in that regard. According to Orbie (2011), the impact of the EU’s soft 
social clauses in terms of implementation has been rather limited. He attributed the 
biggest success so far to the (enforceable) GSP+ system in Latin-America. Also in 
preferential trade agreements it is shown that only “hard” human right clauses are 
effective in fostering compliance (Hafner-Burton 2005). Hence in terms of effectiveness, 
we retain that sanction-based approaches do have an edge over soft non-enforceable 
clauses. 
The potential costs for the EU to apply sanctions or to engage in softer coordination are 
not so different. Including a soft clause does not require much investments apart from 
monitoring and the organisation of coordination meetings. In case of an enforceable 
clause there is also the costs associated with the possible sanctions applied. These are 
translated in the trade forgone and costs of retaliatory action. This is largely limited due 
to the asymmetries in trade between the EU and most of the target countries subject to 
such sanctions. Most of the countries with a poor record on labour standards do not 
represent significant markets for the EU. Evidently, India and China being the notable 
exception. 
The puzzle in this context amounts to the question why the EU would not use its 
formidable power in trade and impose sanctions, seeing that – based on the logic of 
choice- it is the most cost-effective strategy available to the policy-makers? Instead of 
answering this question by referring to the normative identity of the EU, we argue that 
institutional constraints lie behind that choice. These are respectively the internal 
capacity to effectively transform the economic power of which the EU disposes, and the 
external context wherein the EU operates. 
 
THE INTERNAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
Whether a power resource represents an effective means to influence other actors’ 
behaviour is dependent on the institutional context that constrains the use of such 
power. This argument is nothing new in European studies, as the gap between 
expectations and capabilities has featured prominent in the study of EU foreign policy. 
This divergence is due to three primary components: the ability to agree, resource 
availability and the instruments available at the EU’s disposal (Hill 1993). 
Over time, the European Union has largely bridged the gap with regard to the resources 
and instruments available, but still faces difficulties to obtain internal consensus. By 
consequence the ‘consensus-capabilities gap’ represents the main hindrance in the 
pursuit of an effective EU foreign policy (Toje 2008). In the area of trade, this argument 
has also surfaced by conceptualising the EU as a conflicted trade power (Meunier and 
Nicolaïdis 2006). The EU’s capability to transform its ‘formidable power in trade’ into real 
influence is contingent on the extent to which it is able to speak with one voice. That 
ability, we argue, is influenced by three factors: the institutional rules governing trade 
policy-making, the lack of a clear competence of the European Commission and the 
plurality of motives that is used to link trade to labour policies. 
The Common Commercial Policy is an exclusive EU competence. This implies that the 
European Union, as represented by the European Commission, is the only legal entity 
entitled to negotiating multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. It does so, however, 
on the basis of a mandate agreed by the member states in the Council of Ministers 
according to the rules of QMV. Similarly, the final results of the negotiations are also 
subjected to the Council’s approval on the basis of QMV. The seemingly straightforward 
formal decision-making structure hides the actual prevalence of uncertainty regarding 
the voting rules: an informal consensus is preferred over a formal vote, especially when 
determining the mandate for bilateral or multilateral trade negotiations (Meunier 2000). 
By contrast, QMV is more likely with regard to the GSP, which is closer to the EU’s day-
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to-day functioning and does not involve the definition of negotiating strategies (Orbie, 
Vos and Tavernier 2005: 183). In other words, even though all of the EU’s trade policy is 
in principle subject to QMV, the possibility of a formal vote appears more remote for 
multilateral or bilateral negotiations, where it is practically never used, than for the 
unilateral GSP, where it may be regarded as a last resort. The above implies that, under 
the assumption that a majority of EU member states favours the linkage, a state 
opposing the introduction of labour matters into trade agreements is more likely to 
succeed in tilting the EU’s position to his interests during bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations (consensus) than in the case of the GSP (QMV as last resort). 
In addition, the EU’s competence to act on external matters of trade and labour is all but 
clear. Even though, the scope of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy has been 
interpreted broadly by the EU’s Court of Justice, labour issues in trade agreements are 
not explicitly part of the EU’s exclusive competence.  Labour standards are still a 
member state competence, with few exceptions (Novitz 2002). In short, the EU does not 
have the obligation to speak with one voice on trade and labour issues in multilateral 
fora, in contrast with negotiations related to trade in goods. Sophie Meunier and Kalypso 
Nicolaïdis’ description of the EU as a ‘conflicted trade power’ is particularly relevant when 
it comes to issues that go beyond trade. Here possible conflicts are not limited to the 
contents of potential agreements but also extend to the very goals pursued by the 
agreements: is linking trade to labour a way of protecting domestic industries or 
promoting the EU’s values? In such a context, member states that see trade first and 
foremost as just an economic policy tool are likely to have a different hierarchy of 
preferences than those who see it primarily as a tool for foreign policy purposes. In case 
of large disagreement, consensus will only be found at the most basic level, i.e. the 
normative underpinnings of foreign policy goals.
 5
 Toje (2008: 139) argues in this regard 
that ‘the consensus–expectations gap is set to continue to prevent the EU from engaging 
in effective crisis management, leaving the Europeans to continue making statements 
and setting examples – rather than actually shaping world affairs.’ On the basis of this 
discussion we expect the internal context to be most stringent in multilateral settings 
and less severe in the unilateral context. 
 
The external context 
The choice of means used to pursue labour standards is also affected by the external 
context. The question of influence is intrinsically linked to the question of scope and 
domain; it depends on who tries to influence whom and on which topic. Power 
differentials matter. While the United States under the Clinton administration imposed 
sanctions on Taiwan for its failure to counter the illegal trade in rhinoceros horn and 
tiger bones, it refrained from doing so against China  
(Krustev 2010). The decision to incorporate sanctions and effectively enforce them in 
case of non-compliance is contingent on the size and importance of a target country. 
The decision not to push for an enforceable clause or apply economic sanctions when 
dealing with large trading nations can be interpreted in accordance with Baldwin’s logic 
of choice. On the one hand it affects the costs to be incurred by the EU, which are 
positively correlated with the amount of trade between the countries concerned. On the 
other hand size also affects the effectiveness of such sanctions. Whether a country acts 
through coercion or attraction depends on the size of the opposing partner (De Nevers 
2007). Larger, more powerful countries are persuaded through softer versions of power 
whereas weak nations can more readily be the target of coercive forms of power. 
In addition, given the inherent lack of information about the position and intentions of 
partners, when negotiating trade agreements, the reactions to the EU’s linkage 
proposals will be based on the subjective assessment of the EU as opposed to its self-
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conception as a normative power. In other words, developing countries will not 
necessarily take into account what Ian Manners refers to as the value-based identity or 
role of the EU, but their own views and conceptions thereof, shaped both by historical 
developments and strategic considerations. Summarising, ‘the way in which the EU is 
perceived by other countries is likely to have a direct bearing on its success as a player 
in the international arena’ (Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2009: 2). It should be noted that, 
even though nowadays perceptions are often studied in the framework of constructivist 
studies, they have long been studied from a rational point of view (Jervis 1976), and 
may thus be incorporated into rational-choice institutionalism, under the preliminary 
assumption of “bounded rationality” (Odell 2009).
6
 These perceptions therefore matter 
for the ease with which the power resources used can accomplish the desired effect. This 
is especially the case if one aims to apply non-coercive forms of power. It is indeed 
difficult to portray the policy proposed as beneficial to third countries’ economies when 
the EU is being perceived as pursuing its own –protectionist- interests.  
Finally, the external context can affect the costs associated with such an approach as it 
reflects the odds of retaliatory action. The more the EU is isolated in its international 
endeavour, the more likely any sanctions imposed will be questioned. Retaliatory action 
is more likely and thus it increases the costs of pursuing coercive economic measures.  
 
THE EU AND THE TRADE LABOUR LINKAGE: SOFT POWER BY DEFAULT
7
 
Based on the theoretical arguments presented above, we suggest that the EU’s 
reluctance to include enforceable social clauses in the trade-labour domain did not 
emerge as such in a conscious and intentional manner, but was shaped in the first place 
by the internal decision-making environment of the EU, in combination with the lack of 
consensus among the EU’s member states, which led to the pursuit of differentiated 
policies at the multilateral, bilateral and unilateral levels. Second, the EU’s trade-labour 
linkage has also been shaped by the external environment: whereas the strong 
opposition of the developing countries at the multilateral level fostered changes in the 
linkage rhetoric towards a more universal, rights-based perspective, the unilateral 
character of the GSP made it possible to ignore the opposition towards the EU. Most data 
was gathered through desktop research. This includes primary documents such as 
speeches, ILO-reports and statements made in the WTO or in the context of bilateral 
negotiations but also secondary sources such as news articles from Agence Europe and 
academic literature. 
 
THE INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
As has been stated above, the internal institutional setting influences the EU’s 
international position in two ways. First, the lack of consensus among the member states 
and the Commission affects the EU’s capacity to include coercive measures. Second, the 
decision-making rules governing the multi-, bi- and unilateral decision-making within the 
Council shaped that lack of consensus so that it produced three different outcomes at 
the three levels.  
 
The multilateral level 
The lack of a European consensus on the trade-labour linkage at the multilateral level 
became most visible during four sets of multilateral discussions on trade and labour at 
the WTO during the nineties: the 1994 Marrakech Ministerial Meeting, which constituted 
the formal end of the Uruguay Round; the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference, the 
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1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference and, to a lesser extent, the 2001 Doha Ministerial 
Conference. 
During the Marrakech Ministerial Conference, the lack of consensus in the EU became 
evident, both among the member states within the Council, and between the Council and 
the Commission, in the statements read both by the Commission and by the Council 
Presidency. The Council’s statement underlined the fact that ‘even in the European 
Union, points of view are not uniform’ and attempted to balance pro- and anti-linkage 
arguments. The EU’s member states’ statements echo the Presidency’s intervention: 
whereas Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxemburg, Portugal and Spain manifested 
themselves in favour of linkage, the United Kingdom’s positioned itself clearly against it. 
In this context, it should be noted that whereas most states favouring linkage only 
framed the topic from a human rights perspective, Portugal linked it directly to the 
performance of its textile industry. By 1996, the discussion did not seem to have 
considerably progressed. The Commission did not make any formal proposal, but 
seemed to lean towards the US’ pro-linkage approach. At the same time, Leon Brittan’s 
representatives attempted to soothe the developing countries’ worries by arguing, during 
informal meetings, that they would seek to limit the labour-trade discussion at the WTO 
to forced and child labour, and freedom of association (Brazilian Delegation in Geneva 
1996). During the Conference, no consensus seemed to have been found at the level of 
the member states. Nearly all member states (with the exception of the UK) clearly 
manifested their will to discuss the issue at the WTO,
8
 embedding their requests whether 
in normative terms of universality and workers’ well-being or in economic terms of 
competition for local industries (Portugal). Simultaneously, the Commission only gave its 
support in a veiled way. 
The 1998 Council statement further confirmed the lack of a particular EU consensus: the 
British presidency only stated that the EU attached importance to the Singapore 
Ministerial Declaration, without any further specification. However, by 1999, the 
Commission had been mandated by the Council to support an ILO/WTO working group, 
for which it introduced a proposal during the preparations of the Seattle Ministerial 
Conference. Whereas all EU members supported the proposal in their statements at the 
Conference plenary, the UK omitted any reference to it. At Doha, where the debate 
briefly resurfaced, most EU member states (Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Luxemburg and Ireland) manifested their support for an ILO-
WTO dialogue, or at least for the WTO addressing the issue. In short, until the Council 
conclusions of 2003 (cf. supra), the only common denominator between the UK and the 
rest of the EU member states plus the Commission was the same as between the linkage 
proponents and detractors: the Singapore Ministerial Declaration. It can further be 
argued that the Council conclusions of 2003, adopted by unanimity, were not the only 
but also the lowest common denominator of the member states’ and the Commission’s 
interests. In light of the internal disagreement, a softer, norm based approach reflects 
the fall-back position fostered by the institutional constraints that limit the effective use 
of more coercive instruments. 
Two assertions can be made in the light of the theoretical argument presented above. 
First, the effect of the internal context on the EU’s multilateral position is evident. There 
was a clear lack of consensus, encumbered not only by the presence of different views 
on the trade-labour linkage, but also by the confusion between humanitarian and 
economic goals and means. It was, in other words, not clear in which terms (trade 
protection or labour rights) the cost-effectiveness analysis should take place, and what 
were the alternatives for action (coercive measures or development assistance). Second, 
the institutional component of the internal context has also an important role in 
explaining the EU’s position on the linkage: contrary to other commercial negotiations in 
which a qualified majority is enough to pass a Council decision, the consensus 
requirement that applies to multilateral negotiations (Orbie, Vos and Taverniers 2005) 
empowered those countries that were against the trade-labour linkage, mainly the 
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United Kingdom, to block the proposition, at the multilateral level, of any coercive 
measures. Furthermore, the lack of clarity as to the Commission’s competence to deal 
with labour matters in the EU’s international relations made it possible for the member 
states to express their views publicly in the multilateral forum.  
 
The bilateral level 
Though the bilateral level is difficult to document systematically due to the closed-doors 
nature of the Council decision-making, the lack of consensus among member states 
germane to the multilateral setting also surfaces in those negotiations. For instance, the 
UK government explicitly rejected a sanctions-based approach (BIS 2011), whereas the 
Belgian lower chamber has urged its government to put enforceable labour standards 
more at the forefront of trade agreements (Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 2009). 
The lack of consensus is further illustrated, for the most recent PTAs, by the discussions 
at the European Parliament (EP), which gained more competences in trade policy with 
the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon. Even though the EP is generally more 
ambitious than the Council with regard to the pursuit of the linkage, significant 
divergences between the political groups can be observed when the question is raised as 
to how far such pursuit should go.
9
 In this context, it may be argued that the lack of a 
consensus among the member states pushes the European Commission to negotiate less 
ambitious social clauses in its PTAs.  Seeing that there is a de facto requirement of 
consensus, states opposing social clauses are likely to water down those clauses thanks 
to their informal veto power.  
 
The unilateral level 
Similar to the two previous cases, the decision making about the EU’s unilateral GSP, 
reflected in several successive Council Regulations, was a contentious process. However, 
reconstructing that process to the letter becomes cumbersome due to the difficult access 
to primary Council documentation. Consequently, two non-exhaustive examples of the 
cleavage are provided below. 
First, the discussions that followed the introduction of a Commission GSP proposal in 
1994 saw labour conditionality introduced for the first time into the scheme. This was 
done in the form of a temporary preference withdrawal for countries using forced or 
prison labour, and an incentive that would reward the adoption and application of 
standards on freedom of association and collective bargaining and minimum employment 
age as laid out by the corresponding ILO conventions. As documented by Orbie (2006, 
2011), the linkage was not the product of a clear consensus. Commissioner Leon Brittan 
included a labour dimension into his GSP proposal which was supported by the majority 
of the member states, but the UK and Germany opposed it. 
Second, discussions re-emerged in 1997, when the Commission presented a proposal to 
the Council in which it advocated the application of the social clause incentives under 
stronger controls. Commissioner Manuel Marín openly defended an incentive-based 
scheme. At the time the United Kingdom, by then under a Labour government, was 
expected to have softened its position. Even though this time the inclusion of a social 
clause in the GSP was not questioned in the same way as it had been in 1994, cleavages 
emerged concerning the size of the custom duties’ reductions that would be granted an 
in exchange for social and environmental compliance. The more pro-liberalisation 
member states (Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands) aimed for a reduction ‘sufficiently 
substantial to act as a true incentive’, whereas the traditionally pro-social clause, less 
liberalizing states (Italy, Greece, Portugal), feared that ‘these clauses would open up the 
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market too widely to products which are sensitive for the European market’ (Agence 
Europe 14 April 1998). The final decision contemplated ‘sufficiently substantial’ customs 
reductions, as favoured by the more liberal member states and the Commission (Agence 
Europe 24 April 1998). In addition to the GSP scheme itself, divisions on the social 
clause’s application emerged with regard to its application to Burma/Myanmar’s imports 
in 1996, when forced labour practices by the military junta were denounced by, among 
others, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Even though the 
consensus on the need to punish the anti-democratic regime was evident and trade 
preferences were eventually withdrawn, Agence Europe reported an initial disagreement 
within the Council (Agence Europe 9 October 1996). 
In light of the theoretical argument provided above two issues are evident. First, the 
strong divergence across the member states’ positions was similar to the disagreement 
at the multilateral level. Second, QMV allowed to overcome the lack of consensus 
regarding the introduction of a trade-labour linkage in GSP scheme, and later on the 
decision to implement that linkage: the very possibility to conduct a vote on the points 
of contention enabled the pro-linkage member states to construct majorities and 
overcome any opposition even if, following the tradition of consensus, QMV did not 
actually take place. 
 
THE EXTERNAL CONTEXT 
The EU’s choice of instruments to promote the trade-labour linkage has not only been 
influenced by the internal constraints, but also by the realist, external context, which is 
mainly characterised by developing countries’ widespread and strong opposition to the 
linkage under any form. However, the extent to which that opposition has had an impact 
on the EU’s policy has also been mediated by the level (multi-, bi- and unilateral) at 
which decisions take place. 
 
The multilateral level 
The previous sub-sections have made clear that the trade-labour standards debate has 
been characterised, at all policy levels, by heated discussions. The developing countries’ 
opposition had, from the very beginning of the linkage discussions in 1994, two main 
features. It was in the first place unrelenting. Their standard formulation consists in 
positing that the trade-labour linkage cannot be discussed at the WTO because it may 
lead to protectionist measures. Secondly, it was unanimous. Even though some South 
American countries and South Africa did initially make some attempts to lean in favour 
of a social clause those efforts were soon overrun by the intensive informal coordination 
of mainly India and Pakistan. The developing countries’ strategy proved extremely 
successful in influencing both the developed countries’ and the ILO’s discourse. In the 
first place, the fact that the developing countries even declined talking about whether to 
start a procedural discussion drove the discourse to their terrain: the linkage advocates’ 
discursive strategies were focused on proving their innocence (attempting to convince 
the developing countries of their non-protectionist intentions) rather than on discussing 
whether or not to start a debate on the issue. 
In the above framework, the European Commission (and also the US) had little choice 
but to reformulate its strategy, as stated by Pascal Lamy (European Commission 2000):  
‘After Seattle, while keeping its core idea, the EU’s approach has evolved a little 
in order to take into consideration the preoccupations expressed by the 
developing countries in Seattle. We preach now the need to launch a regular 
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dialogue covering a larger domain, and with a larger participation of international 
organizations and other interested parties.’
 10
 
Later documents progressively dilute the emphasis on trade measures, universal labour 
standards and the circumscription of the dialogue to the WTO-ILO, and instead 
emphasise the need to “conciliate” and increase the coherence of international economic 
and social policy-making. The developing countries’ strong opposition to the labour issue 
did not only affect the EU’s approach directly; it obliged the ILO’s secretariat to soften its 
language, what on its turn allowed the EU to embed its own consensus in a multilateral 
normative framework. Through the mid-1990s, the ILO secretariat advocated a mildly 
economically oriented policy towards labour standards in the context of globalization. 
The topic was first addressed by the Director-General’s Annual Report in 1994 (ILO 
1994). Even though that report discarded the use of trade sanctions in response to 
labour standards violations, it pleaded for a potential social clause that would link 
fundamental labour standards to the removal of already present trade barriers. 
The ILO’s proposal awakened fierce opposition from the developing countries. After 
several embittered discussions, the ILO members adopted the 1998 Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, as a consensus document that would 
strengthen the ILO without establishing any links with trade. In this regard, the 
Declaration explicitly ruled out the commercial use of the four fundamental rights and 
principles it enshrined. At the same time, all references to the ‘social clause’ or to ‘trade 
and labour standards’ were replaced by the more neutral label ‘the social dimension of 
globalization’. This implied a broadening of the policy focus from the narrow trade-labour 
relationship to the much broader impact of globalization on social conditions (ILO 1998a; 
1998b; World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization 2004). 
The reforms were later (1999) synthesised in the Decent Work paradigm. The concept 
includes the promotion of employment, the development of social protection, the 
promotion of social dialogue and tripartism and the respect for the four fundamental 
principles and rights at work (ILO 2008; 2001; 1999). The EU’s move away from the 
economic language of trade and labour coincides with the increased use of the ILO’s 
paradigms: after 2001, the use of the “decent work” paradigm and the “social justice” 
emphasis, in which no trade-labour linkage attempts are made, become ubiquitous in 
the EU’s Commission and Council documents (European Commission 2006a; 2006b; 
2004a; 2004b). At the same time, the labour conditionality present in the GSP has 
remained as such. 
In that framework, the evolution of the EU’s discourse towards “soft power” should be 
seen as stemming both from the pursuit of international credibility and from a cost-
effectiveness analysis. First, the lack of consensus during the first years of the debate 
had damaged the EU’s credibility as an external actor in two ways. On the one hand, the 
emphasis of some member states on the economic motivation of linkage undermined the 
“soft-power” approach to promote human rights, by making the EU appear as a 
“hypocrite power”. On the other hand, the visible lack of consensus among the member 
states strengthened the developing countries’ argument. By using the EU’s internal 
divisions as an example, the linkage opponents justified their own position: the UK’s 
opposition to the linkage contributed to “mainstreaming” it beyond the group of 
developing countries.
 11
 In this sense, the discourse’s moderation towards the ‘lowest 
common denominator’ helped to enhance the EU’s credibility by allowing it to speak with 
a single voice. 
Second, cost-effectiveness elements are highly likely to have played a role in the EU’s 
discursive change. Confronting the developing countries over linkage entailed risks of 
unwillingness to discuss other topics of the multilateral agenda crucial to the EU’s 
liberalisation strategy (investment, services). Whereas those risks would be negligible in 
the case of small developing country markets, larger countries opposing the trade-labour 
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linkage such as India, Pakistan or Brazil did pose a larger risk, as the two remaining 
cases below also illustrate. 
 
The bilateral level 
At the bilateral level, the external context matters primarily with regard to the 
divergences in market size. First, discrepancies in market power clearly affect the extent 
to which the EU can negotiate a favourable deal. Second, pushing hard on non-trade 
issues such as labour may imply concessions on, for instance, the opening of weak 
sectors at home. Such trade-offs are more outspoken when negotiating with powerful 
trade partners, as the following three examples (the CARIFORUM EPA and the PTAs with 
Colombia and India) show. 
In terms of market power, the CARIFORUM states are weak when compared to Colombia 
whose economy is more than twice as large. Colombia on its turn is dwarfed by India in 
terms of GDP. These differences are reflected in the social clauses that have been or are 
being negotiated by the EU: as indicated above, the EPA with CARIFORUM includes the 
most elaborated social clause in the PTAs negotiated by the EU thus far, and shares 
some features with the Colombian agreement: both deals contemplate a limited 
possibility to enforce labour-related issues through consultations and the possibility to 
convey a group of experts that may issue non-binding recommendations. In addition, 
the two agreements include a prohibition to lower labour standards to encourage trade 
or investments. 
Further, Colombia’s potential leverage regarding labour standards issues is diminished 
by its lack of compliance with ILO conventions. The assassination and intimidation of 
union officials has been a highly salient topic in the PTA negotiations: EU trade unions 
have complained that the social clause in this PTA would be a weakening of the earlier 
system governing EU-Colombia trade i.e. GSP+ (EMCEF 2011; TUC 2010), and special 
tripartite meetings to address the issue have taken place at the ILO. These events 
legitimise the European demands to a large extent, and reduce the chances of 
allegations of murky protectionism during the negotiations. Moreover, the fact that both 
the CARICOM countries as well as Colombia already agreed on a tougher clause in its 
negotiations with the US, softens the perception of the EU’s relatively weak social clause. 
In the case of India, including labour issues is much more cumbersome, as debates are 
more concerned with the inclusion of a sustainable development chapter rather than on 
the concrete features of such a chapter. From the beginning of the negotiations, Indian 
representatives have made clear that labour issues constitute a red line (González-
Garibay 2010: 780-782). This has been echoed by Commissioner De Gucht in addressing 
European Parliament on the 9th of May 2011: ‘We also need to be clear that a 
sustainable development chapter which would allow the use of trade restrictions linked 
to social or environmental issues will not be acceptable to India.’ It is thus likely that, if 
a sustainable development chapter is included at all in the PTA, it will be in a diluted 
version. 
 
The unilateral level 
Given the fact that the EU’s GSP decision making does not foresee any formal 
negotiations with or input from the potential beneficiaries of the scheme, the potential 
impact those countries may exert on the final outcome is somewhat arbitrary. 
Discussions do, however, take place, and beneficiaries react to the measures adopted. 
For instance, GSP preferences were discussed in the framework of the EU-Central 
America relations during the 1990s, and in 1998 the Andean Community lobbied for the 
de-coupling of trade preferences aimed at combating drug trafficking from compliance 
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with labour standards (Orbie 2006). In 1998 Pakistan lobbied the member states’ 
governments intensively in response to a complaint of child labour filed by several trade 
union federations (Agence Europe 25 February 1998). Similarly, the 1998 Council 
approval of new GSP guidelines unchained reactions from the large developing countries, 
with India and Pakistan openly criticizing the social and environmental clauses as a 
possible precedent for WTO action (Agence Europe 02 June 1998). 
However, none of the aforementioned actions has ultimately an effect on EU member 
states. For instance, bilateral talks on GSP do not produce binding outcomes, as in the 
case of PTAs, and the Andean lobbying was reportedly successful only due to the support 
of some member states at the Council (Orbie 2006). Similarly, the Indian and Pakistani a 
posteriori complaints did not imperil the application of the GSP social and environmental 
clauses. In other words, from a formal viewpoint, the EU has the last word on the final 
from of the GSP. In spite of the lack of formal input by the developing countries, it 
should be noted, however, that the implementation of the GSP social measures has so 
far only taken place against relatively small trading partners (Sri Lanka, Burma, Belarus) 
whose violations of human rights and/or labour standards are consensually 
acknowledged by most if not all of the EU’s member states. Conversely, China, which is 
often criticised for its human rights violations, has not been the subject of any 
preference withdrawal so far, and the complaints against Pakistan in 1998 were not 
conducive to any concrete outcome. This may be regarded as an evidence of the fact 
that the external context does influence the EU’s unilateral policy making through 
strategic considerations that weigh in the way in which the GSP is implemented.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This article raised the question why the EU has refrained from applying a sanction-based 
regime to enforce compliance with labour standards. Prior studies have explained the 
EU’s soft and cooperative approach as the outcome of its particular identity. In this 
article, we have focused less on the outcome and more on the process. Hence, we 
provide an alternative explanation using liberal and realist insights. The former manifests 
itself in the procedural limitations to achieve consensus about an ambitious clause. The 
latter marks the constraints derived from the EU’s (limited) power in the different forums 
where it could have advocated the linkage. 
Lack of agreement among the member states about the EU’s identity and policies have 
long been acknowledge to explain a lack of coherence in foreign policy. Trade is an 
interesting area as it is an exclusive competency. Here, the member states cannot act on 
their own. This article has shown that in such event, lack of coherence is manifested 
through the EU’s behaviour in arenas where different internal rules apply. The stricter 
the requirement for consensus the more likely we will see a lowest common denominator 
position being advocated.  
Our analysis has also shown that liberal and realist notions provide an alternative 
reading of the EU’s policies as they focus more on the policy process than the policy 
outcome. Identifying and acknowledging the importance of such factors can help us in 
establishing the (lack of) intentionality behind the EU’s decisions and hence assess how 
far the EU might still be from the ideal of a Normative Power Europe. Indeed, as Jan 
Orbie acknowledged in light of the then-launched trade negotiations with India: ‘the 
principles and activities of European trade arrangements have certainly become more 
normative in the past decade, but the EU (at least as it is presently constituted) may 
soon be facing the limits of what it can achieve’ (Orbie 2009: 181). Moreover, the 
combination of normative and protectionist motives behind the promotion of labour 
standards at least raises some questions as how to reconcile this diversity among 
intentions across the member states and distil common underlying norms and principles. 
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*** 
 
                                                     
1 There is to date no formal link between the two organisations. 
2 In 2005 all GSP conditionalities (labor, environment, human rights, good governance) were grouped in 
the so-called GSP+ arrangement. 
3 These rights, also called ‘core labor standards’, are freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
the prohibition of forced labor, the prohibition of child labor, and non-discrimination 
4 For critical views on the effectiveness of (trade) sanctions see Pape (1997) and for an application to 
the trade-labor debate, see Brown (2001).  
5 Implicitly, we assume some form of hierarchy here between the ease by which consensus can be found 
and the instruments being pursued. It is most difficult to come to a common position with regard to the 
use of military force, followed by economic sanctions and finally, the normative statements. Therefore, 
we consider the soft power approach, based on the normative underpinning of the EU as its default 
position in case no consensus can be found. 
6 The difference between both theoretical strands lies in the fact that, in a rational-choice context, 
perceptions are regarded as causal variables, as opposed to constructivism, which pays attention to the 
extent to which those perceptions constitute actors’ identities. 
7 A large part of the information contained in this section was retrieved from the WTO Documents Online 
facility (http://docsonline.wto.org/). For the sake of simplicity, references to individual documents are 
omitted and only sources external to the facility are indicated throughout the text. 
8 Luxembourg and Germany did so in a somewhat ambivalent manner. Whereas both countries stated 
their wish to establish an ILO-WTO dialogue, they also made clear that the topic of labor standards 
belonged in the ILO. Ireland did not issue any statement at all. 
9This became apparent in the discussion on a resolution to include an ambitious sustainable 
development chapter (available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B7-2011-
0291&language=EN. Accessed on 21 March 2013) 
10 Moreover, in 2002, Pascal Lamy stated that he stopped pursuing the inclusion of new labor language 
at Doha due to India’s threat not to approve the launching of the Doha Round (European Commission 
2002). 
11 A statement by the Brazilian Foreign Minister is illustrative in this regard: ‘Even the European Union is 
very divided and its position will have to be the lowest common denominator’ (Lampreia 10 November 
1996). 
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This article addresses the failure by scholars of EU trade policy to fully explain the difficulties faced in realising 
the ‘normative’ goals contained within the European Union’s external trade policy and the conviction that it 
might be a ‘force for good’ through trade. In seeking to account for and, in particular, move beyond the failure 
to fully explain these difficulties, the article adopts a critical social science approach that focuses on relations of 
domination and the (potentially misleading) appearances that such relations tend to uphold. In contrast to the 
traditional view of the EU as a potential ‘force for good’, we conceptualise it as a site of domination, focusing in 
particular on three mechanisms through which this domination is achieved – expansive market (capitalist) 
exchange, the ‘Othering’ that tends to accompany such processes of expansion, and the de-politicisation 
necessary to achieve and/or legitimate these processes. The article proceeds to explore recent developments in 
EU trade policy, and in particular the Global Europe agenda and associated new generation of free trade 
agreements with trade partners in Asia and Latin America. In doing so, the article examines the extent to which 
processes of market expansion, Othering and de-politicisation have been realised in recent EU trade policy. It 
argues for a conceptualisation of the European Union as a conveniently-conflicted counter-hegemon through 
trade, whereby the EU presents itself as a potential “force for good” through trade, but simultaneously avoids 
the realisation of that potential (and justifies its non-realisation) by evoking the conveniently-conflicted status 
that arises from institutional constraints and both internal disagreements and external differences. This account, 
we claim, is both more plausible than the existing empirical accounts in that it is able to explain the consistent 
promotion of an apparently unrealisable ‘progressive’ agenda by the European Union, and an improvement upon 
those accounts in that it illuminates and demystifies relations of domination and certain ideas that act to uphold 
them. 
EU trade policy; bilateral trade agreements; normative trade agenda; critical social science 
 
 
 
The literature on EU trade policy witnesses a growing number of contributions focused on 
the so-called normative agenda of the EU’s trade policy (see Hettne and Söderbaum 
2005; Manners 2009; Orbie 2008, 2011). Espousing the view that, from the mid-1990s 
onwards, the EU has increasingly geared its trade policy towards becoming a progressive 
force in the (re)shaping of the international (trade) system, destined to reduce or 
prevent harm in world politics through trade, the scholarly discussion in this regard 
pertains not directly to what the EU can achieve in trade, but rather to what it can obtain 
through trade, as Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (2005) famously phrased it. In 
particular, scholars have widely anticipated EU attempts to “harness globalization” 
through trade, thereby reflecting and reproducing the discourse introduced by former 
Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy in the late 1990s. Thus, DG Trade’s mantra of 
“harnessing” or “managing” globalization explicitly puts ‘trade at the service of 
development’ (e.g. Mandelson 2005), arguing that EU trade policy, the most powerful 
and most integrated area of EU external relations, seeks to advance the development of 
the South, as well as promote progressive values and norms, including social norms, 
such as the respect for core labour standards, and environmental norms (Meunier 2007; 
Orbie 2008; Young 2007 – see Young’s term of ‘EU social trade policy’). As Meunier 
(2007: 915) puts it,  
‘the EU offers access to its market as a bargaining chip in order to obtain changes 
in the domestic arena of its trading partners – from labour standards to human 
rights, from democratic practices to the environment (...) This conditionality 
enables the EU to leverage its trade power in exchange for a tamer, more 
managed competition from many developing economies.’ 
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There exists, therefore, a shared scholarly expectation and/or aspiration that the EU 
could utilise its trade policy as a means through which to promote a more equitable, 
egalitarian and/or regulated global socio-economic model, posing something of a 
counter-hegemonic alternative to global neoliberalism. Nevertheless, upon empirical 
examination this potential appears to be hardly realised (Bossuyt 2009; Drieghe 2008; 
Meunier and Nicolaidïs 2006; Orbie and Babarinde 2008; Stevens 2006; Van den Hoven 
2006). The empirical record of the EU’s trade policy has witnessed it consistently 
claiming to be faced with outweighing negotiating constraints that result in the 
downplaying of its commitment to both development (Orbie 2008) and the promotion of 
a ‘social trade policy agenda’ (Young 2007: 805-806; Dür 2008a; Dür and De Bièvre 
2007; Orbie et al. 2008). Thus, the promotion of social market regulation has typically 
been jettisoned for a ‘strategy that pursues trade liberalization at the expense of 
developing country trade partners’ (True 2009: 742). 
Despite this empirical track record, we argue that scholars have continued to expect that 
the European Union might realise its much discussed (and self-proclaimed) potential to 
become a progressive ‘force for good’ through trade policy. In seeking to account for the 
EU’s limited track record in promoting an egalitarian counter-hegemonic agenda through 
trade policy, explanations have tended to focus predominantly on internal 
disagreements, between member states and between EU institutions, which have 
prevented a more effective policy from being adopted and/or advanced. To use the 
terms of Meunier and Nicolaïdis’ (2006) often-cited article, the European Union has a 
limited ability to pursue a more progressive normative trade agenda because it is a 
‘conflicted trade power’. The EU is considered to be conflicted both because of diverging 
interests between its member states and because of institutional fragmentation and 
disagreement over the priorities and norms that it seeks to promote through its trade 
power (for a number of explanations focusing on divergent positions between member 
states, see Young and Peterson 2006: 807; Young 2007; Orbie et al. 2008; Bossuyt 
2009: 720-722; Hettne and Söderbaum 2005; Meunier and Nicolaidïs 2006; Orbie et al. 
2005; Orbie et al. 2008).  
As an alternative approach, we advocate an analysis, which claims that the counter-
hegemonic nature of commonly proclaimed EU ambitions through trade (which are 
largely shared by EU scholars) might be better understood if they are assumed to be 
unrealisable. In doing so, we present a conceptualisation of EU trade relations that 
adopts a critical social science approach in order to portray a mode of European 
domination pursued primarily through three mechanisms – expansive market (capitalist) 
exchange, the “Othering” that tends to accompany such processes of expansion, and the 
de-politicisation that forms part of the attempt to realise and/or legitimate these 
processes. In short, we argue that claims regarding the counter-hegemonic tendencies 
of the European Union’s trade policy are designed to conceal and legitimate an inherently 
neoliberal project. This, we argue, represents a more plausible explanation for the non-
realisation of the European Union’s self-proclaimed “counter-hegemonic” role through 
trade. 
Critical social science can perhaps best be considered an attempt to deal with the 
perennial problem facing social scientists as a result of the (unavoidably) value-laden 
nature of empirical observation. In short, how do we undertake empirical observation 
whilst simultaneously recognising that (a) ideational frameworks invariably shape our 
process of perception; (b) those ideational frameworks are learned through our 
interaction with society; and (c) that, as a result of their basis in society, ideational 
frameworks will therefore tend to reflect dominant practices and relations and in part 
serve to reproduce these. Moreover, critical social science seeks to address these 
problems without sliding into a relativist position whereby all “truths” or 
conceptualisations are considered equally plausible and equally decidable (Bhaskar 1975, 
1992; Sayer 1992; Hay 2002; Bates and Jenkins 2007). Therefore, the key question for 
critical social science is how we might decide which of a range of contending accounts 
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and conceptualisations – each informed by alternative ideational frameworks - we 
consider to be most accurate or adequate? For Sayer (2009), the answer to this question 
lies in the claim that critical social science must attempt to critique and expose 
unnecessary human suffering, and in the process identify the means by which greater 
human flourishing can be achieved. Indeed, if we accept that perception is grounded in 
(unequal) social relations, which may in turn give rise to particular illusions that act in 
part to reproduce those social relations, we might also accept that the attempt to more 
accurately conceptualise those same social relations includes the dispelling of those 
related illusions and an undermining of the beliefs that underpin them. In this sense, 
critical social science seeks to identify means by which to overcome, or destabilise, 
domination, including the commonly held ideas, which uphold processes of domination 
(Sayer 2009: 770). 
 
RECONCEPTUALISING EU TRADE POLICY: FROM A POTENTIAL ‘FORCE FOR 
GOOD’ TO A SITE OF DOMINATION 
In adopting a critical social science approach, and thereby reconceptualising EU trade 
policy in terms of the relations of domination that the policy acts to reproduce, it is 
beneficial to first consider those forms of domination that are commonly held to have 
been constructed within Europe as part of the process of European integration. Two 
claims regarding the social inequalities associated with the EU mode of governance are 
especially prominent within the European integration literature. First, a number of 
authors have highlighted the pro-market (neoliberal) agenda that prevails at the 
European level1 and which has acted to sharpen the domination by capital over labour 
within Europe (Van Apeldoorn 2002; Scharpf 2010; Gill 2001). Second, many scholars 
have argued that a democratic deficit exists at the European level,2 which precludes 
widespread popular participation, and thereby consolidates the domination by the 
European political elite over the European public/citizenry (Schmidt 2006; Hix and 
Follesdal 2006; Mair 2007). If we draw upon these criticisms to consider European 
governance in terms of relations of domination, we might consider the European Union 
as an attempt by Europe’s political elite to ensure its continued rule over (and 
domination of) the European citizenry, through recourse to a “de-democratized” form of 
democracy that governs largely through the promotion and extension of the market 
mechanism of private exchange as the regulating principle governing social interaction, 
and in the process maintains the continued domination by capital over labour within the 
site of the European Union (see Bailey 2010 for an extended version of this argument). 
Based on this critical conceptualisation, we argue that the reproduction of three 
mechanisms of domination, each of which have particular implications for EU trade 
policy-making, results from the model of governance constructed within the territory of 
the European Union. In highlighting each of these three mechanisms, we draw upon 
broad debates within relevant fields of critical social science. Thus, rather than engage in 
a detailed discussion of competing positions within each debate, we seek instead to 
identify common points of convergence. This has the advantage of enabling us to 
identify, in broad terms, the mechanisms that we subsequently use to inform a 
discussion, description and explanation of concrete developments in EU trade policy 
making.  
 
Mechanism of domination 1: the (expansionary) market mechanism  
Drawing on broad claims within the Marxist tradition, we can view the European Union’s 
internal focus on market liberalisation and the reproduction of the market mechanism as 
acting in turn to generate pressure for the further expansion of market exchange and 
therefore, in terms of trade policy, the liberalisation of external trading relations. As 
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Robert Boyer puts it, ‘the inner logic of market relations and the incentive to 
permanently innovate challenge (...) domestic institutions (which would otherwise 
restrict market relations to a localized and bounded space)’ (2011: 73; for a similar 
view, see Streeck 2011: 155). The predominance of market exchange as a regulative 
principle within a particular society, therefore, generates pressure for the further 
expansion of that market mechanism. As research within the Marxist tradition has noted 
on a number of occasions, the market both requires, but also renders problematic, the 
continued existence of opportunities for profit-making (Harvey 2006: 183-203). Thus, 
market exchange within capitalist society requires that profits can continue to be 
realised, despite generating a downward pressure upon the rate of profit as a result of 
both market competition and capital accumulation. This contradiction tends to be most 
easily resolved (in part) through the expansion of opportunities for capital to exploit 
labour, albeit acting in turn to set up those same contradictions on a yet further 
expanded scale still. As Karl Marx (1894) put it, ‘(t)he market must, therefore, be 
continually extended, so that its interrelations and the conditions regulating them 
assume more and more the form of a natural law working independently of the producer, 
and become ever more uncontrollable’. As a result, ‘(c)apitalist production seeks 
continually to overcome these immanent barriers, but overcomes them only by means 
which again place these barriers in its way and on a more formidable scale’. In this 
sense, the reproduction of the market mechanism as a mode of governance within the 
European Union generates pressure for greater market-searching expansion beyond the 
boundaries of the European Union, thereby producing a tendency for EU trade policy to 
seek the expansion of market relations and trade liberalisation. This is likely to take a 
form whereby EU trade policy seeks both an increase in opportunities for exports, but 
also welcomes increased import opportunities, due to the increased (and intensified) 
opportunities for market exchange that both elements of market expansion offer.  
 
Mechanism of domination 2: “Othering” the target of expansion 
Alongside the pressure to expand relations of market exchange, we can also draw on 
insights, developed largely within the postcolonialist literature, which note how attempts 
by expansionary systems of domination also generate pressures to (re)produce a 
discourse and culture that portrays that expansionary domination as normal, natural, 
reflecting superior qualities of the “metropole”, and/or beneficial for the target (“Other”) 
population. This also has implications for EU trade policy making. As postcolonialist 
literature has made clear, expansion tends to be depicted in terms of both being to the 
advantage of the (supposedly inferior) receiving “other” and (thereby) serving to 
legitimate the dominant values within the expanding “home” zone. As such, the 
postcolonialist critique ‘turns the gaze back onto the colonizer to better reveal the tactics 
and representational practices of the dominant’ (Kapoor 2008: xiv). This process of 
“Othering”, which colonising powers tend to undertake, can adopt both positive and 
negative forms (see Rutazibwa 2010: 215-21). Positively, colonising forces tend to 
portray themselves as benevolently assisting the colonised to improve its (currently less 
favourable) circumstances, through promotion or prescription of particular types of 
behaviour, including seeking to model behaviour in the colonised region upon that of the 
coloniser, and encouraging colonised regions to become more similar to, engage more 
closely with, and/or welcome the intervention of, the coloniser. Negatively, colonising 
forces tend to stigmatise, prohibit and/or marginalise proponents of those forms of 
behaviour that might act as sources of resistance to colonisation within the colonised 
zone, often in terms of either discussing the inhibiting effect that such behaviour might 
have upon the advancement of the colonised zone itself, or through a moral critique of 
such recalcitrant forms of behaviour.  
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Mechanism of domination 3: de-politicising expansionary domination  
Finally, the third mechanism of domination engendered by the EU mode of governance, 
which we expect to impact upon EU trade policy-making, is the tendency often noted 
within radical democratic theory for liberal (representative) democracy to systematically 
act to limit popular participation in decision-making (see, for instance, Wood 1995; 
Prichard 2010; Roussopoulos 2005). Thus, if the European Union is to maintain itself as 
an expansionary and Othering market-oriented mode of governance, it is also necessary 
that the process of expansion and Othering that constitutes EU trade policy-making is 
itself sufficiently de-politicised, by which we mean that citizens fail to effectively contest 
the lack of democratic deliberation that such a policy presumes (for a discussion of 
depoliticisation, see Burnham 2001; Buller and Flinders 2006; and as applied to the case 
of EU external relations, see Shields 2011). In order for this technocratic model of 
market-oriented governance to be workable within the European Union, and for that 
model to be exported and legitimated as outlined in the discussion of Othering provided 
above, it is also necessary that popular participation in, opposition to, or mobilisation 
against, such mechanisms of domination are absent (or at least minimised).3 We should 
therefore anticipate that an EU trade policy experiencing pressure to realise market 
expansion and promote an Othering of target regions, should likewise be characterised 
by a process of depoliticisation, whereby EU political elites seek to avoid or minimise 
popular participation in and opposition to EU trade policy-making. 
In sum, we identify three mechanisms of domination that characterise and act to 
reproduce the EU model of governance (and thereby generate pressure for their 
realisation) – expansive market (capitalist) exchange, the “Othering” that tends to 
accompany such processes of expansion, and the de-politicisation that forms part of the 
attempt to realise and/or legitimate these processes. This conceptualisation is used 
below to inform an account of recent developments in EU trade policy.  
 
EU TRADE POLICY AND THE EXPANSION OF MARKET (CAPITALIST) EXCHANGE 
While still publicly presenting itself as a champion of multilateralism, in recent years the 
EU has increasingly focused on negotiating bilateral and regional trade deals in an 
attempt to increase market liberalisation between the EU and third countries/regions. 
Indeed, reversing a moratorium on bilateral and regional trade agreements introduced in 
1999 by then Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, DG Trade reverted in 2006 to bilateral 
negotiations as a means to pursue further trade liberalisation in the light of (government 
and corporate) frustration felt at the lingering deadlock of the Doha Round of WTO 
negotiations. This ‘bilateral turn’ was announced by DG Trade in its “Global Europe” 
agenda in late 2006, which called for the active pursuit of bilateral and regional trade 
arrangements with emerging markets in view of securing new market access for EU 
businesses - the so-called new generation of free trade agreements (European 
Commission 2006a).  
Presented as DG Trade’s contribution to the Lisbon Agenda, the “Global Europe” strategy 
aimed at increasing Europe’s economic competitiveness. Prospective FTA partners were 
therefore selected based on the key economic criteria of market potential and level of 
protectionism against EU export interests, whilst taking into account the partners’ 
negotiations or trade agreements with EU competitors. This resulted in India, South 
Korea and ASEAN4 being singled out as three target markets of key interest to EU export 
companies. Simultaneously, the release of the “Global Europe” communication 
significantly endorsed and accelerated the EU’s plans to improve access opportunities of 
European companies to the regional markets of the Andean Community (CAN) and 
Central America.5 This led to the inclusion of trade and trade-related provisions in the 
mandates for the Association Agreements (AAs) envisaged with the two regions similar 
to the provisions presented in the mandates for the FTAs with the Asian growth markets.  
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While the bi-regional negotiations with Central America progressed relatively smoothly, 
the bi-regional talks with CAN were soon suspended due to internal disagreement within 
the Andean bloc over some of the trade-related issues in the planned AA. Eager to 
proceed with the negotiations, the Council authorised a modified negotiating mandate 
based on a proposal from the Commission to negotiate a separate multi-party trade 
agreement with those Andean countries that are interested in concluding a trade pact 
with the EU, in casu Peru and Colombia. The bi-regional formula also proved difficult in 
the case of ASEAN. Here poor progress in the bi-regional trade talks also led the EU to 
hold bilateral negotiations with individual members of the Association, notably the most 
economically advanced members, including Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam.6 The 
promptness with which the EU shifted towards a bilateral track of talks with individual 
member countries of ASEAN and CAN overshadowed its commitment to promote regional 
integration in the respective regions, and revealed the EU’s steadfast determination to 
enhance market liberalisation. 
In launching the “Global Europe” strategy in 2006, the Commission clearly sought a 
more direct approach to securing the expansion of market exchange with third countries 
than had until that point been secured through multilateral negotiations at the WTO. In 
doing so, DG Trade sought to meet pressure to expand market relations that it had been 
experiencing from domestic export-oriented actors, themselves empowered by the 
market-oriented mode of EU governance (Siles-Brügge 2010; Dür 2011). The strategy 
highlighted the way in which the model of economic growth being reproduced within 
Europe generated pressure to expand market exchange beyond Europe’s borders, 
thereby creating a general pressure for market liberalisation between the EU and third 
countries/regions. In the words of the then EU Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson: 
‘More than ever, Europe needs to import to export; to trade in order to grow. Our supply 
chains are global. We need to be open so that we can insist on openness from others’ 
(European Commission 2006a: Foreword). The fact that the proposed series of FTAs 
were designed to be ‘WTO-plus agreements’ further indicated the EU’s determination to 
improve market access for its export companies, aimed at tackling not only tariff barriers 
to trade but also regulatory and non-trade barriers, including issues such as competition, 
investment and public procurement, which – in the Commission’s terms - were not yet 
‘ready for multilateral discussion’ (European Commission 2006a: 11).  
The move away from the moratorium on bilateral free trade agreements in 2006 was 
driven largely by concern within the EU that the US and Japan were forming trade 
relations with emerging countries/regions. The fear was that, should these relations be 
consolidated, they would pre-empt and preclude the expansion of such market exchange 
relations between the EU and those emerging countries/regions (Siles-Brügge 2010: 12-
13; Bossuyt 2009: 707). Opportunities for market expansion were therefore threatened 
if the EU did not start deepening its trade relations with these growth markets. As the 
Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the “Global Europe” communication 
declared, EU exports were ‘less well positioned in rapidly growing areas, particularly 
compared to the Japanese and US exports. We risk missing market opportunities in 
dynamic areas, which account already for half of world import growth’ (European 
Commission 2006b: 5). Moreover, since the global economic crisis began in 2008, 
pressure to secure enhanced market exchange seems to have further built up, as the 
Commission has increased its focus on achieving trade liberalisation through ambitious 
FTAs. Declaring that ‘trade has a key role to play in the economic recovery’, Trade 
Commissioner Karel de Gucht announced a focus on further trade liberalisation at the 
release in November 2010 of the Commission’s new trade strategy, ‘Trade, Growth and 
World Affairs’ (De Gucht 2010a).  
In sum, pressure to expand market relations, generated by the need to identify new 
market opportunities in order to keep up with global market competitors and respond to 
the reduction in such opportunities created by the post-2008 crisis has had a clear 
impact upon EU trade policy since 2006. In contrast to more “empirical” accounts, which 
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have been keen to assess the extent to which this pursuit of further global market share 
might be accompanied by a normative, or “progressive”, counter-hegemonic agenda 
(see, for instance, Bossuyt 2009; Specht 2006; True 2009; Orbie 2011), the critical 
approach presented here plausibly depicts this process as one of market extension in 
order to consolidate and maintain the market relations that have already been 
established within and beyond the European Union. 
 
EU TRADE POLICY AND THE “OTHERING” OF TARGET COUNTRIES/REGIONS 
EU trade policy has also shown considerable signs of reflecting pressure to “Other” those 
countries that are being targeted for expansionary market liberalisation as described 
above. As noted, “Othering” takes both positive and negative forms, as can be witnessed 
in the case of the new generation of FTAs.  
In terms of positive forms of “Othering”, we witness three ways in which submission to 
the EU’s market expansion is portrayed by the EU as being of benefit to receiving 
(target) countries. First, the Commission (and DG Trade in particular) routinely argues 
that receiving countries will benefit from expanded trade relations with the European 
Union, in terms of an increased likelihood of achieving both greater economic 
development and poverty reduction. For instance, the “Global Europe” communication 
declared that, ‘(p)rogressive trade opening can be a powerful factor in increased 
productivity, growth ... and in reducing poverty and promoting development around the 
world’ (European Commission 2006a: Executive Summary). This tends to be depicted as 
the EU benevolently seeking to facilitate third countries’ development. These 
developmental benefits, it is claimed, will also filter down to the citizens of target 
countries. For example, in the position paper accompanying the Sustainability Impact 
Assessment for the prospective FTA with India, the Commission declared that, ‘increases 
in incomes, real wages, employment opportunities and declining poverty ratios could 
indirectly have positive effects’ on health and education in India (European Commission, 
2010b: 3). Similar claims were made in the Commission’s 2010 communication, Trade, 
Growth and World Affairs, which noted that ‘developing countries that have entered 
global trade and production chains have seen incomes and employment grow rapidly as 
well as significant reductions in poverty’ (European Commission 2010a: 5). These claims 
have been echoed on multiple occasions by Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht in 
statements made in the context of the new generation of FTAs, inter alia, when 
addressing audiences from the partner countries concerned (see De Gucht 2010b, 
2010d, 2011a).  
Second, DG Trade routinely argues that receiving countries will benefit from expanded 
trade relations with the European Union in terms of an increased likelihood of more 
equitable socio-economic outcomes for the receiving countries, most notably through the 
inclusion in the respective FTAs of a comprehensive sustainable development chapter 
(De Gucht 2010d). As stated by Trade Commissioner De Gucht (2011b) when addressing 
a Malaysian audience upon his visit to the country:  
‘Trade must be inclusive so that everyone can share the benefits. It's not just 
about opening markets but it's about helping people, and countries, adjust to 
open markets as well. That is why setting a broad trade agenda remains so 
important to me. I want to make sure that the negotiations look at the trade 
implications on environmental and social factors. And of course there are policies 
outside the field of trade that are essential for prosperity to spread.’ 
Thus, the “Global Europe” communication announced that new FTAs would include ‘new 
co-operative provisions in areas relating to labour standards and environmental 
protection’ (European Commission 2006a: 12). Moreover, stressing the importance of 
dialogue with civil society, the social agenda of the “Global Europe” strategy calls for the 
Volume 9, Issue 4 (2013) jcer.net David Bailey, Fabienne Bossuyt 
 568 
establishment in the partner countries of a dialogue mechanism to allow for the 
consultation of - as well as monitoring by - civil society regarding the sustainable 
development aspects of the respective FTAs. In addition, Sustainability Impact 
Assessments have been conducted for each of the FTAs, which as in the case of the 
Indian FTA, are designed to be ‘preventive, mitigation and enhancement measures ... for 
ensuring and strengthening the pro-poor and pro-gender equality effects of the FTA’ 
(European Commission 2010b: 8).  
Third, DG Trade promotes regional economic integration as a means by which to achieve 
development and prosperity, thereby routinely referring to its own model and experience 
of regional integration. This is therefore a process whereby the EU advocates replication 
of the coloniser’s mode of behaviour, which Rutazibwa (2010) refers to as an ‘isomorphic 
intervener centric mechanism’. As envisaged in the original mandates for the 
negotiations with ASEAN, Central America and CAN, one of the overarching goals was to 
stimulate and consolidate regional integration within the respective regions, which was 
to be pursued through full region-to-region negotiations in all trade and trade-related 
areas with the three regional blocs. Even after the abandoning of full region-to-region 
negotiations with CAN and ASEAN (see above), DG Trade has sought to refer to the 
merits of regional integration in the subsequent bilateral trade talks with receiving 
countries from the respective regions. For instance, in a speech delivered at the Lee 
Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore, Trade Commissioner De Gucht (2010c) 
noted that, 
‘we have a soft spot for regional integration processes elsewhere. (...). With the 
ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, ASEAN has set 
itself ambitious goals. The EU has been a long-time supporter of this process, we 
will continue to do so, and as a regional group you can always count on a 
sympathetic ear in Brussels. Nobody else knows and understands the challenges 
of regional integration as well as we do’. 
In sum, there are three ways in which the European Union seeks to highlight the positive 
benefits to be reaped by “Other” countries or regions: increased prospects for 
international development; greater opportunities to achieve more equitable socio-
economic outcomes; and advantages to be accrued by countries and regions that 
replicate the European Union model of governance. It is here, therefore, that we see 
most clearly the EU’s self-declared ‘normative’, or counter-hegemonic, identity being 
proclaimed in casu by DG Trade.  
In terms of negative forms of “Othering”, the Commission and DG Trade have articulated 
a discourse whereby third regions or countries are denigrated for routinely acting 
unfairly by failing to comply with EU-led market expansion. As such, target countries and 
regions represent potential sites of danger or immorality that must be “civilised” by the 
more ethically sound European Union. We witness the Commission claiming, for 
instance, that ‘many of the EU’s major trading partners operate discriminatory 
procurement practices which impede the fair participation of EU suppliers in national 
procurement markets’ (European Commission 2006b: 9). Similarly, emerging countries 
are considered to maintain ‘unnecessarily high barriers to EU exports’ (European 
Commission 2006a: 6). In the area of public procurement, EU exporting companies ‘face 
discriminatory practices in almost all our trading partners’ (European Commission 
2006a: 8). Further, third countries undertake ‘unreasonable subsidization of local 
companies or anti-competitive practices’ and have ‘little transparency over the granting 
of aids’ (European Commission 2006a: 8). As a result, the Commission needs to ‘prise 
open markets that are illegally closed’ (European Commission, 2010a: 12). In sum, the 
Commission needs to act to ensure ‘that European firms do not suffer in third countries’ 
(European Commission 2010c: 14), a process which might include ‘“naming and 
shaming” third countries’ that failed to enforce its commitments to free trade (European 
Commission 2010a: 12). 
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The approach that the EU is taking towards the new generation of FTAs has in fact led to 
accusations of neo-colonialism from partner countries, in particular in Latin America, 
which feel that the EU’s FTA agenda does not sufficiently account for the asymmetry 
inherent to their trade relations with the EU.7 Indeed, while the EU insists that the trade 
partners targeted under the new generation of FTAs are treated as ‘equal partners’, it 
cannot be denied that there exists a huge asymmetry between the EU and many of the 
trade partners concerned, such as Peru, Colombia, India, Vietnam, Indonesia and the 
Central American countries, most of which are still considered developing countries. In 
addition, while publicly announcing that it concedes to countries’ specific needs, the EU 
has not refrained from concluding a multi-party trade agreement with Peru and 
Colombia, which it stresses Ecuador and Bolivia can still join but only if they agree to a 
‘Single Undertaking’. 
In sum, DG Trade has consistently sought to “Other” – both positively and negatively - 
those countries targeted for expansionary market liberalisation. This therefore echoes 
forms of dominance highlighted by post-colonialist scholars, whereby informal power 
over third countries/regions is consolidated through the promotion of norms that express 
the superiority of the dominant “metropole”. Whilst existing approaches to the EU’s 
proclaimed counter-hegemonic power through trade have tended to focus on the extent 
to which a progressive agenda might be realised through such expansionary policies, the 
critical social science account developed herein instead focuses on the way in which this 
process can be considered an attempt to consolidate EU dominance over third 
countries/regions and legitimate the extension of market relations being sought.  
 
EU TRADE POLICY AND DE-POLITICISATION 
Finally, we can witness in the development of EU trade policy clear signs of the pressure 
for de-politicisation (or de-democratisation) upon trade policymaking. Indeed, in many 
ways the institutional configuration of EU trade policy, which foresees little insight into 
and limited oversight of its decision-making by the ‘general public’ and even by elected 
politicians, acts to ensure such an outcome. Thus, the EU trade policy-making machinery 
grants considerable power and discretion to the Commission in contrast to other actors 
(in particular the European Parliament8 and national parliaments), and the Commission 
tends to prioritise market-enhancing (including regulatory non-interventionist) objectives 
rather than market-adjusting, interventionist goals (Orbie 2008: 62). From this 
perspective, as Jan Orbie puts it (2008: 62), ‘the limited capacity of the EU to engage in 
a normative external trade agenda basically relates to its raison d’être: the Union is 
institutionally designed to promote negative integration and market-enhancing policies 
rather than positive integration and redistribution’. In other words, and as we argued 
above, as an external trade actor, the EU reproduces its internal role as a market-
enhancing regulatory state because of its historical internal market focus and 
experience. In upholding this de-politicised, de-democratised form of EU trade 
policymaking, DG Trade tends to adopt three broad positions, which we might consider 
to range on a spectrum of varying levels of DG Trade’s preparedness to cede a role in 
policy-making to both popular contestation and input.  
First, and perhaps representing the position that cedes least ground to popular concerns 
or demands, DG Trade has argued that contemporary economic conditions necessitate 
market-oriented expansion, which thereby puts the policy beyond public discussion or 
debate. For instance, in the “Global Europe” communication the Commission claims that 
‘Europe must reject protectionism’ (European Commission 2006a: 5, emphasis added), 
‘more than ever, Europe needs to import to export’ (European Commission 2006a: 7, 
emphasis added), and that ‘economic factors must play a primary role in the choice of 
future FTAs’ (European Commission 2006a: 11, emphasis added). This necessitarian 
discourse has (predictably) been reinforced as a result of the post-2008 global economic 
crisis, witnessing the Commission claim, for instance, that ‘(i)n today’s difficult economic 
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climate it is more important than ever that we open up opportunities for our businesses 
to trade their way out of the downturn’ (European Commission 2008). 
Second, and showing more willingness to cede a role for public opinion, the Commission 
and DG Trade have actively sought to consult societal actors, but in doing so tend to 
discriminate between corporate actors and non-corporate actors. As illustrated by 
Gabriel Siles-Brügge (2010), since the launch of the Commission’s Market Access 
Strategy in 1996, pro-liberalization business interests have been increasingly involved in 
various forms of consultation with DG Trade. As the author indicates, ‘one of the 
cornerstones of this new strategy was a concerted effort on behalf of the Commission to 
involve business interests in policy-making. (...) This allowed, in the light of the Market 
Access Strategy’s emphasis on engagement with pro-liberalization business groups, the 
services lobby to emerge as a key player in trade policy-making, which came to be 
closely allied to policy-makers in the Commission’ (for a similar view, see also Dür 
2008a). While business groups are found to wield considerable impact on the EU’s trade 
policy agenda and outcome (Dür, 2008a, 2008b), empirical studies find little evidence of 
systematic influence of any civil society organisations, including that of Brussels-based 
European NGOs despite their actively engaging in lobbying and campaigning in an 
attempt to influence the European trade agenda (Dür and De Bièvre 2007; Jarman 2008; 
Hannah 2011; Trommer 2011).  
This finding is also widely evinced in the case of the new generation of FTAs, which 
shows how business interests, and in particular those of export-oriented/pro-
liberalisation businesses, have been both consulted more and have carried substantially 
greater weight than those of civil society actors, including trade unions and NGOs. 
Indeed, while pro-liberalisation business lobby groups, such as BusinessEurope and the 
ESF, have been given privileged access to the decision-making process, both during the 
drafting process of the “Global Europe” strategy (Siles-Brügge 2010) and during the 
negotiations of the FTAs concerned (Eberhardt and Dharmendra 2010), the interests of 
civil society have received much less attention. Apart from the few instances where civil 
society actors were consulted, most notably at DG Trade’s institutionalised platform for 
dialogue with civil society, the views of NGOs and trade unions have been largely 
neglected. Moreover, despite the active campaigning by and mobilisation of a 
considerable number of civil society organisations concerned with the possible negative 
social, environmental and/or development impact of the FTAs,9 NGOs have had little or 
no impact on the policy agenda and outcomes (Agence Europe 2010a; Bossuyt 2009; 
Eberhardt and Dharmendra 2010; Specht 2006).10 In addition, as the case of the EU-
Peru-Colombia FTA shows, the Commission has rebuffed deliberate attempts by civil 
society organisations and national parliaments to “politicise” and “democratise” the 
policy-making process of the FTA by demanding that the trade agreement be declared 
‘mixed’, and therefore become subject to national parliamentary discussion and 
ratification. Indeed, civil society organizations from across Europe and Latin America, 
alongside the ITUC and the ETUC, have asked for the opening up of the agreement ‘to a 
Europe-wide debate by elected politicians’, backed by parliamentarians of Germany, UK, 
the Netherlands and Ireland who have presented motions demanding that the FTA be 
declared a ‘mixed agreement’ in attempt to safeguard their parliaments’ participatory 
rights (Olivet and Novo 2011: 2; Bossuyt 2012; German Bundestag 2010; UK Parliament 
2010).  
Third, and ceding most ground to the notion that popular contestation and input have a 
legitimate place in EU trade policy-making, DG Trade has (as we have already 
witnessed) undertaken a number of commitments to advance extra-market values and 
policy goals, perhaps most obviously in the form of the counter-hegemonic, 
redistributive and progressive policy goals indicated above. In doing so, however, DG 
Trade acts to limit (and thereby de-politicise) expectations relating to the likely outcome 
of these efforts, most notably through specific reference both to internal divisions 
(between EU institutions, and between EU member states) and external differences 
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between the EU and third countries/regions, which act to hamper (and thereby preclude) 
such goals. Thus, in seeking to quell (or pre-empt), and thereby de-politicise, civil 
society opposition to the market-oriented nature of EU trade policy, the Commission has 
tended to make limited concessions by committing to pursue more progressive goals. For 
example, this includes practices as engaging in extensive “legal inflation”, whereby 
extensive commitments are included in regional agreements but without the supportive 
legal binding mechanisms that would be necessary to ensure their implementation (Horn 
et al. 2009). This can also be observed in the case of the “social agenda” of the new 
generation of FTAs, in that the social provisions included in the sustainable development 
chapter of these trade deals are “non-binding”, asking only for a “commitment” from the 
partner countries to implement them (Bossuyt 2009). As McGuire and Lindeque (2010: 
1338) point out, this kind of “legal inflation” is ‘largely about satisfying domestic 
European audiences’. DG Trade’s institutionalised dialogue with civil society can be 
considered to serve the same goal. That is, by offering a consultation mechanism, the 
Commission, lacking an electoral mandate, aims to increase its legitimacy as a policy-
maker (Hocking 2004) and thus to appease civil society.11 
Legal inflation has allowed ‘Member States to claim that their particular demands have 
been taken account of’ (McGuire and Lindeque 2010: 1338). In the case of the new 
generation of FTAs, it has also served as a tool for the Commission to try and satisfy the 
European Parliament, and thus to claim that it has taken into account particular 
demands raised at the plenary. Indeed, the latter has been rather vocal in expressing 
concern about the trade deals, in particular those with India, Central America, Peru and 
Colombia, due to the limited attention paid to socio-economic and environmental issues 
(see Agence Europe 2010b, 2010c) and – in the case of India - health protection 
(European Parliament 2011). The Parliament is also insisting that DG Trade should not 
compromise on the proposed sustainable development chapter in the trade 
arrangements still being negotiated with India and the other Asian trade partners 
(European Parliament 2009, 2010). In a similar vein, the Parliament reacted quite 
heavily against the decision made by the Commission and the Council to drop the human 
rights clause in the prospective trade agreement with India (European Parliament 2008).  
In responding to criticisms of the new generation of FTAs, the Commission has sought to 
limit expectations through reference to the impact of internal divisions in preventing 
more substantive achievements from being realised. Further, even when DG Trade is 
unable to realise its purported “social agenda” due to opposition from third 
countries/regions, the predictable nature of this external opposition is such that it can be 
relied upon to legitimate the minimal realisation of substantive social or progressive 
outcomes and therefore indirectly acts to enhance the legitimacy of DG Trade itself. 
Thus, DG Trade has been found playing the innocent in those cases where its attempts 
to embed normative goals in the new trade agreements have failed in the face of strong 
opposition from the partner governments and subsequent pressure from EU member 
states to drop the ‘contested’ issues off the negotiating agenda in order not to 
compromise the considerable trade benefits of the bilateral arrangements, most notably 
in the case of India.12 As noted at the beginning of this article, it is these limiting 
obstacles, which act to lower and contain expectations, and thereby constitute a form of 
de-politicisation, that are most commonly referred to by EU trade scholars seeking to 
understand the inability of the European Union to realise a more substantive progressive 
agenda. This focus by EU trade scholars, we argue, acts to reproduce (rather than 
interrogate or demystify) one of the Commission’s mechanisms of de-politicisation. In 
contrast, the critical social science approach adopted herein conceptualises this lowering 
of expectations as a more general process of de-politicisation generated by the 
contemporary model of European governance. 
Therefore, rather than viewing the EU as a ‘conflicted power through trade’ (Meunier and 
Nicolaidis 2006), we instead conceptualise it as a ‘conveniently-conflicted counter-
hegemon through trade’, which seeks to reconcile (potentially contradictory) pressures 
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to secure expansionary trade relations, the “Othering” of the target countries/regions 
within which such expansion is targeted, and the de-politicisation of these processes. 
This, we claim, is sought through the proclamation of (egalitarian, counter-hegemonic) 
benefits that will accrue to “Other” third countries and regions that form the target for 
trade liberalization, alongside reference to the convenient inhibiting divisions (both 
internally and with prospective trade partners) that act to prevent such egalitarian 
outcomes from being realised and thereby serve to lower public expectations. Whereas 
empirical approaches have highlighted the role of these internal and external differences 
in inhibiting a proclaimed “counter-hegemonic” agenda from being realised, we instead 
provide a plausible account of the process whereby an arguably unrealisable progressive 
agenda is advanced (but unrealised), and the fact of its non-realisation is (in part) 
legitimated through reference to the existence of internal and external differences. We 
claim that this approach, informed by our critical social science approach, is more 
adequate than alternative accounts that dominate this literature, in that it is both able to 
provide a plausible explanation for the phenomenon being observed, and acts to 
illuminate and demystify the relations of domination (and associated ideas) that it claims 
have resulted in the outcome occurring. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that existing accounts of EU trade policy have been unable to 
fully account for the routinely observed constraints upon the EU’s frequently declared 
aspiration to act as a ‘force for good’ through trade. This, we claim, is due to an 
insufficiently critical approach to the study of EU trade policy-making, resulting in a 
tendency to reflect (rather than interrogate) the stated aims and ambitions of EU trade 
policy-makers. Drawing on a critical discussion of mechanisms of domination that we 
argue constitute the contemporary model of European governance, and which give rise 
to a number of pressures being exerted upon EU trade policy, we have therefore sought 
to reconceptualise the EU as a conveniently-conflicted counter-hegemon through trade. 
EU trade policy is largely driven by pressures to achieve market expansion, accompanied 
by a process of “Othering”, the legitimation of which is sought (in part) through a 
discourse highlighting the egalitarian (counter-hegemonic) outcomes that will be 
achieved through such a process of expansion, whilst internal divergence and external 
differences ensure (somewhat conveniently) that such egalitarian outcomes will not be 
realised. As such, we substitute what we claim is a common assumption held by scholars 
of EU trade policy (i.e. that a global progressive agenda, to be achieved through EU 
trade policy, is a viable but as yet unrealised aspiration) with an alternative assumption 
(that EU trade policy is designed to perpetuate core mechanisms of domination and 
cannot, therefore, be expected to sustain progressive goals). In short, we argue that 
claims regarding the counter-hegemonic tendencies of the European Union’s trade policy 
are designed to conceal and legitimate an inherently neoliberal project. Understood in 
such a way, we contend that we are able to provide a more plausible account of the 
consistently experienced obstacles impeding the realisation of the EU’s commonly 
declared progressive agenda through trade. Thus, rather than viewing the EU as a 
‘conflicted trade power’ (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006), our critical social science 
approach leads us instead to conceptualise the European Union as a conveniently-
conflicted counter-hegemon through trade. 
 
*** 
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1 We should note that this view is contested by a number of authors, in particular those more positive 
about the achievements of (or prospects for) the Social Europe agenda (see, for instance, Albers et al. 
2006; Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008). However, in attempting to present a conceptualisation of the 
European Union that focuses on relations of domination, we adopt the more critical conceptualisation 
that exists within the literature on the grounds that this coheres more readily with our critical social 
science approach. 
2 We should note that this claim has also been contested within the literature, perhaps most notably by 
Andrew Moravcsik (2004), who argues that by the standards of actually-existing democratic systems, 
the European Union has a number of substantive checks and balances that enable it to approximate the 
democratic credentials of other existing democracies. Again, however, as we are seeking to present a 
conceptualisation of relations of domination, we adopt in the present article the view presented within 
the more critical literature, on the grounds that it coheres with our critical social science approach. 
3 Whilst the technocratic nature of EU decision making is problematised in the present article, other 
scholars have adopted a more benign interpretation (see, for instance, Radaelli 1999). 
4 ASEAN consists of the following ten states: Brunei/Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Burma/Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.  
5 The Central American region comprises Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua, while CAN consists of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. 
6 Apart from the EU’s reluctance to open its market to Myanmar, the possible conclusion of a full region-
to-region FTA with ASEAN is hampered by the development discrepancies among the ASEAN economies, 
as well as by a set of formal complications resulting from the fact that ASEAN is not yet integrated as a 
customs union and has neither a harmonised legislation nor a representation mechanism. 
7 See, for instance, interview with then Foreign Minister of Ecuador, Fander Falconi, by the Latin 
American Press Agency, Prensa Latina, on 7 June 2011. 
8 It should be noted, of course, that the European Parliament has been granted more powers in relation 
to EU trade policy-making under the Lisbon Treaty. In particular, new EU trade agreements can no 
longer come into force without the approval of the Parliament, as the latter now enjoys co-decision 
power with the Council. 
9 Illustrative examples of such campaigning and mobilisation initiatives include an open letter signed by 
over 80 civil society organizations from across Europe, Asia and Latin America in April 2007, calling on 
the Council of Ministers ‘to reject the recommendations from the European Commission that it be 
granted authority to negotiate the [proposed] FTAs’, for they constitute ‘a serious threat to social 
justice, gender equity and sustainable development, both within and outside the EU’ (N/A 2007). 
Another example is a mass rally of more than 2,000 protesters in New Delhi in March 2011, protesting 
against the proposed inclusion of a ‘data exclusivity’ clause in the prospective EU-India FTA (EUObserver 
2011, 3 March). 
10 Interview with NGO lobbyist, 20 January 2012. 
11 Interview with DG Trade official on 9 November 2007. 
12 Interview with senior DG Trade official on 5 November 2007. For more details, see Bossuyt (2009).  
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This article offers a critical analysis of EU trade policy. It does so by highlighting the political and economic 
enclosures within which EU trade policy is embedded and that continue to hamper more holistic and 
interdisciplinary analyses that are argued to be necessary in order to comprehend the obstacles to and avenues 
towards a more sustainable and socially just world. The article critically analyses economic and political 
hegemony by drawing on two strands of critical international thought, namely neo-Gramscian analysis and 
global political ecology, employing a critical realist approach. The article identifies the perceived twin short-
comings of conventional analyses: firstly, the neglect of understandings of power relations and social justice, 
and secondly the lack of attention to criteria of sustainability. Within critical debates about European 
governance, including the governance of trade and trade policy, neo-Gramscian perspectives highlight the power 
relations within EU governance, exposing the mechanisms of hegemony as well as identifying potential counter-
hegemonic forces. While this offers important insights, the article argues that a critical perspective cannot be 
complete without attention to sustainability. Political ecology makes a vital contribution to critical perspectives 
by highlighting the natural limits within which by necessity all human activity takes place. Using illustrations 
from trade policy debates, the article argues that current EU trade policy and governance is not best placed to 
meet the challenges of sustainability and social justice and it points to the need for more holistic systems 
thinking to challenge orthodoxy. 
Critical international political economy; hegemony of economic and political orthodoxy; political ecology; 
social justice, sustainability 
 
 
 
Increasing and incontrovertible scientific evidence demonstrates that the planetary 
boundaries within which life on this planet flourishes are being breached to dangerous 
levels and if left unchecked could have severe consequences for the continued survival of 
human and other life forms (Rockström et al. 2009). At the same time we face a 
convergence of financial, energy, food, population and development crises. The 
sustainability movement recognises that solutions to these crises must be both 
sustainable and equitable (Fortnam et al. 2010, Raworth 2012). However, there is no 
consensus on how to deliver on both sustainability and social justice, despite decades of 
a discourse on sustainable development (Brand 2012). Evidence of unsustainability and 
injustice is widely documented and despite global efforts to address these issues, as 
witnessed in numerous global policy documents from the UN to the World Bank, action 
on these issues has been weak. Take for example the UN Convention on Climate 
Change, which has so far failed to negotiate a successor to even the rather unambitious 
Kyoto Protocol. Similarly, slow progress is being made in meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals, which end in 2015 (Fukada-Parr et.al. 2012). 
Critical political ecological voices identify unsustainable economic doctrine – including, 
for example, unquestioned demands for continued and unbridled economic growth – as 
being at the root of both unsustainability as well as social injustice (see Kovel 2009; 
Foster 2009), but economic discourse is rarely questioned in the neoliberal mainstream. 
Indeed, economic growth is seen as the solution to questions of unsustainability and 
social injustice (OECD 2011; Withagen and Smulders 2012). In Europe, we find there is 
much progress in creating and implementing progressive environmental and social 
policies (Kronsell 1997; Jordan 2005). And yet in Europe too there is tension and 
contradiction between the creation of an economic project that is globally focussed on 
expansion and competition and a political project that pays attention to concerns such as 
social justice and sustainability. Nowhere is this tension more visible than in EU trade 
policy, hence this article takes trade policy as the focus in which it seeks to analyse 
some of these tensions. 
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Trade is one of the core elements of the EU’s 2020 Strategy, which emphasises growth 
above all else. The new mantra ‘smart growth, sustainable growth, inclusive growth’ is 
speckled throughout the 34 page document (European Commission 2010). To roll out a 
synergistic trade policy that chimes with the 2020 strategy, the European Commission’s 
Directorate General Trade brought out the document Trade, Growth and World Affairs: 
Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU’s 2020 Strategy in the same year (European 
Commission 2010a). These documents address questions of sustainability and social 
justice, all within a continued framework of economic growth. And yet, critical political 
ecological commentators might legitimately ask the question, how sustainable and just is 
EU trade policy? Is it possible to square current neo-liberal trade policy with the 
preservation of ecological and social diversity? The mining of tar sands for petroleum, for 
example, is a hugely destructive business both ecologically and socially, and yet is a 
central controversy in the current bi-lateral free trade negotiations between EU and 
Canada, to do with creating market access for European firms (Bartels and Henckels 
2011; UK Tar Sands Network, 2011; CANC 2012). Neo-Gramscian analysis helps us to 
analyse these unequal power relations within EU trade policy making, where corporate 
interests have more sway than social and ecological voices. They help us to analyse 
these power relations in terms of capitalist hegemony and they show the tensions and 
power struggles present within European elites, over which the social European contract 
is fought out. Neoliberal demands for liberalisation and opening up of markets are 
currently taking precedence over ecological and social concerns.   
Critical social theory points to the entrenched political, economic, and socio-cultural 
structures that reproduce unsustainability and social injustice. The challenges to 
planetary boundaries as well as social injustices in general force us to rethink the 
contours of human existence: how we, as a species, live on planet Earth, how we meet 
our needs through production and consumption thereby transforming nature, how we 
collectively organise to meet these needs. To begin to answer these questions an 
examination of power relations is necessary. These questions also lead to a deeper 
questioning of the epistemological and ontological contours of orthodox thinking on 
political economy, including the political economy of trade, globally and in the European 
domain. This article seeks to contribute to these critical conversations and 
interrogations, by specifically looking at EU trade governance and policy. 
There is a diversity of paradigms that seek to make sense of EU trade policy. Mainstream 
functionalist and rationalist analyses of trade theory tend to eschew analyses of power 
relations as well as wider economic, political or socio-cultural structures. The main 
purpose is to explain trade through the rational actor model (see Dür and De Bievre 
2007). This may explain actors’ behaviour within very narrow margins, but does not 
allow for broader questioning of economic models. Core mainstream economic 
assumptions are taken for granted and reproduced without critical reflection. For 
example, Andreas Dür equates trade liberalisation with the public good ‘trade policies 
that further the public good, that is, achieve trade liberalisation’ (2008: 27). More recent 
constructivist approaches bring in the role of interests and ideas and allow for the 
analysis of non-state actors (Wallace et al. 2005). However, these ideational approaches 
fail to locate policy-making within the wider structures of the global political economy. 
This article proposes a more holistic and critical realist framework, which enables us to 
take seriously our real dependence upon the physical world, as well as the real causal 
effects of ideology (Bhaskar et al. 2009). This allows analysing how current trade policies 
reflect and perpetuate broader economic, political and socio-cultural structures that at 
present can be described as embedded in neoliberal capitalist global hegemony (Kovel 
2007; Gamble 2009), which exacerbates environmental degradation and social injustice 
(Gorz 1987; Foster 2002, 2009). Conventional neo-classical analysis does not reflect 
upon its own location within this broader terrain but rather focuses on how trade can be 
made more efficient, or more open. In some cases it may reflect upon how trade could 
be made to be more inclusive and fair (see COM 2009) and most recently trade has been 
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employed as part of perceived solutions to climate change through mechanisms such as 
carbon emissions trading (Directive 2003/87/EC; Ellerman 2009). In terms of external 
trade policy, however, the EU shares the WTO’s emphasis on liberalization and opening 
up of markets and thus a commitment to concluding the WTO Doha Round (European 
Commission 2010a, 2010c) as well as increasingly operating a system of bilateral trade 
agreements (Siles-Brugge 2011; Hurt 2013: 51). 
Rather than an in-depth analysis of EU trade policy, this article offers a critical analysis 
of the frame within which EU trade policy is located, drawing on two strands of critical 
international thought, namely neo-Gramscian analysis and global political ecology. 
Illustrations of concrete, empirical trade policy are used throughout the article, rather 
than organising the article into discrete sections of theory and the empirical. This is 
predominantly a conceptual piece, which does not make it any less causally relevant in 
the world. Indeed, the power of ideas and conceptual frameworks within which trade 
policy and trade policy making is seen to be located is very real indeed, with very real 
consequences for people and planet (Bhaskar et.al. 2010; Fairclough 1989). The 
methodological, epistemological and ontological contours of such a critical approach will 
be laid out below in the first section. 
The second section shows how within critical debates about European governance, 
including the governance of trade and hence trade policy, neo-Gramscian perspectives 
highlight the role of particular social forces in maintaining neoliberal hegemony, notably 
transnational capitalist class and business elites, as well as counter-hegemonic social 
forces (Bieler and Morton 2001; van Apeldoorn 2001; Cafruny and Ryner 2003). Neo-
Gramscian perspectives serve to highlight the power relations within EU governance, 
exposing the mechanisms of hegemony. While neo-Gramscian critical analyses offer 
important insights with regards to power and social injustice, there has been a lack of 
attention to issues of sustainability. This article argues that a critical perspective cannot 
be complete without attention to sustainability. A critical realist framework enables us to 
take the neo-Gramscian critique further by reminding us of the real dependence on the 
biosphere. In the third part I show how political ecology makes a vital contribution to 
critical perspectives by highlighting the natural limits within which by necessity all 
human activity takes place (Gorz 1987; Foster 2002, 2009). It poses a fundamental 
challenge to orthodox thinking, particularly economic thinking. This article argues that 
analyses of trade policy and governance need to include the analytical categories of both 
social justice and sustainability, which in turn pose fundamental challenges to orthodox 
theory and practice. The conclusion posits that an international political ecology and an 
adequate ecological economics will need to advance dialogically in order to assist in the 
project of sustainability and social justice. 
 
A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
This first section explains and situates the article’s approach in terms of its philosophy of 
social science. Broadly speaking the approach employed is informed by critical social 
theory, which is sometimes usefully juxtaposed to problem-solving theory (Cox 1981). 
Problem-solving theory describes mainstream approaches, such as functionalist and 
rationalist analyses, that work within the parameters of the “real” world. They do not 
seek to challenge or disrupt the status-quo, nor indeed ask how that status-quo evolved. 
Critical theory, on the other hand, seeks to analyse how and why ideas and practices 
become mainstream, seeks to understand the dynamics behind that and indeed how it 
might be disrupted or challenged (Cox 1981: 128-129). These two approaches differ 
ontologically in that problem-solving theory tends to focus on an empirical world that is 
observable, whereas critical theory, in line with critical/or scientific realism also ascribes 
ontological status to unobservable, such as economic, political or socio-cultural norms, 
values or beliefs that are historically specific and may vary over time and space (Sayer 
1992; Bhaskar et al. 2010).  
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Critical social theory is concerned with unearthing underlying theoretical assumptions 
which reproduce and are reproduced in the “concrete” world and are historically specific. 
Theory and practice as such are intimately interwoven. Likewise the separation of 
economics from politics and other dichotomies are rejected (see Maclean 1999; Peterson 
1992). Critical social theory recognises that all theory is necessarily value-laden and that 
knowledge is produced and reproduced through linguistic, conceptual, cultural and 
material means and shapes both theory and practice (Sayer 1992:16). Of fundamental 
concern are the power relations at work in the reproduction of theory and practice which 
are pervasive in all areas of social life. Alongside this, critical realism’s explanatory 
critique is emancipatory, in that it allows for the possibility of alternatives – i.e. non-
actualised possibilities to emerge. The real is not limited to the actual – i.e. to what “is”, 
but includes the possible (non-actualised) (Lacey and Lacey 2010; Bhaskar et al. 2010). 
Similarly, critical social theory is committed to an emancipatory project of radical social 
change, that is to a challenging of all forms of domination (e.g. of gender, class, race, 
nature). However critical theory has been quite notorious for failing to theorise links 
between social and ecological systems of concern to the sustainability project (Dickens 
2007). Hence the need for a critical political ecology that can effectively link critical 
social thought with ecological science in order to meet the sustainability challenge. 
I use the concept of enclosures as an analytical tool. The term enclosure refers to both 
the material and conceptual enclosures that have emerged through as well as frame 
power relations within modernity; also it is traced back to the European enclosure 
movement, a practice integral to the historical project of the state and its institutions 
and providing the ground for the industrial and urban revolutions. Jeremy Rifkin has 
argued that it is in the nature of the nation-state to enclose ecosystems, commodify and 
privatise nature, optimise the expropriation of scarce resources, expand production and 
consumption, and advance utilitarian self-interest in the quest for progress (1991). 
However, the idea of enclosure does not just refer to physical boundaries, but crucially 
also has social content, delineating social boundaries and relationships of power and 
knowledge (Saurin 1993: 51). Thus, the process of enclosure occurs not only through 
material practices but also in the realm of institutions and ideas. Many critical thinkers 
have reflected upon such dynamics of power, employing a variety of concepts that can 
be likened to the concept of enclosure. Notably, the Gramscian concept of hegemony has 
been deployed by neo-Gramscian scholars to denote the way in which dominant power 
relations are maintained through socio-cultural norms and institutions as well as material 
practices. Critical realist and discourse analyst Norman Fairclough has also argued that 
we should understand ideological common sense as ‘common sense in the service of 
sustaining unequal relations of power’ (1989: 84). Rather than purely a coercive 
process, these relations of power can also be consensual (Cox 1981: 137). The 
institutionalisation of certain norms, ideas and values then serves as a means of 
‘stabilising and perpetuating a particular order’ (1981: 136). Similarly, Michel Foucault 
talks about governmentality as a process whereby dominant power/knowledge 
configurations maintain and reproduce social institutions (Foucault 1980). Enclosure 
further relates to what Pierre Bourdieu has called the ‘realm of discourse’ (1977: 168). 
In Bourdieu’s model the possibility of competing discourses within this realm are by no 
means precluded, indeed it is a universe of heterodoxy as well as orthodoxy, while 
drawing a line between its legitimised realm and the doxa or ‘the universe of the 
undiscussed’ (1977: 168). These realms closely mirror social relations of power and can 
be observed in the domain of policy making, including within the EU. A critical social 
theory is not just concerned with how these enclosures come about and how they are 
maintained, but also how they are being challenged. Neo-Gramscian scholars are also 
concerned with the counter-hegemonic ideas and practices seeking to unsettle and 
challenge hegemony (see Gill 2003). Of fundamental concern in this paper is how power 
relations maintain particular enclosures that enable ecological degradation and social 
injustice.1 Ecology teaches us the need for a holistic approach, or systems approach, in 
opposition to thinking which is fragmented by existing boundaries. The concern of critical 
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theory is with breaking down the boundaries that prevent a holistic approach, as well as 
looking towards emancipatory agency and practices. A recent collection (Bhaskar et al. 
2010) demonstrates how disciplinary approaches fail to deal with the complexity of 
climate change, and how this further disables interdisciplinary action.2  
 
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL TRADE POLICY AND GOVERNANCE: SITUATING EU 
TRADE GOVERNANCE 
Following on from the critical theoretical framework laid out above about how power 
operates through institutions and discourse, in this section I contend that EU trade policy 
and the governance thereof must be located within its wider politico-economic context, 
readily identified as neo-liberal capitalist. Further, as has been widely argued by critical 
scholars, the persistence of neo-classical economic thought powerfully encloses global 
and regional hegemony (Newell and Paterson 2010, Cato 2011). European trade 
governance can be located within a wider context of global trade governance. Indeed, 
some neo-Gramscian scholars identify European integration and governance building as 
part of global hegemony, rather than a discrete trend (Cafruny and Ryner 2003). 
 
Discursive enclosures 
Key assumptions about the economic organisation of the world are implicit within 
economic governance structures, including EU trade policy. For the purposes of both 
questions of justice and sustainability, the two key assumptions that are maintained and 
highlighted is that trade is the engine of economic growth (as distinct from 
development), and economic growth strategies are the unquestioned solutions to current 
crises, be they financial, economic, social or ecological (European Commission 2010d, 
European Commission 2010c). In orthodox economic discourse, problems such as 
poverty, inequality or environmental degradation are seen as externalities that can be 
internalised. The fact that poverty, inequality and environmental degradation appear to 
grow alongside economic growth is not readily explained. This is not to say that there is 
no awareness of these trends. The Annual Reports of organisations such as the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or indeed the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank, give eloquent descriptions of the state of the world. They tell the 
two stories of on the one hand deepening global economic, cultural and political 
integration and on the other increasing inequality, insecurity and unsustainability (UNDP 
1999; IMF 1999; UNDP 2007/8; UNDP 2009; UNDP 2010). The solution put forward to 
balance these two stories and deal with the negative consequences is to enhance global 
governance and sustain economic growth. In the UNDP Report’s own words: ‘Reinventing 
global governance is not an option - it is an imperative for the 21st century’ (UNDP 
1999: 97). Likewise, at the European level, the European Commission declares that the 
EU itself has ‘a clear interest in promoting global governance as a means to achieving 
the core objectives of sustainable development, security, peace and equity, objectives no 
territorial actor can secure alone’ (Madelin 2001:3). At the same time, the EU also holds 
steadfast to the liberalization of trade and economic growth argument, as seen for 
example at the Lisbon Summit, where it was agreed that the EU should become ‘the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ 
(European Council 2000). Subsequent EU policy documents continue to echo these 
sentiments (European Commission 2010d; European Commission 2010a; European 
Commission 2010c). A critical analysis of the relationship between these two converging 
trends suggests there needs to be an analysis of the deeper causal relationship between 
the two. 
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Central to the maintenance of these governance structures is a constellation of norms 
and ideas promoted by mainstream economic thought. Orthodox economics separates 
the economy and nature hierarchically, subordinating nature to the economy which 
mitigates against holistic analysis (Kallis et al. 2009). In the orthodox economic view the 
economic system is the space/market where individuals and institutions interact 
rationally, to distribute scarce resources efficiently and thereby satisfy human needs and 
wants. Here an artificial boundary is placed around an abstract notion of the economy as 
separate, closed and capable of functioning perfectly rationally. Nature and the 
environment are external to this closed system, amounting to a collection of ecosystems 
that provide the raw materials for input into the economy (see for example Daly and 
Cobb 1990; Daly and Townsend 1993; Mellor 2006). Where value is attributed to nature, 
it is phrased in terms of “ecosystems services” which is readily reduced to monetary 
value (Sullivan 2009). Environmental problems such as climate change are viewed as 
externality problems. Because nature is seen as subordinate to the economy, it is 
believed that the economy can grow indefinitely. Implicit in this is a further assumption 
that nature is at the disposal of the economy. Our fundamental dependence on nature is 
seen as incidental, since it is believed that any resource shortages or the problem of 
non-renewable resources can be overcome by human ingenuity, technological 
development and through market mechanisms (Cato 2011; Panayotakis 2012). Not all 
discourses of sustainable development and environmental economics challenge the 
growth imperative (WCED 1987; Field 2009; Hanley 2006); and some believe there is a 
safe operating space within the planetary boundaries that can contain a continued 
strategy of economic growth (Rockström et al. 2009; Lynas 2010). 
Growth remains one of the main pillars of orthodox, economic thought, is taken as an 
axiomatic good and rarely questioned by economists or policy makers (Jackson 2009). 
Environmental problems are seen as a problem of market failure that can be remedied 
through market mechanisms (Jacobs 1991; Foster 2002; Barry 2012). Orthodox 
economic doctrine also stipulates that trade liberalization amongst countries and 
companies across the globe is beneficial to economic growth; with trade perceived as the 
very engine of growth (Todaro 1994). The pursuit of growth and the benefits of trade 
liberalization are cornerstones of the orthodox model of global trade governance 
institutionalised in the WTO and in EU trade policy. Like the EU 2020 Strategy, recent 
policy papers from the European Commission’s DG Trade echo the pursuit of growth and 
in addition emphasise speed: ‘The over-riding aim of European economic policy is faster 
growth’ (European Commission 2010a: 4; European Commission 2010; European 
Commission 2010c). In other words, both global trade governance and regional (EU) 
trade governance share the same fundamental assumptions and objectives. The EU is 
embarked upon a trajectory of liberalization and seeks to maximise its global 
competitiveness, consistent with neo-liberal restructuring globally (European 
Commission 2010). At the same time it is embarked upon a series of measures to try to 
embed sustainable use of resources and reduce environmental impacts of growth. In this 
the EU is expressing the contradictions inherent in the attempt to stay within the current 
economic paradigm as well as deliver a sustainable future for its citizens. 
 
The EU project: a Neo-Gramscian perspective  
While, as seen above, Europe is part of a transnational trend of neoliberal restructuring, 
internally it displays qualities of embeddedness, or embedded neo-liberalism, which 
Baastian van Apeldoorn argues remains ‘neo-liberal at its core and reflects the outlook of 
the most globalised sections of European capital, while at the same time seeking to 
accommodate the orientations of other social forces’ (2001: 70). Certain factions within 
the political elites have sought to create something more than an economic zone. 
Notably, the social democratic federalists’ emphasis on safeguarding a ‘European model 
of society’ based on a social market economy as well as social protection (van Apeldoorn 
2001: 76). The result has been the “embedded” variant of neoliberalism, which has seen 
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many progressive environmental and social policies within the European domain. Neo-
Gramscians maintain, however, that these social and environmental concessions could 
be likened to the passive revolution whereby the acquiescence of countering forces is 
secured. In the case of the EU they are the social-democratic forces at the heart of the 
project to create a European polity that believes in safeguarding the interests of industry 
as well as society. 
Within the theory and practice of international relations, the concept of global 
governance is invoked in addressing questions of global change. In the dominant 
literature, global governance is seen as the key tool for addressing global problems that 
states are not able to solve unilaterally. It is perceived to be a governance of various 
layers, including but going above and below the state-level, involving business and civil 
society (see CGG 1995; Held 1995; Ruggie 2004). Within critical literature, this pluralist 
view of global governance is treated with more caution and seen rather as a trajectory 
for global order, rather than an altruistic attempt to solve global problems. Indeed 
Richard Ashley refers to it not as “governance” but rather as “purpose” (Hewson and 
Sinclair 1999: 11; see also Cox 1987). As such it operates as a political enclosure. 
From this perspective the EU project is located within processes of globalization, part of 
global governance, not somehow reacting to it, though in its policy documents it 
emphasises the social element and good governance, as seen for example in the EU 
White Paper on Governance (European Commission 2001). In so far as global 
governance is embedded in the neoliberal global political economy, which is hegemonic 
in the sense that dominant power relations are maintained predominantly by consent 
with the back-up of coercion; similarly, European governance is connected to the 
broader transnational trends of globalization with its ‘attendant, essentially neoliberal 
raison d’etre’ (Cafruny and Ryner 2003: 3). It remains to be seen whether European 
social movements and other actors disillusioned by the failure to act on the key 
challenges of inequality and environmental crisis can mount a challenge to the globally 
dominant economic model. The current crisis of the Euro is arguably an opportunity to 
develop some alternatives that have wider support. 
The analysis above suggests that from a neo-Gramscian perspective European trade 
governance has to be understood in terms of both economic and political discourses, the 
operation of social forces and contestations over policy directions. Thus there is no single 
model but rather the transformation of policy over time as a result of changes in the 
balance of forces. For example, Bastiaan van Appeldoorn identifies a shift in the thinking 
of EU business elites, exemplified by the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), 
from a neo-mercantilist protective regionalism to a globalism in the form of embedded 
neoliberalism (van Apeldoorn 2001). This is still widely reflected in EU policy making and 
a willingness and indeed recognition of the necessity to retain at least a semblance of 
social features and concessions, absorbing what Polanyi calls the double movement, 
whereby a retreat of state will result in counter-movement and a re-embedding of state 
(1957). The shift of attitude amongst corporate elites has not occurred without a fight, 
but rather as a result of struggle over time between factions of the European capitalist 
elite with a gradual triumph of the globalist camp and its accompanying discourse of the 
imperative of competitiveness (van Apeldoorn 2001). 
Neo-Gramscian analysis demonstrates the operation of hegemony within the EU. As we 
saw above, these enclosures are not just maintained by social forces and institutions but 
also by economic doctrine. Also, challenges to these enclosures do not just consist of 
social forces, actors and institutions, but also new ideas and discourses that seek to 
challenge the entrenched economic orthodoxy. It is argued next that sustainability 
presents a key challenge and must be part of any critical analysis.  
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THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABILITY 
This section explores the way in which sustainability challenges current dominant forms 
of trade policy and governance in the EU. As we saw above, orthodox economic doctrine 
still views the economy and nature as relatively discrete entities. Environmental issues 
are seen as market failures (Stern 2007). This failure can be remedied, it is believed by 
environmental economists, by putting a price on nature, giving it a value, in order to be 
able to internalise the problem. There is merit in these arguments, and it is indeed 
possible to apply cost-benefit analyses to alleviating discrete environmental problems, 
including in trade policy debates (Newell 2005; TEEB 2011). However, critical ecological 
economists argue that adequate sustainability approaches require a fundamental shift in 
the way the relationship between nature and society is conceived, requiring attention to 
questions of distribution and social power (Kallis et al. 2009). Further, political ecologists 
argue that the social and ecological contradictions of economic reductionism will literally 
cost us the earth and there is a need for a new social contract with nature, a new 
economy, and a new kind of politics that nurtures sustainability and social justice (Foster 
2002). 
 
What is sustainability? 
It is widely agreed in international reports that sustainability does not pertain to 
environmental matters alone, but that it is fundamentally interdisciplinary, comprising 
nature, society and the economy, as well as inter-generational (UNDP 2007). Although 
many international agreements are in place they are generally weak measures of 
sustainability or social justice, and reflect more on the effectiveness or non-effectiveness 
of international environmental cooperation (Obereke 2008). Sustainability as defined and 
measured in the Millennium Development Goals (MEA 2005) is remorselessly decreasing. 
The unsustainability of our current global development model is clearly demonstrated by 
the strong continuing link between this development and environmental degradation. 
Equity issues are also key: ecological footprinting demonstrates that we need three and 
half planets for all humans to live at western consumption levels with current 
technologies and levels of affluence (Shah 2005).  
Within the European polity, questions of sustainability have long been on the agenda. 
From an environmental economic perspective, the EU has been successful in greening a 
lot of its agenda and policy (see Kronsell 1997; Jordan 2005). The EU’s Emission Trading 
Scheme, for example, is held up as a proto-type globally (Ellerman 2009). Questions of 
sustainability are now addressed in policies across the board, including EU trade. In 
these documents, contradictions between pursuing economic growth and prosperity 
strategies and the challenges of sustainability are muted. The wording often remains 
vague and the onus is on the environmental impact assessments of trade agreements to 
mitigate negative impacts rather than rethink trade policy and trade agreements 
themselves, as from the document, Trade as a Driver of Prosperity:  
‘In the context of the EU2020 emphasis on sustainable and inclusive growth, 
more attention will need to be paid to assessing the social and environmental 
impact of trade agreements, including on greenhouse gas emissions, and 
measures that can be taken to mitigate potential negative impacts.’ (European 
Commission 2010c:4) 
However, as Annica Kronsell points out, a true greening, a true incorporation of 
sustainability goes much deeper than a “greening” of policy discourse. What is required 
is a mobilisation towards ecocentricity in both theory and practice, at both the micro and 
macro level (1997). This is part of a much wider, inter-disciplinary task to challenge the 
deeper economic and political enclosures within which EU policy making sits. 
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Nonetheless, a “greening” of discourse does at the same time provide some leverage 
towards a more radical challenge. 
 
TOWARDS A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECOLOGY APPROACH 
Sustainability raises problems in its demand for interdisciplinarity in terms of the 
learning, knowledge and skills sets required. It is recognised by many reflective 
practitioners that in order to deal with real joined-up problems what is needed is a 
holistic approach that can bring a multiplicity of factors into some kind of meaningful 
relationship. Ecological economics is one developing field that is attempting this, though 
within this field there are diverging paradigms. On the one hand a more conservative 
strand remains fairly wedded to neo-classical orthodoxy (Kallis et al. 2009: 15). Here 
monetary formulations are still employed; planetary “ecosystem services” conceived of 
this way include provision of stable climate and constitute the “natural capital” 
underpinning human livelihoods. It has been estimated that biodiversity loss in Europe 
will cost 1.1 trillion Euros per year by 2050, greatly reducing human wellbeing (Braat 
and Ten Brink 2007). This is additional to the predicted impacts of climate change on 
Europe (EEA 2008). 
While it is certainly important to see sustainability as interdisciplinary and as comprising 
society, nature and the economy, there is a danger of just blending these spheres 
superficially without considering their actual relationships in the world, specifically that 
some may be dependent on others. Some want to claim that economies are actually 
sub-systems of societies, depending on the connective features and unpaid caring 
relations of these societies for their existence. For example they claim that functioning 
economies depend upon the rule of law, habits and practices of trust and care between 
people (Reed 2001; Stark 2005). An ecological political economy approach goes further, 
to argue that human societies are sub-systems of the wider life systems of planet Earth 
that supports them (Perkins et al. 2005). 
Many proponents of sustainability claim that economic rationality wrongly assumes that 
human societies and ecological systems are sub-systems of the economy. This view is 
illustrated by the (still operational) use of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to assess 
progress. This approach has been criticised by numerous commentators as being fatally 
misleading because it is an exercise of quantitative addition, rather than qualitative 
change (Mayo 1999). Whilst GDP is still used as a measure by the World Bank and the 
OECD, it is now qualified by the use of various sustainability indicators. The World Bank 
(2008) is developing a conception of National Wealth and the OECD (2008) is examining 
the global sustainability effects of national growth policies. In 2010 the UNDP report for 
the first time acknowledges that economic growth is not necessarily the panacea that it 
has previously been seen as.  
Sustainability requires an economics that can deliver on the broad goals of human and 
ecosystem well-being as appropriate to different contexts (NEF 2010). In line with the 
continuing dominance of monetary approaches such as GDP, much work is now being 
done to assess the contribution of “ecosystem services” in monetary terms (DEFRA 
2007, ESP undated). Whilst we can estimate future losses of “natural capital” using 
current knowledge, these are generally considered to be conservative estimates as there 
is a great deal we do not know about how complex ecosystems work (IAP 2010). Thus 
whilst policy may attempt to maximise trade-offs between climate stabilisation and 
biodiversity for example, we are dealing with ecological limits that are still unknown and 
key cycles whose interactions are still largely unidentified.  
Critical strands of ecological economics emphasise the need for holistic analysis that sees 
the economy and nature as being in co-constituted, metabolic relationship, which 
necessitates an alteration in the neo-classical economic tools (Martinez-Alier 1987; Daly 
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and Townsend 1993; Kallis et al. 2009: 15). An ecological political economy approach 
views production and consumption as essential for the maintenance of society, but also 
sees the ways in which production and consumption are organised as having a formative 
effect on social relations and institutions, and recognises the economy/society complex 
as being dependent upon wider ecological life-support systems. These approaches 
indicate that a basic understanding of systems relationships is necessary for 
understanding sustainability and the problems and questions it raises for the ways we 
humans organise our societies and our economies. Theorists point out that capitalism is 
capable of assimilating many things, including fair trade, emissions, but ultimately the 
ecological contradictions may overwhelm it (Cato 2009, 2011; Kovel 2002, 2007, Foster 
2002, 2009). As the research behind biodiversity and ecosystem degradation reveals 
(TEEB 2010) capitalism is the most ecologically inefficient system in history to date, 
highlighting the need for fundamental assessments of our current political economy. 
Both political ecology and political economy have their roots in the term oikos, from the 
Greek word for “household”, which invites us to develop a more holistic understanding of 
the relations between society, ecology and economy. However, within hegemonic 
discourse a separation of economics and politics has taken place, even within dominant 
strands of International Political Economy (IPE). The focus has been on the politics of 
world order. IPE has forgotten its ecological roots and remains anthropocentric 
(Lafferiere and Stott 1999, 2006). Political ecology is not just about ethics, but at heart 
is about the material conditions for life on Earth. It reminds us of this material basis, the 
ecosystems, upon which society is dependent. Historical materialist analysis has been 
slow to take on board ecology, but this analysis is becoming more widespread (Foster 
2002, 2009). 
Political ecology challenges political economy in a variety of ways. At heart it points out 
how ecological structures are integral to politico-economic processes. It critiques the 
idea that the economy has become separated and disembedded from society in the 
historical period of the great transformation to the market economy, not just in material 
terms but also in ideational ones, which has fundamental repercussions for the contours 
of social relations, by reconceptualising nature as subordinate (see Polanyi 1957; 
Mitchell 1997). This disembeddedness enables the commodification of externalities, such 
as for example environmental degradation and climate change. Trade policy is not 
substantially challenged by internalisation of externalities. In the case of climate change, 
for example, a lucrative market has been created in emissions trading, of which the EU 
has the most successful variant as seen above (Ellerman 2009). Critical thinkers doubt 
such measures will avert ecocide and that merely internalising the externalities does not 
radically redefine the relationship between nature and society (Cato 2011). 
The idea of limits, both ethical and material, that stem from a political ecology approach, 
present a fundamental challenge to orthodox economic thinking. Likewise, they present 
a fundamental challenge to political orthodoxy. There are ecological limits to 
globalization and the expansion of market society. From an ecological perspective, 
disciplinary neo-liberalism (Gill 1995) cannot rely on exponential economic growth. 
Global and regional governance, then, needs to do more than manage global trade and 
economics, but questions of social and ecological justice require a discussion about 
redistribution of access to wealth and resources. Ultimately, society and the economy 
need to be re-embedded within their ecological limits, and this challenges not just 
economics, but also governance. 
 
EU policy making, ecology and social justice – the case of extracting petroleum 
from tar sands 
In this section, the analysis selects the case of the trade negotiations between the EU 
and Canada. The EU is negotiating a bilateral trade agreement, in line with its general 
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move towards external liberalization through bilateral agreements alongside a 
commitment to multilateral trade fora. The Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA) intends to cover trade, investment, movement of workers, 
trade in services, intellectual property and government procurement, amongst others 
(Bartels and Henckels 2011: 1; European Commission undated; European Commission 
2009). In line with EU policy orthodoxy, it takes for granted that liberalization is good, 
because it contributes to increases in GDP (EC Enterprise and Industry 2009:2). In 
addition, preparatory documents highlight in particular that the private sector in both 
countries is welcoming of this opening up of markets:  
‘The private sectors in both EU and Canada have shown strong support for an 
ambitious and comprehensive economic agreement, both publicly and in response 
to the consultations undertaken by both parties in the framework of the joint 
study. They believe advancing a closer EU-Canada economic partnership would 
send a powerful pro-growth signal to investors and businesses within the EU and 
Canada as well as internationally.’ (EC Enterprise and Industry 2009: 3) 
Like many EU trade policy documents, its focus is on economic growth, market access 
and liberalization, and like many EU trade documents it makes an obligatory, if brief, 
reference to sustainable development where it agrees to looking into environmental and 
labour rights (EC Enterprise and Industry 2009: 7). A core controversy surrounding this 
trade deal is the extraction of petroleum from tar sands, although this controversy is 
viewed differently by different stakeholders. Predominantly, the controversy is couched 
in terms of market access for foreign companies and investors – in particular the access 
of European petroleum companies to Canadian tar sands, thus diminishing Canada’s 
power to regulate extraction of petroleum from tar sands on its own soil (Bartels and 
Henckels 2011). 
From neo-Gramscian and critical ecological perspectives, there is a fundamental conflict 
between trade liberalization including dirty extractive industries and the EUs own 
sustainability targets and commitments to reducing greenhouse gases, including low-
carbon growth and commitment to clean fuel through initiatives such as, for example the 
Fuel Quality Directive (Directive 2009/30/EC). A neo-Gramscian analysis would identify 
the tensions in these discussions between the dominant capitalist interests, such as here 
the extractive industry seeking market access or the Canadian government on behalf of 
Canadian extractive industries, while also identifying the social forces seeking to 
challenge the dominant voices. In this case, for example, other stakeholders such as the 
First Nations, social movements and NGOs across the world view this controversy quite 
differently. According to them, this should not be about which corporations end up 
getting access to mining tar sands, but rather from an ecological and social justice 
perspective, they are arguing that the mining of oil or tar sands exacerbates 
environmental degradation, CO2 emissions as well as having detrimental social and 
health impacts on local populations, and thus should not be carried out at all (Shrybman 
2011). 
The severity of the problem has triggered a global campaign to highlight the detrimental 
impact of this industry (UK Tarsands Network 2011), which has been campaigning 
outside the CETA negotiations. Further, they have been campaigning within the 
European Parliament in collaboration with progressive MEPs to insist the European Fuel 
Quality Directive highlights the high carbon content of fuels extracted from tar sands, 
something the Canadian government has been lobbying to keep out of the document (UK 
Tarsands Network 2011; CANC 2012).  
Echoing the developments in critical social theory, any effective counter-hegemonic 
struggle needs to address both social justice and questions of sustainability. Social 
movements are speaking up for sustainability and social justice in order to challenge EU 
trade policy. They are seeking to influence the course of EU trade policy through direct 
action and campaigning by exposing the contradictions and tensions between continued 
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economic growth strategies on the one hand, and meeting the challenges of 
sustainability and social justice. Within the democratically elected bodies of the European 
Union, the European Parliament also provides a route to influencing the direction of trade 
policy. A recent report adopted in the European Parliament on international trade policy 
in the context of climate change imperatives highlights the need to reconcile the 
conflicting pulls of sustainability and social justice on the one hand and the focus on 
liberalization and economic growth on the other (European Parliament 2010). Influencing 
the frame within which policy making takes place is a struggle to break through the 
economic and political enclosures within which trade policy making takes place; an 
ongoing struggle over hegemony.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Ecological economics is still in development, and an international political ecology that is 
adequate to address trade issues must develop alongside. Inclusion of the power issues 
that a neo-Gramscian analysis can bring to the table will be essential for any social and 
political project in support of an ecological economics. This analysis implies that such 
new economics will need to be fought for politically and will need to be taken up by 
progressive movements in a much more direct and informed way. Theorists can help in 
continuing to raise these issues and in strongly arguing for the need for radical 
reformulation of social theory to respond to the challenges of sustainability and social 
justice. This article has argued that it is not enough to critique EU trade policy through 
an assessment of whether it meets its stated goals or not. Rather, a critical perspective 
seeks to uncover the political and economic enclosures underpinning EU trade policy and 
governance and it interrogates the obstacles to achieving a more sustainable and socially 
just world through trade policy. This analysis explored the discursive hegemony of neo-
classical economic thought and the contours of EU governance. It argued that the 
hegemonic discourse of economic growth and trade liberalisation provides a limited and 
limiting framework for the construction of EU trade policy. Furthermore, the article 
analysed the social and political context of the EU project. The trajectory of EU 
governance is not simply a functional response to the demands of the market but is 
instead the outcome of a process of contestation and elite compromises. The final part of 
the article focused on the challenges of sustainability and the limitations of 
environmental economics in meeting these challenges. It argued that an ecological 
political economy perspective might provide a better starting point for building a global 
society that is ecologically sustainable and socially just. Analysing EU trade governance 
from a critical perspective was one attempt to highlight the way in which political and 
economic enclosures operate through often implicit, taken for granted assumptions, such 
as around economic growth. This paper has sought to contribute to a wider critical 
theoretical project of unearthing implicit assumptions that might hinder progressive, 
socially just and sustainable policies.  
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1 Critical social theory includes a wide spectrum of analyses. My concern with the twin benchmarks of 
sustainability and social justice is one that emanates from critical ecological thought. This is not to say 
that these twin concerns are more important than other concerns, such as for example attention to 
other forms of domination, for example through class, race, gender, etc. Indeed, social justice should be 
broadly understood as intersectional, though this paper does not offer a detailed analysis in this regard 
(for further elaboration on intersectionality, see McCall 2005). 
2 In this article I am not centrally concerned with the analysis of emancipatory practices, but I have 
discussed this elsewhere (Ford 2005). 
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The European Union’s (EU’s) 2006 Global Europe communication established an offensive Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) agenda premised on serving the interests of the EU’s upmarket exporters at the expense of the 
EU’s remaining ‘pockets of protection’. This has remained in place with the advent of the 2010 Trade, Growth 
and World Affairs strategy. Such a development defies both rationalist International Political Economy (IPE) 
explanations – which emphasise the protectionist bias of societal mobilisation – and accounts stressing the 
institutional insulation of policy-makers from societal pressures because the recent economic crisis and the 
increased politicisation of EU trade policy by the European Parliament have coexisted without leading to greater 
protectionism. Adopting a constructivist approach, we show that this turn of events can be explained by the 
neoliberal ideas internalised by policy-makers in the European Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) for 
Trade. We then deploy a novel heuristic to illustrate how DG Trade acted upon these ideas to strategically 
construct a powerful discursive imperative for liberalisation. 
Constructivism; EU trade policy; strategic discourse; Europe 2020; Global Europe; economic crisis 
 
 
 
The “Global Europe” communication announced in October 2006 by the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) for Trade represented an important shift in the 
European Union’s (EU) trade strategy. It led the EU to embark on a series of ambitious 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations with emerging economies in East Asia, with 
the first agreement being signed with South Korea in 2010. At the heart of this strategy 
lay a willingness to serve the interests of the EU’s upmarket exporters at the expense of 
protectionists; the EU-Korea FTA represented a case in point as the EU obtained a 
substantial liberalisation of services and investment in exchange for opening up the EU 
automobile market, at a time where the industry was reeling from the effects of the 
most significant economic crisis in recent decades (Siles-Brügge 2011). Since then, and 
under the leadership of Karel De Gucht who took over as Trade Commissioner in 
February 2010, there has been a move towards consolidating the EU’s offensive “Global 
Europe” agenda in the new Trade, Growth and World Affairs strategy. Serving the EU’s 
high-end export interests (particularly in services and investment) through ambitious 
FTAs – and doing so at the potential expense of protectionists – is still an overarching 
feature of DG Trade’s agenda in the on-going negotiations with India; here DG Trade is 
countenancing to make concessions on the highly controversial issue of mode 4 services 
(the movement of natural persons to deliver a service, usually an issue associated with 
immigration) in exchange for a sufficiently attractive liberalisation offer from the Indian 
side. Even a new emphasis on ‘reciprocity’ in trading relations – a discourse traditionally 
associated with protectionism in EU trade policy – seems to be aimed at improving the 
EU’s offensive trade negotiating leverage while minimising the threat of protectionist 
fallout. The evidence, so far at least, suggests that despite the recent economic crisis the 
EU has been able to conduct an aggressive outward-oriented trade policy which has the 
potential not only to boost exports but also to cause significant pain to import-competing 
interests. 
This poses a problem for much of the rationalist International Political Economy (IPE) 
literature on trade policy. The acknowledgement of collective action problems – that 
protectionists are more likely to mobilise and shape policy than the ‘winners’ from 
liberalisation, due to the concentrated and more immediate nature of the losses incurred 
and the greater diffusion of the benefits (Olson 1965) – has meant that accounting for 
liberal trade policy outcomes has often been seen as an intellectual puzzle for such 
scholars. In the specific case of preferential liberalisation, the consensus seems to be 
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that this is often preferred to multilateral trade-opening precisely because it is more 
likely to be “partial”, offering key market access gains without the usual countervailing 
concessions in import-competing sectors (see, in particular, Dür 2010). In other words, 
gains for the beneficiaries of preferential liberalisation are unlikely to be sought by 
policy-makers at the (significant) expense of other sectors. This is, however, precisely 
the crux of the EU’s offensive commercial strategy, which so far has confronted one 
powerful economic sector (automobiles) and seems set to cause controversy over mode 
4 at a time of economic crisis. This seems to suggest, a priori, that more could be gained 
from the rational institutionalist literature on EU trade policy, which points to the 
institutional insulation of policy-makers from protectionist pressures (see Meunier and 
Nicolaïdis 1999; Meunier 2005). Recent studies, however, have clearly shown that 
protectionists in the EU enjoy good access to policy-makers, whether during the 
negotiation of the EU-Korea FTA (Siles-Brügge 2011) or over proposals to reform EU 
anti-dumping regulations (De Bièvre and Eckhardt 2011). This has been rendered all the 
more poignant by the rise of the EP as an actor in the EU trade policy-making machinery 
following institutional changes wrought by the Treaty of Lisbon. This has, in the eyes of 
some analysts, the potential to further politicise the EU trade policy-making arena (e.g. 
Woolcock 2008). The puzzle, in sum, is explaining why DG Trade continues, particularly 
in the wake of the economic crisis, to push the offensive trade agenda set in motion in 
Global Europe (and which privileges pro-liberalisation over defensive societal interests) 
and how it remains successful in this endeavour. 
This analysis suggests adopting an agent-centred constructivist political economy 
approach that stresses the constructed nature of social reality. The theoretical point of 
departure emphasises the role of “globalization discourses”; these have not only shaped 
the beliefs of political actors (the so-called “reflexive” dimension to discourse) but have 
also been at the heart of discursive strategies to construct ideational imperatives to 
legitimate otherwise controversial neoliberal economic programmes (the “strategic” 
dimension to discourse). The argument is that while policy-makers internalised a 
neoliberal discourse on the desirability, but ultimate political contingency of trade 
liberalisation, they used a far more necessitarian discourse in their public 
pronouncements in order to legitimate their agenda of market-opening. We also develop 
an analytical strategy premised on contrasting these two discourses that allows us to 
conclude that policy-makers strategically used such ideas as instruments of power, thus 
also offering an important contribution to the burgeoning literature on “communicative” 
discourse. It is important at this stage to emphasise that this does not suggest that 
rationalist accounts of trade policy cannot explain recent developments in the EU’s 
foreign economic relations. Indeed, previous studies have rightly pointed to the 
important role played by exporters (in particular service suppliers) in pressuring the 
Commission to adopt a preferential trade strategy (Global Europe) in the first place (Dür 
2010; Heron and Siles-Brügge 2012). Nonetheless, even though such accounts may 
partly explain the turn to preferentialism they cannot, on their own, explain why in 
adopting such a trade strategy the Commission chose to privilege the interests of 
exporters at the expense of importers – given that it purposefully chose to trade away 
the EU’s ‘pockets of protection’ for market access. Rather our analysis suggests that we 
need to also consider the neglected role of ideas and language in the governance of 
trade policy. 
First, this article develops the constructivist theoretical framework to study the role of 
strategically-deployed economic discourses of economic constraint. Second, it charts the 
internalisation of neoliberal ideas by actors in DG Trade, finding that since the 1990s 
policy-makers have consistently espoused a view of trade liberalisation and globalization 
as both desirable, yet ultimately contingent upon political processes. Third, it examines 
how these ideas have shaped EU trade policy since the advent of the crisis, focusing on 
the EU’s offensive preferential trade agenda. Finally, it considers how DG Trade has 
constructed an ideational imperative for liberalization and how this discursive strategy 
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has, so far, been successful, to close on some reflections on the future of EU trade 
policy. 
 
CONSTRUCTING EXTERNAL ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES 
Using the term constructivism inevitably evokes a tradition in International Relations 
(IR) theory mostly associated with the writings of Alexander Wendt (1999). However, 
this article follows others in seeking to move beyond IR constructivism’s structural 
determinism and neorealist-inspired state-centrism (e.g. Hay 2002; Parsons 2007). In 
this vein, the rather persuasive and intuitive ontological position on which to base this 
newer brand of constructivism is the belief that social and political reality is constructed 
by agents through ideas rather than being fixed by particular material (or what could be 
called “structural”) constraints, as in rationalist accounts. An important feature of this 
approach is the emphasis placed on attributing a specific causal role to ideas in political 
analysis, in other words, determining why such ideas have mattered in the determination 
of political outcomes. In this vein, the purchase of neoliberal ideas in academic and 
policy-making circles suggests that a powerful reason why ideas matter in the 
international political economy is that they are treated by actors as though they were 
material straightjackets. The argument made by some is that neoliberal tenets are 
increasingly treated as ‘normalised’, that is, as reflections of a reality in which the 
rational homo economicus is the main determinant of social outcomes, rather than as a 
“normative” framework, advocating policies seen as desirable (Hay 2004b). This is 
particularly relevant for the domain of trade policy, where neoclassical economic theory 
still underpins most policy analysis and academic debate in IPE (for an exception to this, 
see George 2010). A (constructivist) political economy approach, as Charles Maier 
(1988: 6) puts it, explores the constructed nature of such models, ‘regard(ing) economic 
ideas and behaviour not as frameworks for analysis, but as beliefs and actions that must 
themselves be explained’. 
This is the aim of a literature that has concerned itself with the discursive construction of 
globalization as such an economic constraint, taking as its point of departure the debate 
between advocates of the “hyperglobalization thesis” and its sceptics (see Ohmae 1995; 
Hirst and Thompson 1999). Rather than accepting the parameters of this rationalist 
argument – that is to say, entering into a debate over whether globalization is an 
empirically verifiable material process that constricts the choices facing political actors – 
such writers adopt the constructivist view that it is the ideas that agents hold (and 
invoke) about “globalization” that are key (see, among others, Rosamond 2000; Hay and 
Rosamond 2002; Hay and Smith 2005, 2010; Watson and Hay 2003). In a seminal 
article, Colin Hay and Ben Rosamond (2002: 148, emphasis in the original) quite 
effectively condense the central argument of this approach, noting that ‘policy-makers 
acting on the basis of assumptions consistent with the hyperglobalization thesis may well 
serve, in so doing, to bring about outcomes consistent with that thesis, irrespective of its 
veracity and, indeed, irrespective of its perceived veracity’. The perceived material 
rationality of the hyperglobalization thesis becomes meaningful in shaping outcomes only 
because it is internalised by actors, in other words, because it is treated by them as 
though it were a real, material constraint rather than just a (contestable) economic 
framework. 
The key to understanding this process is a study of what this literature terms 
“globalization discourse”. Here discourse is defined as ‘a broad (…) matrix of social 
practices that gives meaning to the way that people understand themselves and their 
behaviour. (…) More precisely, a discourse makes “real” that which it prescribes as 
meaningful’ (George 1994: 29-30, emphasis in the original). Analysing discourse thus 
becomes the study of the process of social construction, where control of knowledge 
about this so-called economic process becomes an exercise of authority in the 
international political economy. As such, Hay and Rosamond (2002) provide a typology 
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of different globalization discourses that can manifest themselves through political 
agency which is organised along two axes. For one, such discourses can put forward 
either a positive or a negative view of the outcomes of globalization, or additionally – as 
in Hay and Nicola Smith (2005) who engage in a more sophisticated exercise of 
discursive mapping – a view that the outcome of globalization is dependent on political 
choices. Secondly, the process of globalization itself can be portrayed as either 
(politically) contingent or as inevitable. It is this latter categorisation which informs the 
central contention of this literature that policy-makers strategically invoke a view of 
globalization as inexorable – while they privately may hold a more contingent view of the 
process – in order to legitimate potentially painful and/or contentious neoliberal 
socioeconomic reforms aimed at further marketisation of the political economy; in other 
words, by appealing to the material rationality of globalising forces they are ‘rendering 
the contingent necessary’ (Watson and Hay 2003; see also Hay 2004b). The power of 
such rhetoric1 thus resides in that it presents a (politically) contingent phenomenon as 
immutable (economic) fact. Such a framework thus problematizes economistic 
understandings of the political economy, borrowing from the critical approach of Robert 
Cox (1981); just as “problem-solving” theory masks the ultimately contingent nature of 
theorising, discourse that stresses the external constraint posed by globalization serves 
to disguise alternative outcomes. 
It thus becomes important to understand both how the supposed “material” rationality of 
the hyperglobalization thesis is internalised and how it can serve as a platform to 
advance actors’ interests. In this vein, the literature on globalization discourse has 
combined two previous strands of work on economic narratives, the so-called “strategic” 
and “reflexive” pathways to the study of economic discourse (Rosamond 2000). In the 
former, actors consciously use particular discourses to construct reality in order to serve 
their interests; in such a case a strategic discourse is separable from actors’ interests or 
exogenous. On the “reflexive” side, Hay and Rosamond (2002: 147) show an interest in 
showing how ‘ideational structures become institutionalised and normalised’. However, 
they reject the premise that actors can have interests that are separable from discourse, 
as a superficial reading of the “strategic” pathway would suggest; the explanatory 
emphasis is thus not on the interests that actors may have independently of discourse 
(as the latter is constitutive of the former) but rather on whether particular actors 
choose to invoke such beliefs to serve interests that are partly constituted by these (or 
other) beliefs (such as the more contingent view of globalization often attributed to 
policy-makers in this literature). 
While recognising the complexities of discourse undoubtedly enriches our study of the 
international political economy it also unfortunately has the potential to obscure our 
analysis of political agency and the role of ideas within it. Specifically, we are referring to 
the issue of determining whether actors are instrumentally invoking ideational 
constraints in the service of the neoliberal project. In an earlier article we argued that 
not enough had been done in existing studies to determine this, largely as a result of a 
methodological dilemma held to be at the heart of the study of discourse (Siles-Brügge 
2011: 631-634). The problem is that it is impossible to determine from a policy-maker’s 
pronouncements themselves whether these are a reflection of their true beliefs or not, 
which makes it difficult to ascertain whether the invocation of external economic 
constraints is done disingenuously (as part of a discursive strategy) or not. Going one 
step further, even if we knew that an actor truly believed in the material reality of a 
particular economic constraint, we could not possibly distinguish from their 
pronouncements between a case where they were invoking this constraint strategically 
and one where they were simply repeating a discourse they have already internalised. 
Only where we know that a policy-maker does not believe a constraint to be real can we 
interpret their rhetoric of external constraint in and of itself as strategic. 
One of the contributions of our earlier article was to provide an analytical strategy to 
overcome this methodological dilemma. Drawing on the insights of previous research 
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(Hay and Smith 2005, 2010; see also Hay and Rosamond 2002: 158-159) our argument 
rested on an important distinction between “coordinative” (private) and “communicative” 
(public) discourses. The former refers to the process of policy construction – more 
specifically, ‘the common language and framework through which key policy groups 
come to agreement in the construction of a policy program’ (Schmidt 2002: 171) – while 
the latter is about a process of engagement with the public in order to legitimate such 
policies (Schmidt 2002: 171-172). The basis of our argument was that we could 
determine the strategic nature of discourses evoked within a communicative setting if we 
knew that an actor had not truly internalised these views. This also implied studying 
coordinative discourses, which given their setting were likely to correspond to the actual 
views of policy-makers. We argued that any discrepancy between discourses present in 
communicative and coordinative settings was strong evidence to suggest that any 
constraints invoked had not been internalised. In sum then, we could be quite confident 
in identifying an actor’s appeal to a particular external economic constraint as rhetorical 
if this discourse was not invoked consistently across different discursive settings (Figure 
1). What we did not explicitly recognise at that juncture was that there is a clear 
limitation to such a framework in that it only serves to identify an actor that has not 
internalised a particular discourse but is using it strategically. We are still left with an 
intractable methodological problem that does not allow us to identify (from their 
pronouncements) actors who may have internalised such beliefs but are still invoking 
them disingenuously. That being said, not only is the scope for uncertainty considerably 
reduced when we deploy our analytical technique, but our approach is extremely 
parsimonious, allowing us to determine the strategic nature of actors’ communicative 
discourses from the analysis of only a few key documents. 
 
Figure 1: Identifying an actor’s discursive strategy 
 
Source: Adapted from Siles-Brügge (2011: 633). 
This is particularly poignant if we consider Hay and Smith’s (2010: 2) argument that 
studies predicated on such a method ‘are simply incapable of providing the detailed 
picture of policy-makers’ assumptions and understandings of globalization (…) that we 
increasingly seem to acknowledge that we need’. Their reasoning is two-fold. For one, 
they point to the difference between coordinative and communicative discourse, 
highlighting that one cannot simply infer “cognitions” from public pronouncements given 
the potential for a strategic invocation of particular ideas. Secondly, they argue that 
policy-makers often make only a passing reference to the term globalization in their 
pronouncements, precluding an in-depth study of their understandings of the term from 
such data. As a result, they argue that there is ‘no substitute for raw attitudinal data’ 
(Hay and Smith 2010: 2) collected via surveys.  
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In contrast, this analytical strategy allows relying on the study of a few key documents 
to study not only communicative but also, and perhaps more controversially, 
coordinative discourse. In this view it is not just the fact that discourse is private that 
allows concluding that it is coordinative; rather, it is contended that we can determine 
the coordinative (or non-strategic) nature of policy documents by exploring their purpose 
and intended audience. After all, what need do policy-makers have to invoke ideas 
instrumentally, when they are drafting policy - and doing so in conjunction with 
stakeholders with which they share, referring to part of Schmidt’s (2002) key definition 
of coordinative discourse, a ‘common language and framework’? Thus, although 
coordinative discourse may at times only be found in purely internal documentation, 
there will be occasions when we can arrive at it by studying publicly available 
documents, provided we understand the context in which they originate. This may offer 
a less comprehensive insight into the beliefs of policy-makers than Hay and Smith’s 
(2010) approach to collecting ‘raw attitudinal data’, but there are two reasons why it is 
still the preferred approach. For one, the interest is in the ideas of policy-makers at a 
particular moment in time, which is difficult to determine by any other means; collecting 
attitudinal data is constrained in this regard by the potential for such problems as 
memory failure that plague retrospective surveys (Belli et al. 1999; Oppenheim 1992: 
130) and interviews (Seldon 1996: 355-356). Secondly, and as noted above, this is a 
more parsimonious technique to reliably arrive at the general outline of policy-makers’ 
beliefs, as we are not interested in an exhaustive geneology – or “anthropology”, to use 
the term Hay (2004a) employs to refer to Karl Polanyi’s (1957) study of the origins of 
market relations – of the emergence of neoliberal ideas in EU trade policy. The 
“snapshots” garnered through documentary analysis, in turn, are sufficient for the 
purposes of deploying our analytical strategy to unmask the strategic nature of appeals 
to an external economic constraint. 
In sum, deploying this framework is particularly helpful as it enables to understand the 
power of economic ideas without sacrificing the analytical complexity involved in the 
study of discourse from a constructivist perspective. Focusing on the “strategic” 
dimension to discourse is important to understand how DG Trade (the principal 
agent/actor in our story, although individual Commissioners also played an important 
agential role) has legitimated free trade after the advent of the economic crisis. In this 
vein, although constructivist approaches have been critiqued from a historical materialist 
position as ‘unable to explain why a particular set of ideas became part of the structure 
and not another, rival set of ideas’ (Bieler and Morton 2008: 104, emphasis in the 
original) this article offers an insight into the ideationally compelling dynamics of 
discourses of external constraint. In other words, it offers a theory of why certain ideas 
did matter at a particular point in time (the Commission’s argument regarding the need 
to liberalise) while others were marginalised (the arguments of import-competing 
sectors). Moreover, the so-called “reflexive” dimension to discourse helps us to 
understand why the Commission pursued the policies it did in the first place, privileging 
the interests of exporters (e.g. service suppliers). After all, their pronouncements on the 
necessity for market access chimed with the neoliberal vision internalised by policy-
makers more readily than requests for import protection from more defensively-oriented 
sectors (e.g. automobiles). A detailed study of their role in lobbying the Commission to 
pursue particular trade policies is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article (see 
Siles-Brügge 2010; Heron and Siles-Brügge 2012). Instead, this analysis seeks to 
suggest that an appreciation of the ideational dimension to policy-making helps to 
understand the influence that exporters hold and has been documented elsewhere. This 
is something, moreover, a historical materialist reading of the EU political economy (van 
Apeldoorn 2002) would not necessarily give us; its overly holistic focus on a cohesive 
transnational capitalist elite allied to a unified Commission does not fit the picture of EU 
trade policy where there are very clear cleavages between (what are in most cases both 
transnational) pro-liberalization (largely export-oriented or importing) and anti-
liberalization business interests (see, among others, Dür 2008; Siles-Brügge 2011; De 
Bièvre and Eckhardt 2011). 
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INTERNALISING THE NEOLIBERAL PARADIGM: THE ‘REFLEXIVE’ DIMENSION TO 
DG TRADE’S DISCOURSE 
The empirical part of this article thus begins by looking at this “reflexive dimension” to 
discourse in this section, suggesting that policy-makers in DG Trade internalised a 
neoliberal discourse that led them to see the marketisation, economic restructuring and 
integration of the EU into the world economy as desirable outcomes (which also made 
them amenable to certain interest groups’ arguments). This coordinative discourse 
began to crystallise over the course of the 1990s in the notion that boosting EU 
competitiveness – understood in terms of an increasing emphasis on ‘value-adding’ and 
exporting upmarket goods and services (European Commission 1996, 2005) – should be 
served through the elimination of restrictions to trade. Crucially, open trade policies were 
seen in the context of neoliberal economic restructuring; the 1996 Market Access 
Strategy – a key policy-making document authored under the tenure of Trade 
Commissioner Leon Brittan – argued that although market opening could lead to political 
pressures from affected industries, the process of restructuring would bring new 
business opportunities to Europe based on the principles of ‘comparative advantage and 
free trade’ (European Commission 1996: 2). The subtext was that Europe should 
concentrate on exporting high-end goods and services where it was judged to be 
“competitive” rather than seek to compete with the likes of China and India on price. 
This distinctly neoclassical economic analysis led DG Trade – albeit cautiously, at this 
stage – to argue that requests for import protection or government support to affected 
groups should be resisted (see European Commission 1996: 2); market disciplines were 
positive as they encouraged competitive adaptation. In terms of the globalization 
discourse literature, this was a view of globalization as a positive yet contingent outcome 
and it led officials in DG Trade to actively seek exporter input (European Commission 
1996: 10) where previously such interests had not featured very prominently in trade 
policy-making (see Heron and Siles-Brügge 2012: 255-256).2 
After the departure of Brittan EU trade policy discourse was recast by the new Trade 
Commissioner Pascal Lamy in terms of the doctrine of “managed globalization”. This, 
however, has to be contextualised within EU trade policy’s wider neoliberal evolution, 
representing less of a discontinuity with previous ideas than some would argue (Abdelal 
and Meunier 2010). Lamy, after all, continued to espouse a positive-sum view of trade 
liberalisation and globalization premised on seeking gains for upmarket exporters, whose 
input was still actively sought to set EU trade policy in the Doha Round of multilateral 
trade talks (Heron and Siles-Brügge 2012, De Ville and Orbie 2011; see speeches by 
Lamy 1999, 2000). The arrival, as Trade Commissioner in November 2004, of Peter 
Mandelson was more important for these purposes, as one of the chief architects of the 
reincarnation of the Labour Party as ‘New Labour’, which embraced aspects of the 
Thatcherite legacy in Britain (see Hay 1999). This is because his tenure represented an 
important “leap” when compared to previous thinking in DG Trade towards a more 
“activist” form of neoliberal trade policy. Crucially, it was suggested in the September 
2005 Trade and Competitiveness Issues Paper – a key document used in policy 
formulation (see Siles-Brügge 2011) – that the EU ‘(u)rge trade partners to open their 
markets, using our possibilities for movement on our trade protection as negotiating 
leverage’ (European Commission 2005: 6, emphasis omitted). Whereas in 1996 policy-
makers had been rather coy about the prospect of “resisting” protectionist pressures 
(see above), in 2005 – following Mandelson’s influence – they chose to confront them 
head-on in the interest of boosting EU competitiveness. In the eyes of policy-makers this 
would be killing two birds with one stone by achieving market access gains for EU 
export-oriented sectors (in other words, “competitive” industries) using a reduction in 
import duties in the few remaining “pockets of protection” (to rephrase the Issues 
Papers’ term of “pockets of distortion”) as a bargaining chip, even though this was seen 
as a desirable outcome in itself. This was not an espousal of “mercantilism” – that is, 
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maximising net exports – as some have argued (Ricard 2006), but rather corresponded 
to a neoliberal view of economic relations, as trade policy was to take a more “activist” 
role in the restructuring of the European economy. As in 1996, globalization was being 
portrayed in Commission coordinative discourse as a positive and contingent outcome, 
but one in which market-opening (particularly of third party economies) was political 
objective that had to be pursued with even greater emphasis. 
In the aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis, and under the leadership of Commissioner 
Karel De Gucht (in office since February 2010), policy-makers have continued espousing 
similar views.3 This can be observed from a key contribution made by DG Trade’s Chief 
Economist, Lucien Cernat, to a debate amongst neoclassical economists on the future on 
EU trade policy. This is tellingly entitled ‘Shaping the Future of EU Trade Policy: How to 
Maximise the Gains from Trade in a Globalised World’, already suggesting a positive-sum 
view of trade liberalisation. Specifically, Cernat (2010: 14, emphasis in the original) 
refers to the orthodox, neoclassic literature in trade economics to argue that ‘promoting 
trade liberalisation brings a triple benefit that can underpin (economic) progress in the 
EU’, namely ‘economic growth’, ‘consumer benefits’ and ‘labour effects’. Apart from the 
emphasis on consumers, this is nothing new. The emphasis on ‘economic growth’ and 
‘labour effects’ betrays a continued faith in the forces of economic restructuring, with 
officials in DG Trade still espousing the view that the EU’s competitiveness is dependent 
on its ability to export high-end products. What is more interesting is that, given the 
context of the economic crisis and the slowing of economic growth in Europe, the 
principal plank in Cernat’s argument is that ‘(w)ith subdued domestic demand in the EU, 
trade is going to become an important driver of growth’ (Cernat 2010: 13). In sum then, 
trade liberalisation is still seen as a desirable objective – contributing to the Europe 2020 
agenda of economic recovery premised on boosting competitiveness – while globalization 
is – as under Mandelson – also embraced as an unambiguously desirable process. 
Crucially, as subsequent analysis will show, both this objective and process are 
perceived as threatened by the political consequences of the economic crisis. 
This is most obvious if we turn to other contributions made by Cernat and his economist 
colleagues in DG Trade to Vox discussions. The argument made in these pieces is that 
EU member states have to resist the forces of “murky”, behind-the-border protectionism 
that are spreading through the international economic system following the Financial 
Crisis (Cernat and Susa 2010; Cernat and Madsen 2011). In Cernat and his colleague 
Nuno Susa’s (2010) words, ‘this crisis might put an additional strain on those areas 
where the absence of clear WTO rules offers unbounded “protectionist policy space’’’. 
Free trade (as well as further liberalisation), then, is seen to be far from inevitable as it 
depends, to a large extent, on the political will of participants in the international trading 
system to be maintained. Moreover, it is also seen to be increasingly contingent on 
domestic political pressure. As the following excerpt from makes clear, the belief among 
policy-makers in DG Trade is that the lack of reciprocity in trading relations with 
emerging economies – who are developing into keen EU competitors – risks turning EU 
public opinion against trade liberalisation: 
‘(Most) Europeans believe that the EU has benefited greatly from international 
trade. However, they are less confident about the future, as (again most) think 
that trade will benefit more the emerging economies (…) in the coming years. 
These views may lead to protectionist tendencies, if Europe’s openness is 
perceived as being matched by EU’s strategic trading partners with ‘behind-the-
border’ policies acting as de facto discriminatory trade barriers’ (Cernat and 
Madsen 2011; see also O’Sullivan 2010). 
This passage captures a real fear amongst trade policy-makers that the public as well as 
political actors’ understandings of trade policy are largely “mercantilist”, that is, focused 
exclusively on the gains to exporters from liberalisation rather than also on the gains 
from imports (in the form of cheaper consumer prices and so forth, as neoclassical 
economic theory dictates; interview, European Commission, Brussels, 25 May 2011). The 
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implication of this of course is that, in the absence of countervailing gains for exporters 
(i.e. where countries did not reciprocate EU openness) such actors will focus on the 
concentrated adjustment costs resulting from trade liberalisation. The significance of this 
for our purposes – beyond highlighting that DG Trade’s views (as highlighted in its 
coordinative discourse) continue to be neoliberal rather than mercantilist – is two-fold. 
For one, it underscores the importance increasingly attributed in DG Trade to 
communicating the benefits of free trade, and in particular of imports. This is a point we 
return to later in the article, where we discuss DG Trade’s discursive strategy. For now, 
we turn to the implications that this raises for the Commission’s “reciprocity” agenda in 
the sense that it is felt that a lack thereof threatens the liberal foundations of EU trade 
policy. 
 “Reciprocity” has long been a code word in Brussels for “protectionism”, having been 
appropriated by actors critical of DG Trade’s market-opening initiatives in order to 
oppose trade liberalisation (Siles-Brügge 2011). However, DG Trade has not deviated 
from its long-held neoliberal paradigm by acknowledging the (political) necessity of 
reciprocity in trading relations. If we carefully examine DG Trade’s previous coordinative 
discourse, such as the 1996 Market Access Strategy or 2005 Issues Paper, it becomes 
clear that it had always acknowledged the potential for opposition to liberal, technical-
rational and (therefore) welfare-maximising trade policies amongst political actors. After 
all, there is recognition of these dynamics among neoclassically trained economists and 
their following among political scientists, who have postulated theories of how to 
overcome these political dynamics prompted by collective action problems (see, e.g. 
Destler 2005). The economic crisis has, of course, rendered these pressures increasingly 
relevant, explaining in part the emphasis on a more concrete political “limitation” to the 
optimum outcome of unfettered trade liberalisation; the emphasis on reciprocity is 
perhaps a greater recognition than ever before of the political contingency of 
liberalisation, but this is not unexpected given the advent of the crisis. Underscoring its 
ideational lineage, reciprocity in DG Trade’s discourse is therefore ultimately about 
mobilising support in favour of trade liberalisation, rather than against market opening. 
More specifically, reciprocity is about ensuring the EU possesses sufficient leverage in 
on-going trade negotiations, rather than being aimed at establishing new barriers. In 
sum, in this section we have explored the “reflexive dimension” to DG Trade’s neoliberal 
policy-making discourse. By focusing on the beliefs of decision-makers from the mid-
1990s to the present day we have been able to explain why they pursued the course of 
action they did. How policy-makers’ beliefs surrounding ‘reciprocity’ have come to shape 
the EU’s specific trade policy measures following the crisis is an issue we turn to in the 
next section. 
 
LEVERAGING, NOT ESTABLISHING PROTECTION 
As we saw in the previous section, the idea of leveraging protection has been one of the 
key ingredients of the EU’s external trade strategy because it has allowed DG Trade to 
serve two aims it sees as desirable simultaneously: eliminating the EU’s remaining 
“pockets of protection” while serving its exporters interests. This was the aim behind the 
2006 “Global Europe” strategy, whose stated aim of promoting competitiveness through 
further liberalisation was to be served through a more offensive external trade strategy 
premised on a new generation of bilateral trade deals with emerging East Asian and (to a 
lesser extent) Latin American economies (European Commission 2006). The first FTA 
concluded as part of this strategy with South Korea was predicated on precisely this 
dynamic; in exchange for a substantial liberalisation of the EU automobile market (at a 
time, we should remember, when it was in crisis following the economic downturn and 
where the opposition voiced by the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association 
known by its French acronym ACEA had considerable resonance among certain member 
states such as Germany, France and Italy), DG Trade obtained a substantial 
liberalisation of services and investment for its outward-oriented firms (Siles-Brügge 
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2011). These were exporters which, as we saw above, the Commission had actively 
sought to engage in trade policy-making since the 1996 Market Access Strategy (see en. 
2 on the role of the ESF), pointing to the “reflexive” role of discourse discussed in the 
previous section. 
Taking this offensive trade agenda predicated on leveraging protection forward, as the 
Trade, Growth and World Affairs strategy purports to do, however, is potentially more 
problematic as all of the emerging country FTA partners originally identified by the 
Global Europe communication – with the exception of Korea and Singapore – are current 
beneficiaries of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). The existence of this 
scheme of non-reciprocal trade preferences offered by the EU to developing countries – 
which is authorised under the WTO’s Enabling Clause – has been seen by officials in DG 
Trade to create a serious disincentive for such countries to sign up to FTAs, as market 
access for many of their commodity exports is already guaranteed without the need for 
reciprocal liberalisation. In sum, in order to be able to trade away protection effectively, 
in line with the neoliberal beliefs of policy-makers discussed in the previous section, the 
EU has to be able to leverage sectors that are currently covered by GSP. 
It is within this context that we have to understand DG Trade’s recent reform of the GSP 
scheme. This will see all high income and upper-middle-income countries – using the 
World Bank’s income criteria – become ineligible for GSP, with simultaneous changes to 
the graduation principle for GSP imports also rendering 5.3€ billion worth of imports – 
spread among only six countries (China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Thailand, and 
Ukraine) – ineligible for preferential access under the scheme (European Commission 
2011a: 112; see also ODI 2011). DG Trade’s stated rationale for these changes is to 
‘focus the GSP preferences on the countries most in need’ (European Commission 
2011a: 2) – in their eyes LDCs and so-called “vulnerable economies” lacking product 
diversification and being poorly integrated into the world economy (European 
Commission 2011b: 11). There are, however, clear grounds for doubting DG Trade’s 
stated aims in this respect. If the primary driver of the EU’s reform of the GSP is to help 
those “most in need” by improving the value of their non-reciprocal preferences, then 
why is it seeking elsewhere to put trade relations with LDCs and “vulnerable” economies 
on a contractually reciprocated basis in the form of the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) and other FTAs (for more on this, see Heron and Siles-Brügge 
2012)?  
As a result, it is argued that the GSP changes have to be understood as part of the move 
towards improving leverage in on-going trade negotiations. All of the FTA partners 
originally identified by the “Global Europe” communication – with the exception of Korea 
and Singapore – are current GSP beneficiaries, with most being significantly negatively 
affected by the reform of the scheme. Argentina, Brunei, Brazil, Malaysia and Uruguay 
stand to lose all of their non-reciprocal trade preferences, while India would lose 
preferences on 2.81€ billion worth of trade, or about 11.1 per cent of its total goods 
exports to the EU (author’s calculation, using data from European Commission 2011a 
and Eurostat 2011).4 DG Trade, in appraising the GSP changes, unsurprisingly argued 
that they ‘ha(d) nothing to do with other (commercial) trade negotiations’, but it was 
quick to point out that they ‘might still have the unintended consequence of providing 
more advanced developing countries with a greater incentive to enter into and conclude 
reciprocal trade negotiations with the EU’ (European Commission 2011b: 15). Of these 
negotiations, the FTA talks with India are seen to be the most economically significant, 
with one senior DG Trade official going as far as to claim in 2011 that the success of the 
“Global Europe” agenda depended upon the successful completion of this FTA (interview, 
interest group representative, Brussels, 20 May 2011). As a result, it is perhaps no 
surprise that DG Trade singled out India when discussing the issue of negotiating 
leverage, noting that while it ‘enjoys relatively good market access for goods to the EU 
under the GSP (…) (it also) maintains fairly high tariffs and some peaks in areas 
particularly important to EU industry (such as cars, wines and spirits) and significant 
Volume 9, Issue 4 (2013) jcer.net Gabriel Siles-Brügge 
 608 
non-tariff barriers in other sectors important to EU exporters’ (European Commission 
2010d: 8).  
This, however, is only one of the two prongs of DG Trade’s strategy of negotiating with 
India. The GSP changes are likely to increase its ability to trade away EU protection for 
market access in the Indian market. To be more specific, and rephrasing the terminology 
of the 2005 Issues Paper, DG Trade’s chosen “pocket of protection” to offer in exchange 
for its offensive interests (for instance, in the area of investment liberalisation for 
services) is the area of General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) mode 4 service 
provision (the delivery of a service through the presence of natural persons). 
Liberalisation of mode 4 is particularly key to India given the low levels of liberalisation 
offered by the EU in this area; the EU15 April 2003 GATS offer in the Doha Round for 
mode 4 amounted to an indexed score of only 4.5 per cent, compared to over 50 per 
cent in all other modes of supply (Hoekman et al. 2007: 374). As a result, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that there is some evidence to suggest that the Indian side sees a 
satisfactory offer on mode 4 as a sine qua non of their acceptance of the FTA (cited in 
Business, Innovation and Skills Committee 2011). In this vein, DG Trade is 
countenancing making India the most generous mode 4 package that it has ever made 
in exchange for movement on its offensive interests. This is obviously conditional on the 
offer made from the Indian side (the hope being that a generous offer will “buy” the EU 
generous concessions beyond services; interview, European Commission, Brussels, 19 
May 2011) – and on subsequent approval from the member states – but it highlights the 
importance attached by both sides to this particular trade off at the heart of the 
negotiations (Aiyar 2011).  
This appears to embody one of the key aspects of DG Trade’s neoliberal agenda (and the 
specific neoliberal discourse it internalised), which, as we saw in the preceding section, 
was its desire to actively trade away “pockets of protection” in exchange for market 
access. As we noted then, this cannot simply be seen as part of a “mercantilist” 
bargaining dynamic, but rather reflected the views of policy-makers that they were 
killing two birds with one stone, using the elimination of trade protection (which was 
seen as undesirable anyway) to achieve market access gains for their constituency of 
competitive exporters (primarily service providers establishing a commercial presence, 
also known as mode 3; for the importance of these in shaping EU trade policy, see Heron 
and Siles-Brügge 2012). Likewise, in the case of the EU-India FTA, DG Trade is showing 
willingness to trade gains on services investment and establishment more generally for a 
liberalisation of mode 4 that it sees as inherently desirable. One draft report in the EP 
(the so-called “Karim Report”) – echoing a Commission report on the subject (No2EU 
2010) – was to enunciate the logic explicitly by noting that, 
‘India has offensive interests in the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) Mode 1 and Mode 4 liberalisation; the European Union would like to 
complete liberalisation in market access and national treatment in Mode 3 in most 
services; (…) the full ambition of the FTA cannot be achieved without MODE 4 
(sic) – which currently faces a range of barriers (…) The elimination of these 
impediments would generate gains not just for India but also for the importing EU 
Member States’ (European Parliament 2009: 9-10). 
Crucially, however, the EU’s relative lack of openness in mode 4 – as Bernard Hoekman 
et al. (2007: 375) note, although mode 4 is a sensitive in most developed countries ‘a 
number of high-income countries are somewhat more willing to accept temporary entry 
of professionals than is the EU’ – has been the product of the extreme politicisation of 
the issue within Europe, given its close association with migration issues within member 
states (Persin 2008; interviews, European Commission, September-October 2009 and 
May 2011). The EU-India FTA talks appear to have brought this issue to the fore at a 
time when member states’ governments are under pressure on immigration issues in the 
wake of the economic crisis. Of particular relevance here is the UK – where the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition recently introduced a fixed annual cap on non-
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European Economic Area migration to the UK (Tieman 2011) – which is expected to be 
the primary destination of India professionals and the key market of interest to Indian 
negotiators (Business, Innovation and Skills Committee 2011). There is unfortunately no 
space here to go into a detailed discussion of the literature on the politics of migration, 
or the important distinction in GATS parlance between mode 4 service delivery (implying 
temporary rather than permanent relocation) and migration which is often lost in the 
public debate on mode 4 (instead, see Leal-Arcas 2010). What is clear, however, is the 
political contentiousness of mode 4 in the context of the EU-India FTA, which is 
illustrated very vividly in one UK tabloid’s reaction that ‘(t)ens of thousands of migrants 
from India are set to win the right to live and work in Britain because of the [EU-India 
FTA]’ (Doughty 2010). Our brief discussion of the politicisation of this domain therefore 
raises the question of how DG Trade plans to push through this particularly controversial 
aspect of its trade liberalisation agenda. This leads us to turn to its strategic use of 
discourses of external constraint, the other dimension to the study of discourse which we 
addressed in the conceptual section of this article. 
 
CONSTRUCTING AN IDEATIONAL IMPERATIVE FOR LIBERALIZATION: THE 
“STRATEGIC” DIMENSION TO DISCOURSE 
Under Mandelson, DG Trade seized upon the prevailing macroeconomic consensus of the 
time in order to construct a discourse of no alternative to trade liberalisation (see Siles-
Brügge 2011). The discursive logic advanced in “Global Europe” was that given the 
competitiveness objectives of the Lisbon Agenda – which sought to make the EU ‘the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’ by 2010 
(European Council 2000) – the EU had no choice but to pursue an offensive external 
trade strategy. The “Global Europe” strategy was thus discursively rendering the 
potentially most controversial aspect of its trade agenda, trading “pockets of protection” 
for market access, necessary by appealing to the external constraint posed by 
globalising markets. In sum, ideas were being used as a powerful instrument in the 
service of a policy-making elite’s neoliberal agenda, in line with the theoretical argument 
made earlier. 
In De Gucht’s DG Trade, the new Europe 2020 strategy plays a similar role to the Lisbon 
Agenda back in 2006. Europe 2020 strategy was a direct response to wider economic 
effects of the 2008 Financial Crisis, formally proposed by the (second) Barroso 
Commission in March 2010 and approved by the Member States at a European Council 
summit in Brussels in June 2010. Although it ostensibly replaced the previous Lisbon 
Agenda – whose ambitious target the crisis had definitively put to rest – the parallels are 
difficult to ignore. The rationale for Europe 2020 – as in Lisbon – was still Europe’s 
(relative) economic decline, with the crisis (and the pain it had and was still causing in 
Europe) adding increased urgency to plans for long-term economic reform rather than 
dashing them. The responses to these challenges were the three ‘mutually reinforcing’ 
objectives of delivering ‘smart growth’ (developing the knowledge economy), 
‘sustainable growth’ (promoting greater resource efficiency, environmental awareness 
and competitiveness) and ‘inclusive growth’ (delivering high-employment and social 
cohesion) (European Commission 2010a). In sum, Europe 2020 sought not only to ‘help 
Europe recover from the crisis’ but also, in Lisbon fashion, to enable the EU to ‘come out 
stronger, both internally and at the international level’ by the new deadline of 2020 
(European Council 2010: 2). Europe 2020 was therefore not so much a reinvention of 
European economic governance as a updating of the Lisbon Strategy reflecting changes 
in the European political economy. The emphasis on the competitiveness challenges 
faced by the European economy – so prominent in Lisbon (see Hay and Rosamond 2002) 
– still persisted; in fact, the crisis had added increased urgency to the need to respond 
to the external constraint posed by globalization. Thus, in its justification of Europe 
2020, the Commission was to note that ‘(t)he crisis has wiped out years of economic and 
social progress and exposed structural weaknesses in Europe’s economy. In the 
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meantime, the world is moving fast and long-term challenges – globalization, pressure 
on resources, ageing – intensify’ (European Commission 2010a: 5).  
Although work on Trade, Growth and World Affairs was initiated as part of this broader 
Europe 2020 agenda, DG Trade ensured that from the beginning it established discursive 
‘ownership’ of this initiative; in this sense, the new trade strategy played an analogous 
role to “Global Europe” as DG Trade’s primary communicative resource. As David 
O’Sullivan (2010: 4, emphasis added), Director-General for Trade, put it explicitly, its 
purpose was ‘to continue to project publicly the benefits of trade and globalization, 
because recent events have given rise to some criticism and some suggestions that 
perhaps trade or globalization might even have contributed to the difficulties’. In his 
eyes there were very good reasons to do so as it was member states who were partly 
behind the drive for an ‘external dimension’ to the Europe 2020 competitiveness agenda, 
including a strong drive from certain member states to include an emphasis on 
“reciprocity” – ostensibly in the more protectionist vein long associated with certain 
members of the Council (see Siles-Brügge 2011: 640, 644). Thus while contributing to 
the drafting of the Europe 2020 document, which included a page setting out the basic 
parameters of the future Trade, Growth and World Affairs strategy, DG Trade worked 
hard (and ultimately successfully) to excise the term “reciprocity” with its potentially 
protectionist ramifications (interview, European Commission, Brussels, 17 May 2011). 
The next step of DG Trade’s strategy consisted in seizing upon the discourse of external 
constraint at the heart of Europe 2020, much as it had with the Lisbon Agenda six years 
previously, in order to render its agenda of trade liberalisation discursively necessary, 
especially in response to the crisis. Trade, Growth and World Affairs explicitly stated that 
‘trade and investment policy must contribute to this (competitiveness) objective’ 
(European Commission 2010c: 4, emphasis added). Crucially, it also addressed the 
threat of protectionist “reciprocity” by noting that while ‘others (…) must match our 
(liberalization) efforts, in a spirit of reciprocity and mutual benefit (…) (t)he EU will 
remain an open economy’. This was an act of discursively neutering the term 
“reciprocity” of protectionist connotations; although DG Trade continued by noting that 
this meant remaining ‘vigilant in defence of European interests and European jobs’, the 
implication, given the constraint posed by globalised markets, was that the EU would 
have to remain open in order not to jeopardise those interests. As the preceding 
paragraph in Trade, Growth and World Affairs had made clear, ‘(o)pen economies tend 
to grow faster than closed economies (…) (and as a result) Europe must seize the triple 
benefit from more open trade and investment: more growth and jobs and lower 
consumer prices’ (European Commission: 2010c: 4, emphasis added). 
The necessitarian character attached to trade liberalisation as a result of the so-called 
‘triple benefits from trade’ – which had featured in a more contingent form in DG Trade 
coordinative discourse (see above) – was underscored in another key document, the 
Staff Working Paper on Trade as a Driver of Prosperity. This came out in accompaniment 
to the strategy – to elaborate on areas the length and format-restricted Trade, Growth 
and World Affairs communication could not address (interview, European Commission, 
17 May 2011). It sought to, through detailed economic analysis, ‘(make) the case again 
for open trade as an important driver for economic growth and job creation in the EU as 
well as worldwide, and as a necessary condition to strengthen the competitiveness of the 
EU in global markets’ (European Commission 2010e: 3, emphasis added). It also aimed, 
as had Trade, Growth and World Affairs, to underscore that “reciprocity” could not imply 
a closure of the EU market, given the importance of imports within the EU political 
economy: ‘(c)reating more growth and jobs in the EU will require a stronger export 
orientation but without falling into mercantilism: competitive exports require competitive 
imports’ (European Commission 2010e: 4, emphasis added). In this way it also 
emphasised the neoliberal rather than mercantilist bent of EU trade policy. 
At this stage, this analysis addresses whether such discourses of external constraint 
were invoked instrumentally as they were under Mandelson. To do so, it deploys the 
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analytical technique discussed earlier (Figure 1), to contrast DG Trade’s coordinative and 
communicative discourses over this period. The analytical strategy is premised on the 
fact that a contrast in discourse between both of these discursive settings suggests that 
an actor has not truly internalised a discourse of external constraint and is therefore 
simply invoking it strategically. Returning to the empirical case at hand we find, as 
before, a clear contrast between the contingency arguments raised by policy-makers in 
private – where trade liberalisation was seen as desirable yet contingent on political 
pressure (Cernat’s column in the Vox debate, for example, was tellingly sub-titled ‘How 
to Maximise the Gains from Trade in a Globalised World’) – and the rhetoric 
characterising the Trade, Growth and World Affairs strategy. By embedding trade 
liberalisation in the context of Europe 2020 this latter rhetoric was rendering it 
discursively indispensable. This is particularly evident when we turn to the issue of 
‘reciprocity’. Whereas in private DG Trade officials stressed that a lack thereof ‘may lead 
to protectionist tendencies’ (Cernat and Madsen 2011), in public they stressed that 
although ‘for an open trade policy in Europe to succeed politically, others (…) must 
match our efforts (…) (t)he EU will remain an open economy’. The clear message, as we 
noted above, was that it had no choice to do so, given that in globalised markets ‘(o)pen 
economies tend to grow faster than closed economies’ (European Commission 2010c: 4). 
As a result, we can confidently conclude that officials in DG Trade did not truly believe 
these to be real economic constraints and were thus invoking them, as before, in order 
to legitimate their neoliberal agenda premised on market opening. 
 
THE DISCURSIVE STRATEGY AT WORK 
In Siles-Brügge (2011), the analysis shows how DG Trade successfully used such a 
discourse of economic constraint – as first enunciated in “Global Europe” – to legitimate 
the EU-Korea FTA in the face of considerable opposition from protectionist forces. Clearly 
the Trade, Growth and World Affairs strategy also contributed to reinforce these ideas at 
the time – being released in November 2010, a few months before the EU-Korea FTA 
was ratified by the EP – and serves the same purpose going forward. In the face of calls 
for “reciprocity” – in the protectionist vein – from some member states (as we noted 
above), it has re-established the discursive imperative for seeking ambitious trade 
agreements in East Asia (and Latin America). Thus, in reaction to Trade, Growth and 
World Affairs, the Trade Policy Committee of Member State representatives appeared to 
have fully internalised DG Trade’s logic of competitiveness-driven constraints when it 
argued that, 
‘given the new opportunities and challenges that the EU common commercial 
policy has to face in an evolving economic environment marked by the steady 
rise of new trading partners and increasingly complex global supply chains, the 
future trade policy horizon has to be built on the objectives and major 
achievements of the 2006 Global Europe strategy that has already led to the 
signature of the Free Trade Agreement with South Korea, (…) a strengthened 
focus on market access and regulatory issues in bilateral trade relations, (…) as 
well as continued action to reverse and roll-back trade restrictive measures 
introduced during the crisis’ (Council of the EU 2010: 3). 
Moreover, although it does remain to be seen whether DG Trade will be able to push 
through its remaining FTAs if they imply politically contentious trade-offs, it is 
particularly interesting to note that it already appears to have begun discursively 
clearing the way for the EU-India FTA – its “big prize” in terms of the Global Europe 
agenda – by pushing for the relaxation of the EU’s regime for mode 4 service delivery. 
As we saw above, this is a ‘pocket of protection’ that DG Trade is particularly keen to 
trade away in order to both obtain liberalisation gains for mode 3 suppliers to India the 
EU’s but also because it sees liberalisation in this area as inherently desirable. It is also a 
contentious issue given its association with immigration policy, particularly in the wake 
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of the economic crisis. As a result, it should not surprise us that DG Trade has explicitly 
invoked a necessitarian logic specifically with regard to mode 4 in Trade, Growth and 
World Affairs:  
‘We should also ensure that the temporary movement of people to provide 
services contributes to making our service providers and investors more 
competitive, both in the EU and abroad. Bringing in the most highly qualified 
people from around the world is essential to enable our companies and our 
research centres to remain at the cutting edge of innovation’ (European 
Commission 2010c: 7, emphasis added). 
The continued success of DG Trade’s discursive agenda in this area vis-à-vis other, 
potentially critical Commission DGs (who are likely to espouse less markedly neoliberal 
views) is reflected in the proposed Directive on Conditions of Admission of Third Country 
Nationals in the Framework of an Intra-Corporate Transfer, which aims to simplify 
procedures in order to promote service ‘imports’ under mode 4. Although the 
responsibility of DG Home Affairs, this document was laced with similarly necessitarian 
arguments to justify the proposed initiatives: 
‘As a result of the globalization of business increasing international trade, the 
growth and spread of multinationals and the on-going restructuring and 
consolidation of many sectors, movements of managerial and technical 
employees of branches and subsidiaries of multinational corporations, temporarily 
relocated for short assignments to other units of the company, have become 
more crucial in recent years’ (European Commission 2010b: 3). 
While naturally still tentative – as member states, the EP and the Commission have yet 
to agree on a final directive (EurActiv 2011) – these developments are interesting in the 
sense that they imply a move in a liberal direction in what many key political actors see 
– rightly or wrongly – as a component of immigration policy at a time when there has 
been a considerable retrenchment in this area more generally. In light of both the crisis 
and the likely increasing role in trade policy-making of the EP – which, since the recently 
ratified Treaty of Lisbon has to give its assent to all trade agreements signed by the EU – 
the importance of DG Trade’s economic rhetoric is likely to be heightened. In this vein 
there are some reasons for optimism for DG Trade policy-makers, as their discourse 
seems to carry some weight already in this domain outside the Commission. Although 
the acquiescence of member states on the issue mode 4 is still uncertain – both in terms 
of the intra-corporate transfer directive and the concessions on mode 4 envisaged as 
part of the EU-India FTA – the EP’s May 2011 resolution on the EU-India FTA 
acknowledged ‘that the full ambition of the FTA cannot be fulfilled without commitments 
in Mode 4’ (European Parliament 2011), echoing the wording of an earlier Commission 
report on the matter (see above). Although it did request ‘a thorough analysis be carried 
out in relation to the individual member states in order to avoid negative consequences 
for the EU labour market’, it conceded to the fundamental point of ‘permitting, under 
Mode 4, temporary stays of necessary skilled professionals’. In sum, in response to 
member states calling for ‘reciprocity’ in a protectionist vein as well as those opposed to 
concessions on mode 4, both groups of actors hostile to the Commission’s neoliberal 
trade agenda, DG Trade has scored a number of important discursive victories. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has focused on the evolution of the “Global Europe” offensive trade agenda 
following the advent of the 2008 Financial Crisis. We have found that despite the 
potential for increased protectionist pressure from societal actors and the EP, EU trade 
policy has still been driven by a concern with servicing upmarket exporters, at the 
expense, potentially, of protected sectors in the EU economy (this article focused on the 
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specific case of mode 4 service delivery in the context of the EU-India FTA). In this vein, 
we have also seen how the move towards emphasising reciprocity in the EU’s trade 
relations with third parties has to be contextualised within this wider objective, as it 
allows the EU to increase its leverage in negotiations with emerging country trade 
partners. This posed a conundrum for conventional rationalist explanations of (EU) trade 
policy, which by emphasising collective action dynamics which privilege protectionists (as 
in much of the IPE literature) or refer to institutional insulation (as in much of the EU 
trade policy literature) cannot on their own explain the continued neoliberal evolution of 
EU trade policy. In contrast, our constructivist approach allowed us to account for such 
developments by emphasising continuity in the beliefs held by officials in DG Trade, with 
the current Commissioner Karel De Gucht and his team espousing very similar views to 
those of their predecessors drafting “Global Europe”. While this explains why neoliberal 
policies were adopted, we need to turn to the sphere of communicative discourse to 
explain how these were successfully pursued against the wishes of hostile actors such as 
the European automobile lobby in the case of the EU-Korea FTA, member states calling 
for greater “reciprocity” in a protectionist vein or those opposed to concessions on the 
issue of mode 4 in the EU-India FTA. What we find is the deployment of economic 
rhetorics of external constraint which draw on the prevailing macroeconomic doctrine of 
the day (in this case the Europe 2020 agenda). This strategically-invoked discourse 
continues to be, so far, successful at legitimating the EU’s offensive trade agenda. 
 
*** 
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1 Hay and Rosamond (2002: 152) draw a distinction between “globalization as discourse” – ‘a repertoire 
of discursive resources (…) at the disposal of political actors’ –  and ‘globalization as rhetoric’ – ‘the 
strategic and persuasive deployment of such discourses, often in combination, as means to legitimate 
specific courses of action, policy initiatives, etc.’. 
2 Particularly influential among these groups was the European Services Forum (ESF). This was formally 
established in 1999 at the insistence of Commissioner Brittan who was seeking to ‘build a strong, 
coherent and active European constituency in favour of international trade in services liberalisation in a 
multilateral context’ (Brittan 1999: 1; for more on the role of the ESF, see Lietaert 2009). 
3 We focus here on the contributions made by leading figures in DG Trade to the “policy portal” 
VoxEU.org (henceforth “Vox”). Vox’s ‘intended audience is economists in governments, international 
organisations, academia and the private sector as well as journalists specializing in economics, finance 
and business’ (Vox 2011). As a result, we can clearly see that this forum, albeit publicly accessible on 
the web, is not so much aimed at communicating policy decisions as it is engaged in encouraging 
debates on policy formulation among a group of actors sympathetic to the aims of DG Trade policy-
makers. 
4 Moreover, for India and a number of other emerging economies, these changes also affect exports that 
undoubtedly benefit from such preferences (ODI 2011). 
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This paper aims to convince the reader of the potential of a critical version of historical institutionalism (HI) as a 
theoretical perspective for EU trade policy analysis. It argues that critical HI sensitises the analyst to important 
but hitherto often neglected factors including: the influence of the past on EU trade policy; the complex, 
multiarena and multilevel nature of contemporary trade policy; and issues of distributional conflict. The core 
concept in critical HI is ‘reactive sequencing’, conceiving of policy evolution as a chain of events produced by 
reactions and counter-reactions. This paper demonstrates that this is invaluable to understand contemporary EU 
trade politics. Some examples of EU trade policy decisions and its general strategic evolution since the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round are given to show the value of critical HI. Finally, the external dimension of 
“Europe 2020” as the latest trade policy strategy is analysed from a critical historical institutionalist angle. 
EU trade policy; critical historical institutionalism; reactive sequencing; new trade politics 
 
 
 
Can the European Union (EU)’s trade policy response to the crisis be explained solely by 
interest group competition (liberalism), decision-making procedures (rational 
functionalism) or even a combination of both? Similarly, can a combination of 
contemporaneous variables as openness of the EU economy or dominance of free trade-
oriented member states explain why the EU has not resorted to trade instruments to 
protect and promote its ambitious unilateral climate change policies? This article argues 
that in both, and many other, instances of new trade politics the answer is: no. We can 
understand current EU trade policy positions only by taking into account the influence of 
past policies and ideas. Thus, this article will advocate a critical variant of historical 
institutionalism as an approach to EU trade policy. 
Nonetheless, EU trade policy research is overwhelmingly dominated by rational choice 
analyses. The Common Commercial Policy and particular decisions within the domain are 
mostly described or explained using one or more of the following rational choice 
perspectives: principal-agent; interest-group pluralism; and/or three level games (for an 
overview see Dür and Zimmermann 2007). These rational choice approaches share some 
inexpedient characteristics: they are a-historical (by focusing on synchronic causality1, 
see also Howlett 2009: 242) and to a large extent a-political (by focusing solely on 
limited inter-interest group competition and/or inter-institutional conflict). By conceiving 
of EU trade policy as a function of the interaction between the member states and the 
Commission (and third states; as in principal-agent and three level game analyses) 
and/or exporters and import-competing interests (in pluralist accounts) they are 
incapable to grasp the dynamics of the “new trade agenda”2. 
This paper argues that a critical (or dynamic) historical institutionalist (HI) perspective 
has much potential to enhance our understanding of contemporary EU trade policy. 
Critical HI distinguishes itself for its attention to: the influence of the past on present EU 
trade policy processes; the complex, multiarena and multilevel nature of contemporary 
trade policy; and issues of distributional conflict. The distinguishing characteristics of 
critical HI will be further elaborated and explained in the next section. Subsequently, it 
will be shown how this perspective allows us to better understand EU trade policy 
decisions and its general strategic evolution since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 
In the final section, the EU’s most recent trade strategy as outlined in the Commission 
Communication ‘Trade, Growth and World Affairs’ (also dubbed ‘the external dimension 
of Europe 2020’) is analysed from a critical historical institutionalist angle.  
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THE DIFFERENCE CRITICAL HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM MAKES 
Historical institutionalism is a school of thought characterised by great internal diversity. 
The same goes for the other new institutionalisms (at least rational choice 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, while other neo-institutionalisms have 
been proposed; see Peters 2000), so that the lines dividing them may blur (Hall and 
Taylor 1996: 955-957) and it becomes difficult to assign concrete institutionalist 
analyses unequivocally to one of the schools. Consequently, it is also impossible to give 
an uncontested summary of the core assumptions and concepts of historical 
institutionalism. 
Political scientists sometimes undeservedly reduce HI to the concept of “path 
dependency” (see the discussion in Peters et al. 2005). This is an enduring legacy (pun 
intended) of the fact that the historical institutionalist school in political science, like its 
rational choice nephew, has been adopted from the economics discipline. Economists 
explaining technological choice and evolution (David 1985; Arthur 1994) and 
institutional/developmental evolution (North 1990) have emphasised how an initial 
choice may become “locked in” through various “positive feedback” mechanisms 
(increasing returns, learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations; 
Arthur 1988 in Pierson 1993). In the writings of Paul Pierson (e.g. 2000), probably the 
most famous intellectual father of historical institutionalism in political science, the “path 
dependence” of politics via the mechanism of increasing returns (or self-reinforcing or 
positive feedback processes) is indeed the most important concept of historical 
institutionalism – although in one of his earliest essays on the theory (1993) he also 
discussed very pertinently inter alia the possibility of counter-mobilisation and the 
interpretive effects of public policies including negative learning. Later, Pierson rejected 
the usefulness of such a broad definition of path dependence that states that ‘we cannot 
understand the significance of a particular social variable without understanding “how it 
got there”–the path it took. Previous events in a sequence influence outcomes and 
trajectories but not necessarily by inducing further movement in the same direction. 
Indeed, the path may matter precisely because it tends to provoke a reaction in some 
other direction’ (Pierson 2000: 252). The narrower conception of path dependence 
Pierson proposes instead, namely that preceding steps in a particular direction induce 
further movement in the same direction, has induced the criticism on historical 
institutionalism that it is preoccupied with explaining inertia while being unable to 
account for institutional and policy change and that it has a structural tendency that 
neglects agency (Peters et al. 2005). As Kathleen Thelen (1999: 385) has rightly noted: 
the positive feedback model is both too contingent in explaining initial choices (as 
“determined” by chance or by “critical junctures” exogenously produced) and too 
deterministic after the initial move when the path narrows mechanically. While these 
criticisms are not undeserved for what may be called the “conservative” branch of 
historical institutionalism that is confined to positive feedback processes, it is an unjust 
reproach for the more “critical” or dynamic approaches (Hay and Wincott 1998, Thelen 
1999, Daugbjerg 2009, Howlett 2009, Ackrill and Kay 2009) that I will build on in the 
rest of this paper. 
The central argument of historical institutionalism that is shared by all its disciples is that 
“policies create politics”. Implied in this statement, and of course in the theory’s label, is 
that “history matters” and “institutions [broadly defined to include policy decisions] 
matter”. Policies create politics means that a policy decision may restructure subsequent 
political configurations through effects on the resources, incentives and (normative and 
cognitive) perceptions of actors. In the critical version, this effect or feedback may run in 
different directions, in other words may be positive as well as negative. Feedback 
moreover has various dimensions: it may be material/structural or ideational, and it may 
be functional (where the presence of certain institutions raise the returns to the presence 
of complementary ones, as in the varieties of capitalism or worlds of welfare state 
literature; see Hall and Soskice 2001; Esping-Andersen 1990) or distributive. Viewed in 
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this way, a better encompassing concept for the various ways the past influences 
present politics than “path dependence” is “reactive sequencing”. This conceives of policy 
evolution as ‘a chain of events linked through reactions and counter-reaction’ (Daugbjerg 
2009: 407). As Thelen phrases it: 
‘(p)olitics is characterized by disagreement over goals and disparities in power, 
and in fact institutions [or policy decisions] often reinforce power disparities ... 
However the losers do not necessarily disappear, and their adaptation can mean 
something very different from embracing and reproducing the institution (or 
decision) ... For those who are disadvantaged by prevailing institutions (or 
policies), adapting may mean biding their time until conditions shift, or it may 
mean working within the existing framework in pursuit of goals different from–
even subversive to–those of the institution’s (policy’s) designers’ (1999: 285-
286). 
From this short summary may be extracted some of the distinguishing elements of 
critical historical institutionalism. First, its central tenet and the unique selling 
proposition of HI in general is of course that “history matters”. Contra synchronic 
analyses that base explanations on prevailing variables at a specific point in time 
(whether interest group resources interacting with political opportunity structures as in 
neoliberal society-centred analyses or the international security or economic structure as 
in state-centred analyses) it draws attention to how decisions are influenced by 
institutions and past decisions. Second, by adopting a non-functional view of institutions, 
it alerts us of the distributional origins and consequences of institutions and past policy 
decisions. Third, its non-parsimonious epistemology and attention to the complex, 
multiarena and multilevel interaction of policy decisions allows us, in casu with regard to 
trade policy, to move beyond the superseded limited focus on conflict between exporters 
and import-competing interests and/or between member states and the Commission that 
still permeates the EU trade policy literature but is unsuited to provide insight into the 
“new trade politics”. 
On a more abstract, meta-theoretical level, the critical version of historical 
institutionalism has a distinctive social ontology. As rational choice institutionalism 
conceives of action as determined by a “logic of consequences” applied by rational self-
interested actors constrained in their course by prevailing institutions, and sociological 
institutionalism sees action as determined by a “logic of appropriateness”, both are 
prone to a tendential structuralism (Hay and Wincott 1998). Historical institutionalism, 
by contrast, ‘is characterized by a particular concern with contingency and the 
unintended consequences of strategic action and with a focus on the path dependency of 
institutional change”’ (Hay and Wincott 1998: 952). Actors are perceived as ‘strategic, 
seeking to realize complex, contingent and often changing goals. They do so in a context 
which favours certain strategies over others and must rely upon perceptions of that 
context which are at best incomplete and which may very often reveal themselves 
inaccurate after the event’, while institutions are ‘understood less as functional means of 
reducing uncertainty, so much as structures whose functionality or dysfunctionality is an 
open – empirical and historical – question’ (Hay and Wincott 1998: 954). This social 
ontology opens up the possibility for conceiving of change as ‘the consequence (whether 
intended or unintended) of strategic action (whether intuitive or instrumental), filtered 
through perceptions (however informed or misinformed) of an institutional context that 
favours certain strategies, actors and perceptions over other’ (Hay and Wincott 1998: 
955). The central role of ideas and discourse is apparent. While structures empower and 
constrain agents, this influence is always dependent on how agents interpret structures, 
which is mediated by discourse. Because of this centrality of discourse Vivien Schmidt 
has recently proposed to label analyses that share these assumptions and that 
emphasise the role of ideas as constitutive of institutions as well as shaped by them 
“discursive institutionalism” (Schmidt 2010a; 2010b). 
Volume 9, Issue 4 (2013) jcer.net Ferdi De Ville 
 622 
Let us now explore in the next section how the critical historical institutionalist approach 
may enhance our understanding of recent EU trade policy.  
 
RECENT EU TRADE POLICY EVOLUTION IN A CRITICAL HISTORICAL 
INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE 
While historical institutionalism has hitherto rarely been applied to EU trade policy, some 
of our prevailing thoughts on and most profound insights into this policy domain are 
rooted in its ideas. One of the pioneering and most widely cited analyses of EU trade 
policy, Brian Hanson’s “What happened to fortress Europe?” (1998), is historical 
institutionalist in all but name. In this article the author asks why the expectation that 
with the completion of the single market in 1992 the EU would adopt a “fortress” 
external trade policy (opening trade internally, while building a wall against goods from 
outside) has not materialised. His argument is that the new institutional context created 
by the “Europe 1992” project and the Single European Act (SEA) in particular created a 
systematic bias toward liberalisation over increased protection. For the ability of member 
states to adopt national trade restrictions had been greatly undermined, while EU voting 
rules made it very difficult to replace national protectionist measures at the EU level. 
Indeed, Hanson’s account illustrates nicely how a “snapshot analysis” is unable to 
explain liberal EU trade policy in the mid-1990s. In this period, Europe was confronted 
with severe recession and record levels of unemployment. Mainstream pluralist theories 
would predict that this would induce import-competing firms to lobby for and receive 
protection(ism). Also state-centred analyses that focus on the relationship between the 
member states and the Commission would not expect external liberalisation in that 
period. The expectation was that with abandoning sovereignty over intra-European 
trade-restrictive measures, member states would want to compensate by imposing 
extra-European protectionist instruments. The tensions between the Commission and the 
member states at the end of the Uruguay Round epitomised by the “Blair House 
Agreement” and the European Court of Justice’s 1/94 opinion are illustrative. The 
historical institutionalist nature of Hanson’s analysis is well captured by his own 
conclusion: ‘[r]ather than being the product of intentional manoeuvring for advantage, 
the external trade consequences of the SEA provide striking evidence of how decisions 
taken at one time can have profound effects on future events by shifting institutional 
rules under which policy is made’ (Hanson 1998: 74). 
While Hanson argues that they are insufficient to explain liberal EU trade policy in the 
1990s, societal and state-centred factors may contribute to our understanding if they are 
also put in a temporal, dynamic perspective. The completion of the single market has 
reduced the importance of “national champions” as the most successful firms have 
adopted pan-European strategies. However, this should not lead automatically to a 
liberal external trade policy as these firms could as well have subsequently preferred a 
fortress Europe. But this is where agency and political conflict comes in. As van 
Apeldoorn has shown (2000; 2002), within the European Round Table of Industrialists 
(ERTI) indeed two rival projects were competing for hegemony: a neoliberal and a 
neomercantilist project. In the end, a globalist fraction consisting of Europe’s most 
globalised firms got the upper hand within the ERTI at the expense of a Europeanist 
fraction made up of enterprises primarily serving the European market. van Apeldoorn 
argues that ‘(w)ith regard to ERT’s strengthened free trade orientation, the crucial battle 
was probably that over the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT trade talks (in 
December 1993), which in retrospect probably signalled the final defeat of the 
“Europrotectionists”, both within the Round Table and the European capitalist class more 
widely’ (2000: 171). This has subsequently allowed the ERTI (by virtue of its enhanced 
material and ideological power) to contribute to the neoliberal transformation of the 
European order, where the increasingly hegemonic concept of “competitiveness” would 
become the central “social purpose” of European governance. 
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The Uruguay Round is indeed another important event in the recent sequence influencing 
EU trade policy. As argued in the previous section, critical historical institutionalism 
emphasises that institutions and policies are not mere coordination mechanisms but that 
they reflect, reproduce and magnify particular patterns of power distribution in politics, 
i.e. have distributional causes and effects (Thelen 1999: 394). To understand the 
importance of the Uruguay Round for subsequent EU trade (and internal market) policy it 
is important to underscore the different context of trade policy-making at the time. 
Trade policy was then still largely the exclusive domain of trade officials in the European 
Commission and the member states that coordinated with their “clients” consisting of the 
biggest exporters. Trade policy was hardly politicised, except for agricultural matters 
where a special institutional arrangement guaranteed the involvement of agricultural 
policy-makers. The uncontroversial sphere in which traditional trade policy could be 
conducted was the product of the “embedded liberalism” era of the first three decades or 
so after the Second World War (Ruggie 1982). The dismantlement of tariffs and quota 
(at-the-border-barriers) did hardly or not impact (in a negative manner) on the daily 
lives of citizens as this international liberalism was accompanied by, and put at the 
service of, national policies directed at domestic social stability and progress. However, 
the Uruguay Round went significantly beyond traditional trade policy with agreements on 
inter alia trade in services and intellectual property rights. But the most important 
innovation for the present discussion was the introduction of agreements disciplining 
national discretion to adopt health, (food) safety, and environmental regulations: the 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreements. The 
reformed Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) implied that these new rules could more 
easily be enforced. Also the ill-fated Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) that 
sparked fears about excessive loss of sovereignty by national governments led to a 
politicisation of trade policy (see Walter 2001). 
This “new trade agenda” has galvanised new actors to become active in trade policy: 
consumer and environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs), parliaments and 
non-trade agencies (Young and Peterson 2006: 800-802). New trade policies thus 
created a new trade politics. As a long-time member of the Trade Policy Committee 
(former “Article 113/133 Committee”) observed in the late 1990s: ‘(t)he Article 113 
Committee mechanism coped effectively on the whole with the extension of the Uruguay 
Round trade debates into services, TRIPs and (to a lesser extent) investment: these 
were all essentially economic issues. For a number of years the Committee has acted as 
a focal point in the Community for discussion of trade and (...) issues, but it is clear that 
increasingly the broadening of the “trade” element of the international agenda into such 
widely different areas of policy stretches to the limit the established mechanisms for 
analysis and coordination of trade policy’ (Johnson 1998: 57, emphasis added). 
An important reason for the politicisation of trade policy and the exponential increase in 
interest by environmental and consumer groups has been the coincidence of multiple 
events and decisions shortly after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the 
establishment of the WTO. The decision of some (industrialised) countries to 
immediately after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round proceed with negotiations on 
liberalisation of services and, especially, pursue a Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
mobilised a diverse anti-globalization movement that culminated in the “Battle of 
Seattle”. Within the EU, in the second half of the 1990s, several European countries were 
confronted with food health crises and regulatory failures (Vogel 2003; Neyer 2005). The 
most important and consequential was without doubt the outbreak of the “mad cow 
disease” (or bovine spongiform encephatolopathy, BSE in short) in 1996. In the middle 
of this food safety crisis, the EU lost a dispute initiated by the US and Canada at the 
WTO concerning its ban of the use of hormones in meat and meat products. Because of 
the suspicion among EU consumers in that period, the EU was unable to comply with the 
ruling by withdrawing the ban. In 1999 both the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament declared that consumer protection needed highest priority and consequently 
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the ban would not be lifted. Both institutions requested the Commission to henceforth 
put the “precautionary principle” more central in all its activities that touch upon 
consumer protection. In the beginning of 2000 the Commission indeed published a 
Communication on the precautionary principle. In this context, also the EU policy on 
genetically modified organisms became much more restrictive. As a contemporary news 
article stated: ‘(m)any observers argue that members of the public would be less 
concerned about the prospect of eating vegetables containing genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) if they had not previously been terrified by the thought that their 
beefburgers might have been contaminated with a fatal disease’ (Coss 1999). Different 
authors have rightly argued that these events have urged the European Union to try to 
get their stringent food safety and other regulatory frameworks recognised and adopted 
at the global level (Falkner 2007; Kelemen and Vogel 2009; Poletti and Sicurelli 2012). 
Stringent regulation, for example resulting from food crises, inflicts competitive 
disadvantages on European firms that will consequently support the international 
harmonisation of regulations at the stringent EU-level to level the playing field (Vogel 
1995; Princen 2002). Attempts to get the precautionary principle explicitly recognised in 
the framework of the WTO are also inspired by the Union’s concern to avoid sentence at 
the WTO (Poletti and Sicurelli 2012). The sequence in which things happen affect how 
they happen: it is not implausible to reason counterfactually that had the food crises of 
the second half of the 1990s happened during the Uruguay Round, the SPS and TBT 
negotiations would not have been negotiated in the depoliticised atmosphere (Skogstad 
2001) that they were and the resulting agreements would maybe not have gone that 
far3. 
The preoccupation of European politicians with food safety and health protection, the 
negative impact of WTO rules as revealed by the hormones dispute and the general anti-
globalization sentiment among the European public at the closing of the millennium 
allowed and incited the then new Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy to make ‘managing 
globalisation’ the highest mantra of his term (Lamy 1999, 2004; Abdelal and Meunier 
2010). While this doctrine has been explained by others as a largely tactical move, 
packaging member states preferences in a way that allowed the EU to enter into a new 
multilateral trade negotiations round while simultaneously inviting developing countries 
(Van den Hoven 2004; Meunier 2007), I interpret it here as a more genuine reaction to 
the previous sequence of events relating to food safety and health protection and the 
WTO’s assault on the EU’s hormones ban. At the end of his term, Lamy in a personal 
fashion proposed to introduce a new safeguard clause in the WTO based on collective 
preferences defined as ‘the end result of choices made by human communities that apply 
to the community as a whole ... Such choices are rooted in the cultural and religious 
values and traditions of the country in question, and are also determined by political 
considerations, historical factors and the level of development’ (Lamy 2004: 2). This 
contradicts enormously with the EU’s ambition in the mid-1990s to use the new WTO 
Agreements and the DSM to pry open foreign markets, in the words of then Trade 
Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan: ‘(w)e are going on the offensive, using our trade powers 
forcefully but legitimately to open new markets around the world’ (1996). At the end of 
Lamy’s term, however, food safety and consumer and environmental protection in 
general had again descended on the EU’s priority list4. Partly this can be explained by 
the fact that the precautionary principle and regulatory reforms had quickly restored the 
confidence of the European public in European regulations and regulators (Löfstedt 
2004). But also significantly, as Neumayer (2004: 4) and Oberthür and Gehring (2006: 
26) have noted with regard to the international level, the WTO agreements confronted 
EU actors with a “strategically selective” (Jessop 2007) institutional context so that 
proponents of environmental and consumer protection always have to operate ‘in the 
shadow of the WTO’. And finally, this is also to a large extent due to the definitive ascent 
in the beginning of the 2000s of a new goal as the finality of socio-economic governance, 
namely “competitiveness”, which had been pushed upwards on the EU agenda by the 
ERTI since the beginning of the 1990s as explained above.  
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Indeed, at the Lisbon Summit of 2000 the “new strategic goal” of the European Union 
was defined as ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion’ (European Council 2000: 2). While in this formulation 
competitiveness is placed at equal height with social cohesion and sustainable 
development, already in the Lisbon Agenda social cohesion was defined subordinately ‘in 
terms of the adaptability of the labour force to the exigencies of competitiveness in a 
globalized world economy’ (van Apeldoorn 2009: 29). When the first five years of the 
implementation of the Lisbon Agenda disillusioned, the incoming Commission President 
José Manuel Barroso made the revival of the programme his top priority and in 2005 
Lisbon was relaunched under the Orwellian label “Growth and Jobs Strategy”. Several 
observers noted that this involved the explicit prioritisation of competitiveness over 
social cohesion and environmental sustainability.  
This priority shift also impacted on the EU’s trade strategy. In October 2006 the then 
new Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson presented the Commission’s new strategy 
“Global Europe” that was explicitly framed as the EU trade policy’s ‘contribution to the 
EU’s growth and jobs strategy’ (European Commission 2006). While mostly this 
Communication has been heralded as a U-turn in EU trade policy because of the 
announcement of new preferential trade agreements and thus doing away with Lamy’s 
moratorium, another, more subtle, twist is as if not more notable, especially with regard 
to the present paper. The central tenet of the communication becomes clear from the 
first page: ‘(a)s globalisation collapses distinctions between domestic and international 
policies, our domestic policies will often have a determining influence on our external 
competitiveness and vice versa’ (European Commission 2006: 2). This induced Hay to 
the apt commentary that competitiveness is used in a tautological way: ‘trade 
liberalization, it seems, is good for competitiveness, because without it there is likely to 
be less pressure for European business and service providers to prove their 
competitiveness internationally’ (2007: 31). Thus, trade policy is used to put pressure on 
European economies to engage in structural reforms as contained in the Lisbon process: 
‘trade liberalization renders the – at this point, still contingent – Lisbon agenda 
necessary ... in so doing it depoliticizes it’ (Hay 2007: 32, emphasis in original). In the 
next section, I will discuss the latest EU trade strategy. 
What has been discussed so far is also reflected in the evolution of “trade and ...” 
policies within the European Union. Starting around the middle of the 1990s when with 
the 1995 enlargement the EU as a whole was on the path to become the most important 
export destination in the world, and the EU had already overtaken the US as the most 
stringent regulator of health, safety and environmental risks (Vogel 2003), the EU 
became a confident “regulatory exporter”. Especially the 2000s witnessed EUphoric 
accounts about ‘why Europe will run the 21st century’ (Leonard 2005). Thanks to its 
market power (Damro 2012) it was supposed to be able to assert significant “power 
through trade” (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006). Until around the mid-2000s it is noticeable 
that European regulators and politicians themselves were quite confident that third 
country firms and governments would accommodate to European risk regulations 
because of Europe’s market power. To cite an example, when the European Commission 
published its proposal for a new chemical safety regime REACH, an accompanying staff 
document cushioned competitiveness concerns by stating the following: 
‘As far as exports are concerned, there will be a potential risk of some loss of 
market share if prices of domestically produced chemicals are forced up due to 
REACH. This namely holds for cases where competitors exist on third markets 
that totally neglect the important European market. Indeed, it would be only 
these companies that would completely escape the REACH legislation and its 
testing and registration requirements and costs associated to this. In the longer 
run, the balance of impacts on competitiveness on these third markets as well as 
on the European market will also depend on the extent to which the REACH 
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regime is successful in establishing itself as a new international standard. This 
would give the EU chemicals industry a substantial boost in terms of international 
competitiveness’ (European Commission Staff 2003: 22-23). 
However, this confidence would melt away soon, as competitiveness concerns –
prompted by the supposed underperformance of the European economy vis-à-vis both 
American productivity and dynamism and emerging economies’ cost advantage that was 
also the underlying rationale of the Lisbon Strategy– trumped international regulatory 
ambitions or “managing globalization”. For example, in a Commission Staff Document on 
‘the external dimension of the single market review’ one can read ‘(i)n many areas ... 
the EU is looked upon as a regulatory leader and standard-setter. However the 
international context is changing rapidly’ (2007: 2, emphasis added). This line of 
reasoning has become even more apparent in the most recent “Single Market Act”. 
Whereas in the 2007 document there were still references to ‘a window of opportunity to 
push global solutions forward’ (European Commission Staff 2007: 8) and the single 
market as ‘a tool to foster high quality and standards’ (European Commission Staff 
2007: 5), in the 2010 document the single market is presented as a ‘”base camp” that 
allows European companies to prepare themselves better for international competition 
and the conquest of new markets. This makes it all the more important to guarantee our 
internal and external policies are coherent and complementary’ (European Commission 
2010a: 17). The different rationale is obvious: the starting point is no longer European 
(regulatory) preferences that can be diffused internationally through the EU’s power 
through trade, but the imperative of global competition that forces the EU to lessen the 
burden on European companies. 
Indeed, as I argue elsewhere more extensively (De Ville 2012), the combination of the 
imperative of competitiveness (having become the EU’s highest priority since the Lisbon 
Declaration) and the ability of free trade supporters to use the disciplining SPS and TBT 
Agreements as a “rhetorical device” had an impact on the outcome of two of the most 
important EU regulatory decisions of the first decennium of the 21st century: REACH and 
the Emissions Trading Scheme as part of the climate and energy package. In both cases, 
the European peak associations of the regulated industries dominated by transnational 
firms succeeded in significantly watering down the regulations by the twin, 
complementary arguments of competitiveness and WTO-compatibility. 
A final example of how historical institutionalism can enhance our insight into EU trade 
policy (evolution) is the European Union’s trade policy response to the Great Recession. 
While a recession of this scale would lead us to expect recourse to protectionism, exactly 
the opposite has happened. The EU has advocated, and put into practice, further trade 
liberalisation –both bilaterally and multilaterally5 – as a way out of the crisis. As I have 
argued elsewhere (De Ville and Orbie 2011, 2013) this represented a successful framing 
strategy by the European Commission to continue its neoliberal trade strategy as frankly 
presented in Global Europe. But this strategy could only be so easily pursued because it 
was not opposed, and even supported by, other conditions and actors. As Rodrik has 
noted in general (2009) also the institutionalisation of free trade within the WTO, the 
powerful underlying configuration of political interests in favour of open trade and the 
existence of safety nets for workers all have contributed to the prevention of 
protectionism in contrast to what happened in the 1930s during the Great Depression. 
Again, as with the refutation of the “Fortress Europe” expectation in the 1990s, we can 
understand the EU’s trade policy strategy after the crisis only through a critical historical 
institutionalist lens. 
This overview of the evolution of the recent strategic orientation of EU trade policy and 
some trade (and ...) policy decisions has already illustrated the way in which EU trade 
policy is influenced by the multilevel and multiarena interaction of: a) intra-European 
socio-economic events, decisions and societal mobilisation; b) earlier EU trade policy 
decisions including institutionalised agreements at the WTO; and c) (expectations about) 
evolutions in the global economy. In the following section I analyse the most recent EU 
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trade strategic communications “Trade, Growth and World Affairs” in a critical HI 
perspective. 
 
TRADE, GROWTH AND WORLD AFFAIRS IN A CRITICAL HISTORICAL 
INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE 
Just like Global Europe was presented as ‘a contribution to the EU’s growth and jobs 
strategy’, the Communication on the trade strategy of the Commission Barroso II is 
presented as ‘a core component of the EU’s 2020 strategy’ (European Commission 
2010b). “Europe 2020” has been criticised from different sides as being a mere 
continuation of the disappointing Lisbon Strategy. While some important differences are 
introduced to the procedural dimension (more focussed targets, stricter follow-up and 
enforcement through, inter alia, the “European Semester”) the content and rationale are 
very similar. Rather than questioning the appropriateness of the Lisbon Strategy, the 
credit/economic/sovereign debt crisis starting in 2007 has been interpreted by European 
leaders as underscoring the need for reform of European socio-economic governance 
along Lisbon Strategy lines. In the Commission’s own words: ‘Europe’s structural 
weaknesses have been exposed (...) Even before the crisis, there were many areas 
where Europe was not progressing fast enough relative to the rest of the world’ (2010c: 
7). 
Consequently, it should come as no surprise that also Trade, Growth and World Affairs is 
to a very large extent a reiteration and thus continuation of Global Europe. The 
underlying rationale is essentially the same: ‘(t)he over-riding aim of European economic 
policy is faster growth ... Trade raises EU growth by fostering our efficiency and 
innovation ... This agenda will confront us increasingly with the interface between our 
internal rules and external liberalization and ... we need to “further enhance the 
coherence and complementarity between the EU’s internal and external policies as a 
whole”’ (European Commission 2010b: 4, emphasis in original). It can even be derived 
that the impression of the imperative of competitiveness of European firms has further 
been amplified by the belief that future economic growth in Europe is dependent on 
exports towards emerging economies6. However, there is a small but remarkable shift in 
the discourse of Trade, Growth and World Affairs as compared to Global Europe and that 
is the emphasis that is placed on reciprocity: ‘for an open trade policy in Europe to 
succeed politically, others – including both our developed and emerging partners – must 
match our efforts, in a spirit of reciprocity and mutual benefit ... The EU will remain an 
open economy but we will not be naïve’ (European Commission 2010b: 4). Thus, the 
EU’s trade policy has become a bit less “Schumpeterian” (as aptly coined by Adriaensen 
and Kerremans 2010) and a bit more mercantilist. While it is difficult to point to the 
precise reasons for this shift in discourse, a plausible explanation is the growing unease 
with China’s trade and especially monetary policies. Such concern has already led to a 
facilitating reform of the rules to adopt anti-dumping duties, the third such 
“protectionist” reform in fifteen years’ time7, and to a proposal for a new international 
public procurement instrument (European Commission 2012).  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to persuade the reader of the promise of a critical historical 
institutionalist perspective for EU trade policy analysis. It has started by explaining the 
distinguishing features of critical HI, namely its sensitivity to: the influence of the past; 
the distributive origins and effects of institutions and policies; and the complex, 
multiarena and multilevel nature of contemporary politics. Consequently, it has 
presented how major EU trade (and ...) policy decisions since the Uruguay Round (and 
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the Single European Act) are temporarily interlinked. Finally, it has analysed the most 
recent EU trade strategy in such a historical institutionalist perspective. 
The empirical analysis demonstrated the merit of the “reactive sequencing” concept for 
understanding EU trade policy. It has been argued that every major trade policy 
evolution since the Uruguay Round has been a reaction or counter-reaction to past trade 
policies. Or, and this might be a contribution of this article to the historical institutionalist 
literature, an anticipation to expected trends, as when the EU became less assertive in 
exporting its environmental standards because it ruled that ‘the international context is 
changing rapidly’, making the adoption by third countries of EU regulation less likely. 
Trade policy decision-making does not operate each time in a neutral vacuum. To the 
contrary, it is influenced by policies, institutions and ideas from the past that benefit 
some actors over others, through dissimilar effects on their resources, incentives and 
perceptions. 
It is argued that very significant trade policy decisions from the recent past confront 
other perspectives on EU trade policy with significant difficulties, especially the (most 
prevalent) rational choice approaches among them. Most notably, two periods of crisis 
(reappearance of high unemployment in the mid-1990s and, much more severely, the 
prolonged recession following the financial-economic crisis starting in 2007) have not 
resulted in protectionist reflexes. However, rational choice approaches, rooted in public 
choice paradigms, would expect concentrated import-competing groups to prevail over 
diffuse consumer and exporter groups, and protectionist politicians and member states 
over free trade oriented ones, in such crises. I argued that they fail to take into account 
the reconfiguration of interests, ideas and institutions after the Uruguay Round. A second 
example, is the way the nexus between trade and environment and consumer protection 
has unfolded the past two decades. Again, any attempt to explain any such decision 
(e.g. REACH) as an isolated case would fail. We can only understand the outcomes by 
incorporating in our analysis past policies (and failures), (perceptions of) constraining 
WTO Agreements, as well as the dominance of the competitiveness frame since the 
Lisbon Agenda. 
I end with a cautionary –or self-critical– note. This paper has tried to show that 
parsimonious synchronic causality explanations of EU trade policy are inappropriate in 
today’s complex world. On the other hand, the perspective presented here may be 
vulnerable to the critique that it is not able to explain anything, merely to pointing out 
with anecdotal evidence the relationship between trade (“and ...”) policy decisions over 
time and between different policies of Europe’s socio-economic governance (especially 
between single market policy and EU trade policy). In philosophy of science terms this 
problem that in this approach every decision can be linked to a previous one ad infinitum 
is called “infinite regress”. However, following other authors (especially Hanson and van 
Apeldoorn) the historical account of EU trade policy presented here did not start with the 
Single Market program (1985-1992) and the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) without 
reason. This period has been a (non-exogenous) critical juncture in Europe’s socio-
economic evolution, and EU trade policy in particular, without which all that follows 
cannot be fully understood.  
 
*** 
 
                                                          
1 Providing “snapshot explanations” of present social outcomes by the value of current variables (Pierson 
2000: 263). 
2 An interesting observation is that also in the economics discipline (often the source of theoretical 
innovation in political science) the last three decades or so have witnessed a move away from 
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neoclassical trade theory to the “new trade theory” (Krugman 1991, 1996), implying a change from 
assuming decreasing returns to increasing returns, or path dependence models (Pierson 2000). 
3 As anecdotic evidence for such counterfactual claim: in 1999 a Member of the European Parliament 
declared during the hearing of then incoming Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy ‘the Delors Commission 
(…) accepted the rules and arrangements for settling disputes within the WTO, which subsequently 
enabled the United States win the infamous disputes over bananas and hormone meat’ (in Abdelal and 
Meunier 2010: 356-357). In the case of multilateral investment rules a very similar story but with a 
different sequence resulted in a different outcome: the Ethyl dispute between the Canadian government 
and the US firm Ethyl Corporation under the NAFTA investment rules that erupted during the MAI 
negotiations rallied NGOs against these negotiations effectively derailing the talks (Walter 2001: 62-63).  
4 As Löfstedt (2004: 251-252) shows on the basis of data compiled by the Weinberg Group the 
precautionary principle has been omnipresent in European policy documents until 2002. In that year a 
significant drop is noticeable.   
5 While it has also unilaterally not made more use of trade defence instruments than in normal times.  
6 ‘By 2015, 90% of world growth will be generated outside Europe, with a third from China alone … So in 
the years to come, we need to seize the opportunity of higher levels of growth abroad, especially in East 
and South Asia. Developing and emerging countries are likely to account for nearly 60% of world GDP by 
2030. This is compared to less than 50% today’ (European Commission 2010b: 4). 
7 After the last reform, antidumping duties proposed by the Commission can only be vetoed by a 
qualified majority of member states. Previously, since the 2004 change, a blocking simple majority was 
required. Between 1995 and 2004 a simple majority in support was required for the imposition of anti-
dumping duties while before 1995 a qualified majority had to be found in favour. An important reason 
for the most recent reform is reportedly that the Commission and a majority of the member states 
feared that China would otherwise be able to devise a divide-and-rule strategy to prevent anti-dumping 
sanctions (interview with Belgian diplomat, January 2011). It is probably also no coincidence that the 
imposition of anti-dumping duties have been made more easy in 1995 and 2004, coinciding with a 
“liberal” and “big bang” enlargement respectively, complicating the adoption of antidumping measures. 
This again suggests that EU trade policy (rules) indeed reacts to internal (in casu enlargements) and 
external (in casu Chinese ascent) events. 
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This article analyses the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP) at the level of Treaty revision and 
particularly focuses on the last Treaty negotiations that led to the Treaty of Lisbon. The analysis is based on a 
revised neofunctionalist framework that the author developed in previous work. It draws on the following 
concepts: (i) functional spillover; (ii) cultivated spillover; (iii) social spillover; and (iv) countervailing forces. 
Insights into the dynamics and countervailing forces driving Treaty revisions considerably deepen our 
understanding of the Common Commercial Policy, as EU external trade policy-making is substantially affected 
by the parameters set by the Treaty. The analysis indicates that the revised neofunctionalist framework can 
broadly account for the changes of the Common Commercial Policy during the last Treaty revision. It is further 
suggested that integration in the area of trade policy cannot be explained exclusively by rational choice 
dynamics, such as utility maximizing actors with fixed preferences, but that socialization through deliberation 
also needs to be taken into account.  
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Within the broader scope of this special issue on contending or complementary 
paradigms for the study of EU trade politics this article analyses the Union’s Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) at the macro-level, i.e. at the level of Treaty revision. EU 
external trade policy has featured at the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) leading 
to the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon. When looking at the pre-
negotiations and negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty, we are confronted with a puzzle: why 
have negotiations leading to the Treaty of Lisbon managed to achieve something like a 
break-through concerning the extension of competence to the Community in contested 
trade areas such as services, intellectual property and investment, which the Maastricht, 
Amsterdam and (to a lesser degree) Nice IGCs failed to bring about? Given the fact that 
this puzzle seems to be located at the interface between the last Treaty revision and 
previous ones, this article particularly focuses on the development leading from the Nice 
Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty. 
Hence, the purpose of this contribution is to explain the outcome of the last Treaty 
revision with regard to the provisions on the Common Commercial Policy. My analysis is 
based on a revised neofunctionalist framework. Why make revised neofunctionalism my 
point of departure? First, as Wiener and Diez (2009) have argued, the theoretical 
spectrum for answering questions related to this type of research question – explaining 
outcomes of EU decision-making – is limited. Most approaches devised for the study of 
the EU or regional integration more generally are not applicable for my purpose.1 For 
example, some of the more recent theorising does not share my focus on seeking to 
explain outcomes. Instead, they aim at describing or at providing a normative or critical 
perspective, like federalist theory (Pinder 1986), gender/critical perspectives (Mazey 
2000) or critical discourse analysis (Derrida 1992). In addition, along the triad of polity, 
politics and policy, my analysis primarily focuses on the former two, polity and politics. 
My focus on polity and politics renders policy network analysis (Peterson and Bomberg 
1999), and the explanatory variants of discourse analysis (Diez 1999), which are more 
geared towards policy, less plausible as a theoretical choice. Governance theory 
(Jachtenfuchs 2001), which is sometimes viewed as a catch-all theory, arguably also 
does not have its core competencies at explaining outcomes along the polity/politics 
dimension. New institutionalism – in its rational choice, historical and sociological 
variants (Aspinwall and Schneider 2001) – does share an interest in the politics 
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dimension, but less so as regards polity, and thus, although conceivable, does not seem 
an ideal choice either. Only few theories, such as neofunctionalism (Haas 1958), and 
(liberal) intergovernmentalism (Hoffmann 1995 [1964]; Moravcsik 1998), operate at the 
nexus of explaining, on the one hand, and the interface of polity and politics, on the 
other hand. 
Second, when left with the choice of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, it is 
clear that both have been criticised widely on several accounts. However, (liberal) 
intergovernmentalism faces severe difficulties to account for any endogenous preference 
formation on the part of (national) decision-makers who seem to define their interests 
regardless of (their country’s) EU membership, and also discounts the importance of 
social interaction and learning processes. By contrast, my prior research has indicated 
the general usefulness of neofunctionalist insights concerning this type of inquiry 
(Niemann 1998, 2006). Moreover, it suggests that some of the criticisms that were 
levelled against the theory were either exaggerated or unjustified, that the theory has 
been misread by a number of authors (Niemann 2000: 13-23), and that it is possible to 
draw on a wider neofunctionalist theoretical repertoire than the one commonly 
perceived. In addition, my previous work indicates that neofunctionalism is best 
understood as a dynamic theory (Rosamond 2005: 247) – due to its inherent propensity 
for self-reflection as well as the time sensitivity of several neofunctionalist assumptions 
made almost five decades ago – and that many of the more recent micro-level concepts 
can sensibly be accommodated within the larger neofunctionalist framework. The 
apparent possibility of developing and modifying neofunctionalism in a meaningful way 
was in stark contrast to the general lack of enthusiasm in the scholarly community to 
use, revive, or revise neofunctionalist theory. This discrepancy puzzled and encouraged 
me to undertake a more comprehensive investigation into the state and validity of 
neofunctionalism and the possibility of revising it. 
The purpose of this paper is not to undertake a revision of neofunctionalist theory. I 
have done so elsewhere. Instead, this article will present the revised neofunctionalist 
framework as a point of departure for explaining the Lisbon Treaty changes regarding EU 
external trade policy. To account for the Lisbon outcome, I use a revised neofunctionalist 
framework that draws on the factors/concepts of (i) functional spillover; (ii) cultivated 
spillover; (iii) social spillover; and (iv) countervailing forces. The Common Commercial 
Policy has thus far escaped analysis from a (revised) neofunctionalist perspective. Since 
EU trade policy-making is substantially affected by the parameters set by the Treaty, 
insights into the dynamics and countervailing forces driving Treaty revisions should 
deepen our understanding of EU external trade policy-making and decision-making. The 
analysis indicates that integration in the area of trade policy cannot exclusively be 
explained by rational choice dynamics, such as utility maximizing actors with fixed 
preferences, but that socialization through deliberation also needs to be taken into 
account. In order to strengthen the revised neofunctionalist explanation, a rival 
(alternative) explanation – based on exogenous factors mainly related to the changing 
international trade agenda – that has been prominently used to account for previous 
developments of the Common Commercial Policy in the literature (e.g. Meunier and 
Nicolaïdis 1999) has also been probed briefly. However, the subsequent analysis shows 
that this alternative explanation fails to persuasively explain the latest Treaty change. 
There are several rationales for examining the case of latest EU Treaty revision 
concerning the CCP. First, the above mentioned puzzle indicates that the Lisbon Treaty 
revision (including its pre-negotiation) constitutes a case that is particularly worth 
analysing, given the differing outcome compared to previous CCP Treaty revisions. 
Second, while this case has been subject to considerable legal analysis (Dimopolous 
2008; Cremona 2006), there is a significant lack of theory-driven political science 
research on this particular topic. Finally, (history-making) decisions at macro-level of 
Treaty revision are substantially politicised and may thus constitute a hard case for 
(revised) neofunctionalism. 
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My analysis starts off from a multiple causality assumption, suggesting that the same 
outcome can be caused by different combinations of factors. In order to arrive at causal 
inferences, allowing for some degree of positive causality, a number of methods are 
employed: comparative analysis, advancing alternative explanations, process tracing and 
triangulation across multiple data sources, including about 30 interviews.2 
The chapter proceeds as follows: first, it outlines the theoretical framework is specified; 
second, it summarises the development of the Common Commercial Policy, including the 
outcomes of the last few Treaty revisions, with special emphasis on the Treaty of Lisbon; 
third, it seeks to explain the outcome of the last Treaty revision on the basis of the 
revised neofunctionalist framework, while also briefly probing the alternative explanation 
based on exogenous pressures.  
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: REVISED NEOFUNCTIONALISM 
Amongst the earlier theories of regional integration, neofunctionalism is distinguished 
both in its sophistication and ambition. The theory was first formulated in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s mainly through the work of Ernst Haas (1958) and Leon Lindberg 
(1963) in response to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC). The theory was in its prime until 
the mid-1960s, during which time the evolution of European integration seemed to 
vindicate its assumptions. From the mid-1960s, the theory was increasingly criticised, 
particularly in the face of several adverse empirical developments (Niemann 2006: 20-
23). In the late 1960s and early 1970s neofunctionalists made attempts to revise some 
of their hypotheses and claims, but in the mid-1970s Haas declared the theory to be 
“obsolete”. With the resurgence of the European integration process in the mid-1980s, 
however, neofunctionalism made a substantial comeback. Since the 1990s, some 
endeavours have been made to newly revise the original approach (Schmitter 2004), 
although not always explicitly under the neofunctionalist label (Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz 1997). 
Neofunctionalism’s basic theoretical tenets can be summarised as follows: first, 
integration is understood as a process. Implicit in the notion of process is the 
assumption that integration processes evolve over time and take on their own dynamic. 
Second, integration is assumed to be driven by multiple, diverse and changing actors 
who are not restricted to the domestic political realm but also interact and build 
coalitions across national frontiers and bureaucracies (Haas 1964: 68). Third, 
neofunctionalists see the Community primarily as ‘a creature of elites’. While Haas 
(1958) devoted much of his attention to the role of non-governmental elites, Lindberg 
(1963) largely focused on governmental elites. Neither ascribed much importance to the 
role of public opinion (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 41).  
Neofunctionalism is mainly a theory about the dynamics of European integration. Five 
assumptions encapsulate the driving forces behind its progress: (1) its practitioners 
assume rational and self-interested actors (Haas 1970: 627), who (nevertheless) have 
the capacity to learn and change their preferences. Interest-driven national and 
supranational elites, recognising the limitations of national solutions, provide the key 
impetus. However, these self-regarding motives are not perceived as constant.  They are 
likely to change during the integration process, as actors learn from the benefits of 
regional policies and from their experiences in co-operative decision-making (Haas 1958: 
291). (2) Once established, institutions can take on a life of their own and progressively 
escape the control of their creators. Concerned with increasing their own powers, 
employees of regional institutions become agents of further integration by influencing 
the perceptions of participating elites (both private and public), and therefore 
governments’ (national) interest. (3) Early reformulations of the theory stressed the 
primacy of incremental decision-making over grand designs. Moreover, seemingly 
Volume 9, Issue 4 (2013) jcer.net Arne Niemann 
 637 
marginal adjustments are often driven by the unintended consequences of previous 
decisions. This effect arises from the incapacity of most political actors to engage in 
long-term purposive behaviour as they ‘stumble’ from one decision to the next, 
especially when engaging in such an innovative task as regional integration. Decisions in 
this arena are normally taken with very imperfect knowledge of their consequences and 
frequently under the pressure of deadlines (Haas 1970: 627). (4) Neofunctionalists 
reject the conventional realist axiom that all games played between actors are 
necessarily zero-sum in nature.  In the Community setting exchanges are often better 
characterised as positive sum-games and a “supranational” style of decision-making, 
which Haas defined as ‘a cumulative pattern of accommodation in which the participants 
refrain from unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreement by 
means of compromises upgrading common interests’ (Haas 1964: 66). (5) Haas agreed 
with the assumption made by some economists, such as Pierre Uri, who was the chief 
economist of the ECSC in the 1950s, that emerging functional interdependencies 
between whole economies and their productive sectors tend inexorably to foster further 
integration (Haas 1958: 372).  
The neofunctionalist conception of change is succinctly encapsulated in the notion of 
“spillover”. The term was first applied in two distinctive manners: (1) it was used as a 
sort of shorthand for describing the occurrence of (further) integration; and, (2) it was 
used to identify the driving force and inherent logic of integration via increased 
functional/economic interdependence (Haas 1958: 383). Later on (and also in this 
article) the term spillover has been used to explain all the different neofunctionalist 
dynamics. 
The revised neofunctionalist framework presented and used here, which has been 
derived inductively from prior research (Niemann 1998, 2000, 2006),  departs from early 
neofunctionalism in several ways: first, the ontological scope is slightly broadened – 
somewhat beyond what Haas (2001) post hoc described as ‘soft rational choice’ for the 
original neofunctionalist account – towards a wider and more inclusive ontology by 
encroaching ‘soft’ constructivism to a larger extent than Haas (2001: 27) attributed to 
early neofunctionalism. While this revised neofunctionalist account accepts that there is 
a real (material) world out there, which offers resistance when we acted upon, at the 
same time it asserts that behaviour is only to some extent shaped by physical reality. 
Instead, actors’ capacity for learning and reflection has an impact on the way in which 
they attach meaning to the material world. Actors cognitively frame or socially construct 
the world according to their knowledge, norms, experience and understandings. Hence, 
actors’ interests and identities are moulded and constituted by both material and socio-
cognitive structures. Their preferences are shaped by social interaction and the evolving 
structures, norms and rules of the domestic and the EU polity (i.e. membership matters) 
rather than exogenously given. And because agents are assumed to have the capacity to 
learn, their preferences are subject to change rather than stable, given evolving social 
structures and varying actor constellations in the real world.  
This extension was undertaken for two reasons: while some elements of (early) 
neofunctionalism can be solidly located in the rational choice tradition with rational, 
intentional and self-interested actors (Burley and Mattli 1993: 54-55), other elements 
were more reminiscent of constructivist thought with actors capable of learning 
processes (Rosamond 2005: 242, 250). In addition, this account places more explicit 
emphasis on socialisation, deliberation and learning than did Haas’s early 
neofunctionalism for explaining EU decision outcomes. 
Second and closely related, the ontological status of structure and agency has shifted. 
Early neofunctionalism viewed agents as predominant and paid relatively little attention 
to structure.3 The revised neofunctionalist account regards the properties of both 
structure and agency as very significant to explaining social and political processes. It 
dismisses both structural determinism and agency-centred voluntarism. Instead, this 
framework embraces the concept of structuration which emphasises the interdependence 
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of structures and agency (Giddens 1984). Structure and agency mutually constitute each 
other. Structure has a dual nature. It enters simultaneously into the constitution of the 
agent and social practices, and exists in the generating moments of this constitution. 
Agency, however, is not reduced into servants of structure. They have created structural 
properties in the first place and can potentially change any aspect of structure. Agents 
act upon both structures and their own preconceived interests. Structures in the revised 
neofunctionalist framework are, for example, the EU and the international system of 
states, the EU institutional order, domestic constellations/institutional balances and 
functional-economic interdependencies and necessities. Agency is manifold, ranging from 
governmental elites to private and supranational actors. Revised neofunctionalism 
assigns agency and structure an equal ontological status. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, departing from early neofunctionalists’ grand 
theoretical ambitions and the automaticity of spillover, the revised approach should be 
understood as a wide-ranging, but partial, theory that is only intended to account for 
part of the process of regional integration in Europe, namely that of explaining EU 
decisions and their impact upon integration. The latter is no longer viewed as an 
automatic and exclusively dynamic process, but rather occurs under certain conditions 
and is better characterised as a dialectic process (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991: 18), i.e. 
the product of both dynamics and countervailing forces. Through such a dialectical 
account the non-linear, stop-and-go nature of the European integration process is 
thought to be conceptualised more adequately. In this process, that is now more 
explicitly subject to both (forward-)dynamics and countervailing forces, the strength, 
variation and interplay of pressures on both sides of the equation thus determine the 
outcome of a particular decision or sequence of decisions.  
Fourth, the revised neofunctionalist framework further develops and specifies the 
dynamics of integration. Some of the spillover dynamics are also adapted and expanded 
within this process. Functional spillover is broadened in scope to go beyond merely 
economic linkages and is freed from its deterministic ontology – implying that functional 
structures have to be found plausible and compelling by actors in order to be acted upon 
– thus reflecting a ‘soft’ functionalis. In addition, cultivated spillover – the concept that 
originally denoted the role of the Commission/High Authority – is (also) widened to 
include the integrative roles played by the Council Presidency, the European Parliament 
and the European Court of Justice. Furthermore, the newly termed notion of “social” 
spillover is separated from what had been called “political spillover” (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 
1991: 5) – formerly broadly denoting the integrative role played by governmental and 
non-governmental elites – for a more clear-cut explanation of reflexive (elite) learning 
and socialisation processes. The concept of communicative action is incorporated into 
social spillover to more adequately describe and explain these processes. Learning and 
socialisation are no longer regarded as constant (as implied by early neofunctionalists) 
but as being subject to conditions. The ensuing pressures are intertwined in several ways 
and cannot always be neatly separated from each other. The first three factors 
(functional spillover; social spillover; and cultivated spillover) are hypothesised as 
dynamics, while the fourth factor (countervailing forces) goes against these integrational 
logics.  
 
Functional spillover 
Functional pressures emerge when an original integrative objective can be assured only 
by taking further integrative actions (Lindberg 1963: 10). The basis for the development 
of these spillover pressures is the (functional) interdependence of policy sectors and 
issue areas. Individual sectors and issues tend to be so interdependent in modern 
polities and economies that it is difficult to isolate them from the rest (Haas 1958: 297, 
383). Functional pressures thus encompass the endogenous tensions, contradictions and 
interdependencies closely related to the European integration project, and its policies, 
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politics and polity, which induce policy-makers to take additional integrative steps in 
order to achieve their original common goals. Functional spillover constitutes a structural 
component in the analytical framework. Functional pressures have a propensity for 
causing further integration, as intentional actors tend to be persuaded by the functional 
tensions and contradictions (as well as the costs and benefits arising from them). 
However, they do not determine actors’ behaviour in any mechanical or predictable 
fashion. Functional structures contain an important element of human agreement. In 
order to act on such structures, actors also have to perceive them to be credible and, to 
at least some degree, compelling. 
As for the operationalisation of functional spillover, the following indicators can be 
specified for this pressure: first, the basis for functional pressure is that there is the 
actual existence of an original goal. The salience and urgency of this goal to some extent 
determines the strength of the functional necessity. Second, another basis is the 
existence of a functional interdependence between issue A (original goal) and issue B 
(where further action may potentially be necessary). Further integration in the area of A 
must have adverse/significant consequences for issue area B and thus foster (additional) 
collective action there. Third, is further action in a particular issue area necessary to 
achieve the original objective, or are there alternative solutions for solving this functional 
dissonance? If the initial objective cannot be sufficiently reached by other means, the 
functional connection is likely to be a strong one. Finally, functional dynamics are much 
more likely to unfold, if they are openly discussed and considered during negotiations. If 
all these mechanisms and aspects are present in the process, there is a strong likelihood 
that (further) integration occurs in area B (here the EU’s external trade policy). 
 
Cultivated spillover 
Originally only applied to the role of the High Authority/Commission and its “cultivation” 
of ties with national elites, one might plausibly broaden the notion of cultivated spillover 
to the role of supranational institutions more generally. Several factors underpin the 
plausibility of hypothesising supranational institutions as promoters of intensified 
integration. Firstly, institutions, once established, tend to take on a life of their own and 
are difficult to control by those who created them (Pierson 1996). Agent autonomy has 
been considered particularly pronounced with regard to the Court of Justice (Mattli and 
Slaughter 1998), but also been stated in the context of the Commission (Nugent 2001: 
17), the Council Presidency (Elgström 2003: 44), and the European Parliament 
(Westlake 1994: 243-44). Secondly, concerned with increasing their own powers, 
supranational institutions become agents of integration, because they are likely to 
benefit from the progression of this process. This has above all been witnessed in the 
case of the Commission and the European Parliament, but also concerning the ECJ 
(Burley and Mattli 1993). And lastly, institutional structures (of which supranational 
structures are a part) have an effect on how actors understand and form their interests 
and identities (Haas 1958). 
Being the most visible agent of integration, the Commission facilitates and pushes 
agreements on integrative outcomes in a number of ways. For example, it can act as a 
promotional broker by upgrading common interests, e.g. through facilitating package 
deals. Further, it is centrally located within a web of policy networks and relationships, 
which often results in the Commission functioning as a bourse where problems and 
interests are traded and through which support for its policies is secured (Mazey and 
Richardson 1997). The Commission may also exert itself through its often superior 
expertise (Nugent 1995, 2001: 210). 
Over the years, the Council Presidency has evolved into an alternative architect of 
compromise. Governments taking on the six-month role face a number of pressures, 
such as increased media attention and peer group evaluation, to assume the role of 
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honest and promotional broker (Elgström 2003: 39). During their Presidency, national 
officials tend to undergo rapid learning processes about the various national dimensions 
which induce a more ‘European thinking’ and facilitate ‘European compromises’ (Wurzel 
1996: 272, 288). 
The European Parliament (EP) has fought, and in many respects won, a battle to 
become, from being an unelected body with minor powers, an institution on an equal 
footing with the Council in the larger part of normal secondary legislation (Maurer 2003). 
It has clearly become another centre of close interest group attention (Bouwen 2004) 
and plays a critical, if not wholly successful, role in the Union’s legitimization. Even at 
the IGC level its role has increased significantly.  
The primacy of Community law has been asserted by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), which also managed to transform the Treaty of Rome into something like a 
constitution (Weiler 1981: 274). It has furthered the integration process for example by 
(1) having raised the awareness of subnational actors concerning the opportunities 
offered to them by giving them a direct stake in Community law through the doctrine of 
direct effect; (2) by raising the visibility, effectiveness and scope of EC law; (3) by 
arguing along the lines of functional pressures and by justifying its decisions in light of 
the common interests of members as enshrined in the general objectives of the EEC 
Treaty (Burley and Mattli 1993: 43-44, 68-69; Mattli and Slaughter 1998). 
The operationalisation of this pressure include: (a) supranational institutions’ level of 
energy devoted to an issue (here CCP reform), including their cultivation of relations 
with other decision-makers to get support for their objectives; (b) the level of their 
internal cohesion within the respective institution (Nugent 1995); (c) their choice of an 
appropriate negotiating strategy and negotiating environment; (d) supranational 
institutions’ background position at the beginning of negotiations, including their 
standing and level of trust enjoyed by other delegations at the table; and (e) as for the 
Presidency, the willingness and ability to play the role of honest and promotional broker 
(Elgström 2003). The final (and most important) indicator focuses on the output, rather 
than the input dimension of the role played by supranational institutions. What is 
important here is the extent to which attitudes, interests or positions on the part of 
decision-makers have changed towards the approach taken by supranational institutions. 
Having identified such change, it still has to be ascertained, if it was induced by 
supranational institutions. This brings us back to the first five indicators, but the causal 
connection between these indicators with the preference change on the part of national 
decision-makers has to be substantiated. An indicator combining elements of these 
reference points would be the admittance on the part of national decision-makers and, 
alternatively, independent insiders involved in the negotiations (such as Council 
Secretariat officials) that national preferences and positions changed towards those 
favoured by supranational institutions because of the involvement and reasoning of the 
latter. 
 
Social spillover 
Socialisation, deliberation and learning processes prevalent in the Community 
environment, here categorised under the umbrella term of social spillover, are 
postulated to encourage cooperative decision-making and consensus formation, thus 
leading to more integrative results. The proliferation of working groups and committees 
has led to an elaborate mosaic of bureaucratic interpenetration at the European level 
that provides a forum for frequent and recurrent contact between thousands of national 
and EU civil servants. Thus an arena well suited to foster such processes is provided, 
through the construction of mutual trust and a certain esprit de corps among officials in 
Community forums. The foundational assumption is that the duration and intensity of 
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interaction are positively correlated with the significance of socialisation and learning 
processes (Lindberg 1963; Lewis 1998: 487-488). 
It is held here that not only the quantity, but also the quality of interaction constitutes a 
major factor regarding cooperative norm socialisation and learning processes. We can 
distinguish between (1) incentive-based learning – the adaptation of strategies to reach 
basically unaltered and unquestioned goals – and (2) more deeply-rooted reflexive 
learning, i.e. changed behaviour as a result of challenged and scrutinized assumptions, 
values and objectives (Nye 1987: 380). The latter cannot be sufficiently explained 
through incentives/interests of egoistic actors (Checkel 2001: 242). Furthermore, if we 
attempt to thoroughly understand social behaviour and learning, this requires that we 
take language into greater consideration. It is through speech that actors make sense of 
the world and attribute meaning to their actions. 
Using the notion of communicative action allows us to both attain a more fundamental 
basis for reflexive learning and to integrate the role of communication more thoroughly. 
The concept of communicative action, as devised by Jürgen Habermas (1981), refers to 
the interaction of people whose actions are coordinated not via egocentric calculations of 
success but through acts of reaching understanding about valid behaviour. Participants 
are not primarily oriented to achieving their own individual success; they pursue their 
individual objectives under the condition that they can coordinate or harmonise their 
plans of action on the basis of shared definitions of the situation. Habermas distinguishes 
between three validity claims that can be challenged in discourse: first, that a statement 
is true, i.e. conforms to the facts; second, that a speech act is right with respect to the 
existing normative context; and third, that the manifest intention of the speaker is 
truthful. 
Under “communicative” behaviour the force of the better argument counts and actors 
attempt to convince each other (and are open to persuasion) with regard to these 
validity claims. By arguing in relation to standards of truth, rightness and sincerity, 
agents have a basis for judging what constitutes reasonable choices of action, through 
which they can reach agreement (Habermas 1981: 149). While agents bargain in 
strategic interaction, they deliberate, reason, argue and persuade in communicative 
action and may also undergo more profound learning processes. Rather than merely 
adapting the means to achieve basically unchanged goals, as in strategic action, they 
redefine their very priorities and preferences in validity-seeking processes aimed at 
reaching mutual understanding. However, strategic action and communicative action are 
only ideal types, and agents combine different (complementary) modes of action in their 
behaviour (Checkel 2001: 241; Risse 2000: 18). Hence, we cannot expect constant 
learning. Nor can we expect unidirectional learning, as the EU level is not the single 
source of learning, with the domestic and international realms also triggering 
socialisation processes. 
Social spillover processes work as an interface between structure and agency. 
Functional, exogenous and domestic structures become part of decision-makers’ norms 
and values throughout processes of socialization and learning. It is important to note 
that actors, in their quest to arrive at the most “valid” solution, tend to be more open-
minded, and are thus more inclined to consider even those arguments derived from the 
wider structural environment. These processes also have a tendency to open (national) 
actors up to the arguments provided by other players, such as supranational 
entrepreneurs. 
The operationalisation of social spillover processes is particularly challenging, especially 
from an extreme positivist viewpoint, as observation and measurement of this pressure 
are exceptionally difficult. While we have to rely more on context, understanding and 
interpretation, we can still establish some signposts for empirical research. First, the 
object of investigation has been narrowed down. While it is conceivable to investigate 
this factor broadly in terms of various forums and contexts, this study has focused on 
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negotiators, operating mainly in the Convention. Second, the level of enmeshment 
among national officials, for example, through their involvement in a certain negotiating 
group, or in the Brussels framework more generally, can be ascertained. The frequency 
of formal and informal contact, as well as the duration of interaction can serve as 
pointers here. Third, as far as the quality, as opposed to the quantity of interaction, is 
concerned, there are several indicators for communicative behaviour. For example, 
arguments in deliberation mode are not based on hierarchy or authority. Pointing to 
status or rank to make an argument, does not qualify as communicative action. In 
addition, argumentative consistency is a good marker of deliberation. Actors that change 
their arguments depending on the audience probably engage in rhetorical behaviour. 
Moreover, characterisations of the interaction process in terms of reasoning and arguing 
by interviewees who have not been prodded along with structured interviews proposing 
different characterisations of the policy process can substantiate communicative 
behaviour (Risse 2000; Niemann 2004).  
 
Countervailing forces 
As the process of integration cannot be adequately described as solely dynamic or 
integrative, it is necessary to account for countervailing forces. For this reason 
integration is here presented as a dialectical process, subject to, and explained through, 
the interplay of both dynamics and countervailing forces, mutually affecting one another. 
The nature of these countervailing forces may either be stagnating (engineering 
standstill) or opposing (tending to cause spillback). One can better ascertain the relative 
strength of the (forward-)dynamics of integration if one also accounts for these forces. 
Domestic constraints may substantially circumscribe governments’ autonomy to act 
(Moravcsik 1993: 483-494). Governments may be constrained directly by agents, such 
as lobby groups, opposition parties, the media/public pressure, or more indirectly by 
structural limitations, like a country’s economy, its geography or its administrative 
structure, especially when distinct from that of the European mainstream due to 
adjustment costs of integration (Héritier 1999). Governments’ restricted autonomy to act 
may prove disintegrative, especially when countries face very diverging domestic 
constraints. This may disrupt emerging integrative outcomes, as domestic constraints 
may lead to national vetoes or prevent policies above the lowest common denominator. 
Adverse bureaucratic pressures also partly come under this rubric, when constraints 
created at this level are not so much ideological in nature (sovereignty-consciousness), 
but when bureaucrats limit governmental autonomy of action in order to protect their 
personal interests or to channel the preferences of their “constituencies”. 
Sovereignty-consciousness – which in its most extreme form can be thought of as 
nationalism – encompasses actors’ lacking disposition to transfer sovereignty to the 
supranational level and yield competences to EU institutions. Sovereignty-consciousness 
tends to be linked to national traditions, identities and ideologies and may be cultivated 
through political culture and symbolisms (Callovi 1992; Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999: 
485). Sovereignty-consciousness has repeatedly impeded the development of the 
Community, as, for example, during de Gaulle’s and Thatcher’s terms of office. Less 
prominent actors such as bureaucrats, especially when working in ministries or policy 
areas belonging to the last bastions of the nation-state, may also represent sovereignty-
conscious agents. 
With regard to the operationalisation of countervailing forces there are several aspects 
worth mentioning: first, although sovereignty consciousness is a rather diffuse notion, 
(semi-)structured interviews (and cross-interviews) can go some way to reveal the 
attitudes of decision-makers vis-à-vis issues like the delegation of competences to 
supranational institutions. In addition, when member governments come out against 
further supranationalisation of a policy sector despite the fact that they would benefit 
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materially from such a step, this most likely happens for ideological (sovereignty-
related) reasons (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999). Second, there are several indicators for 
domestic constraints, such as resistance from important fractions of government. Finally, 
in terms of (adverse) bureaucratic politics, one can ascertain for instance the extent to 
which national bureaucrats had access to agenda/decision-making processes and the 
degree to which they used such access.  
Although the revised neofunctionalist account has moved closer to other theories, it can 
still be distinguished from other accounts. Suffice it here to make the distinction with 
what perhaps constitutes its closest rival, liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993, 
1998). One central difference is that integration is still, crucially, regarded as a 
“process”. While (liberal) intergovernmentalism looks at a single “photograph”, 
neofunctionalism (including the revised account) examines a whole “film” (Pierson 1996: 
127). In addition, the revised account contests (liberal) intergovernmentalism’s 
assumption of interest aggregation exclusively at the national level through some 
hermetic process – that takes interests largely as given. Instead, (revised) 
neofunctionalism points to endogenous preference formation processes in which 
ECSC/EC/EU membership and the interaction between the different actors matters, and 
also affects the way that these actors perceive their interests (Haas 1958: 9-10). 
Perhaps a final point of distinction, even though Andrew Moravcsik has over time 
somewhat altered (and augmented) the role played by supranational institutions in the 
integration process (see Moravcsik 1991 and Moravcsik 1998: 8), is to note that he still 
suggests that supranational institutions tend ‘to be futile and redundant, even 
sometimes counterproductive’, so still viewing their entrepreneurship role in the 
European integration process as marginal (Moravcsik 1998: 8, 490-494), a view that is 
rather opposed to that adopted by (revised) neofunctionalism. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EU EXTERNAL TRADE POLICY 
Several authors have noted that, particularly in terms of definition and scope, the 
drafting of the Community’s Common Commercial Policy was far from ideal (Ehlermann 
1984). These authors lament the fact that the Treaty of Rome only included a non-
exhaustive list of examples of subjects belonging to the CCP and the lack of any clear 
definition of the boundaries of this policy. As a result, external trade policy has been the 
subject of recurrent disputes between the Commission, the Council, member states and 
the Parliament. Disagreement developed (during the Uruguay Round and thereafter) 
especially concerning the question who was competent on the new trade issues: 
services, intellectual property rights (IPRs) and investment. The Commission, above all, 
feared that the Community’s capacity to act externally would be substantially hampered 
if competence was not transferred exclusively to the Community on these issues, as in 
the area of trade in goods. The Commission failed to achieve progress on these issues 
during the Maastricht IGC. In addition, the ECJ in its Opinion 1/94 ruled that both the 
Community and Member States were generally jointly competent on issues of services 
and intellectual property rights. Against this background, the Commission decided to 
further pursue the issue of Article 133
4
, the cornerstone of the CCP, at subsequent IGCs.  
The Amsterdam IGC produced a very modest outcome. The result of the negotiations 
was a new paragraph (5) in Article 133, which enabled the Council to extend the 
application of Article 133 to services and intellectual property rights by unanimity 
without having to go through another IGC (Sutherland 1997: 30). It has been commonly 
agreed that the progress made during the IGC 1996-97 negotiations was minimal, 
whether the benchmark used for assessment was the status-quo ante practice, the 
different options on the table, or the requirements of a changing multilateral trade 
agenda (Patijn 1997: 39; Ludlow 1997: 39; Woolcock 2005). 
Volume 9, Issue 4 (2013) jcer.net Arne Niemann 
 644 
Some integrative progress was brought by the Treaty of Nice. Most importantly, qualified 
majority voting was introduced for trade in services and IPRs. However, several 
important exceptions to QMV were also established, for example in areas where 
unanimity was required for the adoption of internal rules or where the Community had 
yet to exercise its competence. Agreements which relate to trade in cultural and 
audiovisual services, educational services, human health services and transport service 
were explicitly excluded from QMV. The Nice provisions featured some further significant 
shortcomings: (1) FDI was excluded from the scope of Article 133; (2) the negotiation 
and conclusion of horizontal agreements remained subject to unanimity, if one of the 
above derogation areas formed part of broader negotiations. Moreover, member state 
ratification was required in such cases; (3) decision-making pertaining to CCP continued 
to exclude the European Parliament, which was further deprived even of any formal right 
of consultation; (4) Member States retained the right to maintain and conclude 
agreements in the fields of trade in services and commercial aspects of IPRs. Broadly 
speaking, commentators viewed the progress made at Nice towards enhancing the 
Community’s capacity to act on the international scene, though more substantial than 
that achieved at Amsterdam, as nonetheless rather modest (Duff 2001: 14; Brok 2001: 
88; Krenzler and Pitschas 2001: 312). 
 
From the Treaty of Nice via the Convention to the Treaty of Lisbon 
The Draft Treaty that emerged from the Convention5 was very close to the Constitutional 
Treaty that resulted from the 2003-04 IGC. The CCP only played a subordinate role at 
the 2003-04 and 2007 IGCs where the provisions of the Draft Constitutional Treaty were 
watered down only insubstantially.
6
 The vast majority of the CCP provisions found in the 
Lisbon Treaty had already been agreed during the Convention. The CCP Treaty 
provisions have evolved significantly: (1) the role of the European Parliament has been 
expanded considerably: it has been granted co-decision on legislative acts, most types of 
international agreements (including all trade agreements) require parliamentary 
approval, and its role in the process of trade negotiations has been strengthened; (2) 
services, intellectual property and also investment now fall within the exclusive 
competence of the Community; (3) exceptions to unanimity (such as for areas of cultural 
and audiovisual services as well as social, education and health services) have been 
more narrowly circumscribed; (4) national parliaments are no longer needed for the 
ratification of future WTO agreements (involving the new issues). Broadly speaking, 
observers agree that this latest CCP Treaty revision constitutes considerable progress, 
certainly when compared to earlier Treaty revisions (Antoniadis 2004; Commission 2004: 
25; Cremona 2006: 29; Krenzler and Pitschas 2006; Dimopoulos 2010).  
 
THE TREATY OF LISBON: A REVISED NEOFUNCTIONALIST ACCOUNT 
Before probing the revised neofunctionalist framework, the most important alternative 
explanation for this Treaty change will be considered and refuted. While (revised) 
neofunctionalism (largely) focuses on pressures that are endogenous to the European 
integration process, some scholars have emphasised the importance of 
exogenous/external factors as the driving force for change.
7 
 
Alternative explanation: exogenous pressures 
Several authors have previously pointed to exogenous pressures as important factors 
impacting on the development of the Common Commercial Policy (Billiet 2006; see also 
Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999). Exogenous pressures encompass those factors that 
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originate outside the integration process itself, i.e. that are exogenous to it. Emphasis is 
placed here on the external political and economic environment that affects the 
behaviour of national and supranational actors and also influences EU policy-making. 
Such accounts also tend to point out that the Community and its development need to 
be viewed in the global context, especially when it comes to its external policies. The 
aspect that has been referred to most often in this context is the changing multilateral 
trade agenda: the increasing importance of trade in services, intellectual property rights 
and foreign direct investment in the WTO context.  
These issues began to feature much more prominently on the multilateral trade agenda 
since the Uruguay Round (UR). A number of actors have argued that the scope of Article 
113/133 needs to be interpreted in a dynamic way. As trade policy changes and trade in 
goods loses in importance, the Community powers under the CCP become gradually 
eroded: as the enlarged trade agenda increased the number of occasions that decisions 
had to be taken under mixed competences, which applied to the newer trade issues, 
decision rules and the mode of external representation seemed no longer appropriate. 
Mixed competence implied unanimity in the Council and thus potentially lowest common 
denominator outcomes and the potential abuse of the veto option. Cases in which the 
trade partner is closer to the status quo, the EU’s bargaining power tends to be low and 
it is susceptible to “divide-and-rule” games.8 Hence, it has been argued that the EU’s 
external trade policy needed to be supranationalised with regard to these newer trade 
issues, such as trade in services, intellectual property rights, and investment.  
It can and has been argued that the broadened international trade agenda increased the 
number of instances that shared competence applied to EU external trade negotiations 
(Krenzler and da Fonseca-Wollheim 1998). Explanations focusing on this exogenous 
factor place emphasis on the fact that important future trade negotiations thus exert 
pressure towards a reform of the CCP. It is acknowledged here that such exogenous 
dynamic constitutes a substantial dynamic for revision. However, I argue that variation 
on the strength of this pressure has been fairly minor since the mid-1990s, so that it 
cannot (in itself) convincingly explain change from the Amsterdam IGC to the 
Convention/Lisbon Treaty.  
Although trade in services, the importance of intellectual property rights (IPRs) and 
investment increased in economic terms after the 1996-97 IGC,9 all of these issues were 
squarely and prominently on the table since the UR and were also considered during the 
Amsterdam IGC talks (Krenzler 1996; Young 2002; Kuyper 1995). My series of 
interviews in Brussels and several national capitals suggests that the perception of the 
above-mentioned exogenous pressure did not increase over time. With regard to the 
evolving multilateral trade agenda and the strengthening of the institutional framework 
of the WTO, interviewees mostly/predominantly emphasised that, ‘this was clear since 
the Uruguay Round’ (interview 2002), ‘the nature and significance of these issue 
remained basically unaltered over time’ (interview 2004), and that ‘increases in services 
and investment had been expected and did not really push us more at a later stage 
[than during the 1996/1997 IGC]’ (interview 2004). In addition, judged on the basis of 
official documents and media reports, the transformation of the multilateral trade 
agenda, if anything, featured more highly in the discourse during the Amsterdam IGC 
than in the two subsequent Treaty revisions (Niemann 2006). 
Closely related, prior to the conclusion of the Amsterdam IGC, the Commission and the 
Member States had already gained substantial experience with negotiating under mixed 
competence in the post-UR services negotiations on basic telecommunications services 
and the movement of natural persons. Important negotiations on financial services were 
to be advanced and concluded shortly after the 1996/97 IGC. It was also clear from the 
General Agreement of Trade in Services that the GATS agreement would be revised after 
five years at the beginning of 2000, eight months after the coming into effect of the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Also, from 1996, the EU took the lead within the WTO to argue for a 
comprehensive new (millennium) round of trade negotiations (Woolcock 2005: 241). 
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Hence, considerable experience with negotiating under mixed competence was present, 
and important additional trade negotiations under shared competence were already on 
the (immediate) agenda during the 1996/97 Intergovernmental Conference. 
Third, the changing international trade agenda also cannot sufficiently explain why the 
issue of ‘trade and investment’ became a Community competence with the Treaty of 
Lisbon. Perhaps most revealing in that respect, reduced exogenous FDI pressures 
coincided with an increase of competence on investment during the Convention and 
2003/2004 IGC (when the CCP provisions that appear in the Lisbon Treaty were settled). 
Before and during that period annual FDI decreased, both worldwide and also concerning 
EU FDI capital flows. In addition, negotiation of investment during the Doha Round 
became increasingly questionable, if not unlikely, after considerable resistance to 
negotiate on this issue was encountered at the Doha Ministerial Conference of 2001, 
before the issue was formally abandoned by the EU at the Cancun Ministerial Conference 
in September 2003 (Dür 2007). Thus, exogenous dynamics (based on the shifting 
international trade agenda) do not shed sufficient light on why investment became one 
of the issues on which Community competence was augmented during the Convention 
and subsequent IGC leading to the Lisbon Treaty, as actual investment flows pointed in 
another direction. 
More generally speaking, exogenous dynamics cannot convincingly explain the changes 
in the area of EU external trade policy that came about through the last Treaty revision. 
Hence, we must look to endogenous factors, and thus consider the revised 
neofunctionalism to gain a fuller understanding of this development. The subsequent 
analysis will make use of (and probe) the four factors of the revised neofunctionalist 
framework for an explanation of the Lisbon Treaty CCP outcome. 
 
Functional spillover 
The most important functional pressure during the past Treaty revision was the pressure 
of enlargement. Despite being an ostensibly exogenous event, as enlargement became 
set as an internal policy goal it became an endogenous source of pressure for reform of 
EU decision-making rules. Once enlargement became an internal objective 
problems/tensions were created (anticipated) in terms of decision-making and co-
ordination among the Member States under unanimity (exerting pressure for an 
extension of QMV in trade matters). Unanimity was already regarded as problematic with 
15 delegations by some players. This logic of anticipated problems was argued in various 
Commission papers on the modernization of Article 113 already during the Amsterdam 
IGC (Commission 1996; Krenzler 1996: 6). However, at the time, this argument never 
gained much strength. As was pointed out, there was a ‘lack of urgency’ since ‘no 
enlargement is foreseen before 2003–2005’ (Patijn 1997: 38; also Devuyst 1998: 626; 
Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1999: 78, 82).  
Thereafter, these pressures further increased with the launch and confirmation of the 
enlargement process at the Luxemburg European Council of 1997 and the Helsinki 
European Council of 1999 respectively (Commission 1999; Galloway 2001: 108). 
However, integrative rationales stemming from enlargement only became really 
pressing, urgent and unavoidable at the time of the Convention. The Seville European 
Council of June 2002 expected the Accession Treaty to be signed in spring 2003 and 
anticipated the participation of new member states in the 2004 EP elections. Therefore, 
decision-making in the Council with 25 member states – and the corresponding 
diversification of interests and increased heterogeneity of political cultures – was now an 
imminent reality, which put substantial pressure on those trade policy issues subject to 
unanimity (and thus prone to paralysis). Enlargement became a frequent rationales used 
to substantiate the need for further CCP reform (see Lamy 2002). 
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Moderate additional functional pressures were created by the Laeken European Council 
Declaration on the Future of Europe. Herein, the Heads of State and Government 
reinforced a number of aims, which increased the rationale for a deepening of the 
external trade policy. The first objective stated in the Laeken Declaration was the 
strengthening of the Union’s role in the world. Here the declarations had high 
expectations (Norman 2003: 110). To achieve this collective goal, improvements in the 
decision rules of the CCP was ‘at least a logical corollary, if not a necessity’ (interview, 
2004). The second set of aims concerned greater simplification and efficiency. Given the 
complexity of the Nice provisions on Article 133, the CCP was an obvious candidate for 
improvements along these lines. Streamlining and rationalisation of external trade policy 
provisions can, of course, go both ways: re-nationalisation or supranationalisation. 
However, given the various other dynamics, the bias was clearly in favour of the 
Community method. Finally, Laeken also called for greater democracy and transparency. 
The two most likely solutions – greater involvement of national parliaments or a more 
substantial role for the EP – were not equal competitors, given the overall tendency 
towards more Commission competence and more QMV which is well complimented by 
stronger EP involvement under the tried and tested Community method. The functional 
tensions created by these aims should not be exaggerated, as they had been formulated 
at various European Councils before without having much impact. The difference this 
time was two-fold. These objectives were arguably emphasised more strongly than in 
previous Presidency conclusions
10
 and the members of the Convention took them more 
seriously than officials preparing previous IGCs (interview 2004), not least because they 
were largely unbound by (governmental) briefs (Maurer 2003: 134). 
 
Social spillover 
With regard to this factor I will focus here on the negotiations taking place in the IGC 
Representative Group
11
 and the Convention. During the Amsterdam and Nice Treaty 
revisions the conditions for social spillover were rather disadvantageous: (A) the fact 
that the Representatives Group, which constituted the principal forum for the Nice IGC 
negotiations, only met about 30 times and had a life span of less than a year did not 
afford sufficient space for very intense socialisation processes to develop (interview 
2004). The Representative Group during the Amsterdam IGC existed for a year and a 
half. While there is some evidence for the development of a certain esprit de corps in 
that negotiating forum, on balance it does not compare to that in other (more 
permanent) Council fora (interview 1997; Niemann 2006). (B) In part due to the 
expansive nature of the IGC agendas in 1996/97 and 2000, delegates simply lacked the 
time to engage in any extensive reasoned debate on external trade policy (Gray and 
Stubb 2001: 20). As one official has noted, ‘when we discussed external policy for an 
hour, we spent 55 minutes on CFSP and five minutes on Article 113’ (interview 1999). 
(C) The nature of the subject area, together with the background of negotiators, worked 
against the prospect of progress through argumentative debate. Neither the IGC 
Representatives, nor Foreign Ministers, nor Heads of State and Government, who dealt 
with the CCP issue at Amsterdam and Nice, had the requisite knowledge and expertise to 
fully engage in a sensible discussion of what is a fairly complex subject (Beach 2005: 
201). (D) Tight, inflexible and sometimes competing instructions deriving from the 
demands of various national ministries in the IGC context hampered genuine exchange 
on the pros and cons of increased Community competence. As one official put it, ‘any 
emerging consensus achieved on the merits of the problem of unanimity in services was 
to be destroyed by yet another “input” of some national ministry’ (interview 2004). (E) 
Also related to the negotiation infrastructure in a broader sense, ‘underlying the debate 
about thin dividing lines between Community and national competencies was a basic 
distrust by some member states of the role of the Commission in representing the 
Community in international negotiations and keeping the member states abreast of what 
is going on’ (Patijn 1997: 39; also Ludlow 1997: 52; Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999). The 
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roots of this suspicion of the Commission lie in past instances where the Commission 
negotiated without the due transparency vis-à-vis member states, as happened for 
example in the negotiations leading to the “Blair House Agreement” in 1992 during the 
Uruguay Round. Thus, as the above analysis suggests, the negotiation infrastructure at 
the Amsterdam and Nice IGCs structurally favoured those actors that sought to preserve 
the status quo and militated against a (substantially) more progressive outcome. 
One of the more significant deviations from the trend set by previous two Treaty 
revisions was the greater favourable impact of socialisation, deliberation and learning 
processes in the Convention, which in turn influenced the IGC 2003-04 outcome. This 
impact was brought about by several favourable conditions: (1) the inclusion of an initial 
listening and reflection phase at the Convention, during which expectations and visions 
could be freely shared. This fostered a deeper understanding of other members’ ideas 
and softened pre-conceived opinions (Kleine and Risse 2005, 2010). (2) In the plenary 
and especially in the Working Group on External Action unlike at the IGC 1996-97 and 
2000 IGC negotiations, sufficient time was available for substantial debate and a more 
thorough exchange of arguments and counterarguments concerning the merits of CCP 
reform (interview 2004). (3) The quantity of interaction – with Plenary and the 
Praesidium both holding more than 50 sessions over a period of 18 months – produced 
an ‘esprit de corps’ (Göler 2003: 9; see also Maurer 2005), where most participants ‘had 
or developed substantial responsibility for the success of the project’ (interview 2004; 
also interview with Klaus Hänsch, 2004). (4) Convention member’s freedom of action 
was not significantly circumscribed by governmental briefs (Maurer 2003: 134). Unlike at 
IGCs, bureaucratic resistances hardly impinged on the deliberation process because 
government representatives could largely avoid entrapment in the processes of inter-
ministerial coordination for the formation of national positions (Maurer 2003: 136; Closa 
2004: 202). (5) The atmosphere, spirit and negotiating structure prevented delegates 
from easily opposing proposals without being drawn into a reasoned discussion where 
ones arguments would become subject to scrutiny (Closa 2004: 201).  
In such an environment strong arguments, built on the foundation of mutually agreed 
criteria, could register more easily, and were thus more likely to prevail in the 
discussion. Hence the strong functional and exogenous rationales for an extension of 
Community competence now had a better chance to be taken up by actors and unfold 
their logic. As one official put it, ‘we had had good arguments for the extension of Article 
133 all along. However, for the first time, we had the feeling that people were really 
considering these points and their implications’ (interview 2004). In such deliberative 
process, negotiators tended to concur more fully in the common results. A reasoned 
consensus rather than compromise was reached. My interviewing suggests that the CCP 
Convention outcome was largely perceived as such a reasoned consensus (interviews 
2004, 2005). This same principal can be seen at work (albeit to a lesser extent) in the 
Draft Constitutional Treaty as a whole, which lent weight and authority to the Convention 
text and made it difficult for negotiators at the subsequent IGCs to depart significantly 
from this consensus (Closa 2004; Maurer 2003; Göler and Marhold 2005), not least 
because member states were very much part of it. Moreover, the job the Convention had 
done was generally held to have been a good one. The dominant discourse suggested 
that as much of the Draft Constitutional Treaty as possible should be preserved 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung  16 and 18 June 2003; Guardian 14 June 2003). The 
substantial bonding strength of the Convention text, being used at the subsequent IGCs, 
is the starting point for further negotiations on most issues (including external trade). In 
a way, the text turned into the default setting (Beach 2005: 199). As a result, the 2003-
04 and 2007 IGCs hardly reopened debate on the CCP.  
The effects presented above as socialisation, deliberation and learning are difficult to 
further substantiate within given space limitations.12 However, the following evidence is 
suggestive: (1) Interviewees characterised the negotiations in terms of arguing and 
reasoning, both unprompted, and/or when offered different potential characterisations of 
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the predominant policy style during different phases. (2) Convention members largely 
avoided appeals to hierarchy, status, qualification or other sources of power when 
making their statements and thus did not add non-discursive authority to their 
arguments (interview with Hänsch 2004; interview 2005). (3) Speakers’ utterances in 
the plenary (and working group sessions) seem to be very consistent with their 
statements in other forums, which may be held as indicative of truthful arguing (Risse 
2000: 18-19; Checkel 2001: 241; Niemann 2004: 385).13 (4) “Powerful” actors were not 
disproportionately successful at the Convention when their arguments were not 
persuasive. For example, the French cultural exception, which had the backing of the 
French government representative and others, was already provided for in a general 
passage about unanimity rule for external policy where unanimity was required 
internally. Therefore an explicit derogation was neither necessary nor desirable for the 
sake of simplicity. Consequently, this derogation, which made no sense to the vast 
majority of members, was not accepted during the Convention and was therefore kept 
out of the text (interview 2004). Only at the very end, after the Thessaloniki European 
Council, the Praesidium took the cultural exception on board, and then largely for 
strategic reasons, as to win the support of the French on the overall package. This stage 
has been called ‘IGC-pre-negotiations’, and not without reason; it was no longer 
characterised by the deliberative spirit of the Convention (Dinan 2004: 31). (5) The 
Convention spirit did not allow (or at least made it very difficult for) Convention 
members, unlike IGC Representatives, to reject something without justification and 
explanation (Closa 2004: 201). Consequently, those delegates preferring derogations on 
the Community method for the CCP were drawn into a (reasoned) debate (interview 
2004). (6) Finally, in cases where attempts to address an issue in a bargaining-like 
setting, such as during the Nice and especially Amsterdam IGCs, did not lead to 
significant progress, yet advances were made in a more discursive setting, a process of 
deliberation and arguing is likely to have played a role (Kleine and Risse 2005, 2010). 
 
Cultivated spillover 
During the Convention, in the decisive phase for the determining the CCP contents of the 
Lisbon Treaty, supranational actors successfully managed to cultivate spillover. My 
analysis here will confine itself to the role of the Commission and the European 
Parliament. Their role was enhanced to that of previous IGCs, where the Commission 
was somewhat distrusted by member governments, partly due to events where the 
Commission overplayed its hand (Niemann 2006) and also mainly concerned with putting 
its own house in order (Monar 2001: 115-116). In addition, the Commission and 
Parliament were at times not sufficiently supporting each other’s demands at the IGCs 
(interview 1999). 
For the Commission the Convention provided significantly more favourable conditions for 
engagement and proactivity than IGCs. Its two representatives enjoyed informational 
advantages – in no small part due to their very substantial infrastructural backing – and 
were considered “first-tier” members of the Praesidium (Beach 2005: 200). Despite 
some coherence discrepancies between the official opinion of the Commission and the 
so-called “Penelope” paper initiated by Romano Prodi (Norman 2003) – which 
nonetheless contained no contradictions on external trade policy – the Commission 
played a leading role during the Convention (Goulard 2003: 381). This is certainly the 
case for the CCP, mainly for two reasons: first, the Commission enjoyed strong support 
in the Praesidium, with ten out of twelve members at least sympathetic to its views 
(Norman 2003: 161-162). The Commission also successfully cultivated contacts, most 
importantly with Jean-Luc Dehaene who chaired the Working Group on External Action, 
and members of the Praesidium, but also by providing background information for 
interested conventionnels (Norman 2003: 162). Secondly, as previously mentioned, the 
deliberative decision style at the Convention meant that the well-founded arguments of 
the Commission – for example on the changing trade agenda – were afforded time and 
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due consideration. As one Commission official put it, ‘as opposed to the last IGCs, people 
at the Convention were eager to really discuss the pros and cons of more Community 
competence. [In this kind of environment,] we could finally influence the debate because 
the best arguments made the biggest impact’ (interview 2004; Commission 2004: 25). 
For these reasons, along with the superior expertise of the Commission on the CCP, 
observers judged that the Commission played a leading role securing the progressive 
CCP outcome in the External Action Working Group, and in defending its essence later in 
the Praesidium and Plenary (interviews 2004, 2006). 
The European Parliament, was able to exert more influence than during previous Treaty 
revisions. EP representatives, no longer second class participants as at an IGC, were 
influential for a number of reasons. Firstly, with the exception of the small Commission 
delegation, the 16 representatives from the EP formed the most coherent and the best 
organised fraction of the Convention. This can be attributed in large part to the fact that 
EP Convention members were pre-equipped with the requisite institutionalised and 
functioning working structures to prepare for meetings in the framework of the 
Convention (Maurer 2003: 137). As a result, amendments by one EP member were often 
backed by more than ten MEPs. Secondly, EP representatives constituted the most active 
fraction in the Convention in terms of making proposals, participating in the debate and 
liaising with other Convention members (Duff 2003: 3). The principal objectives of the 
mainstream of the EP delegation were a far-reaching extension of Community 
competences and a substantial increase in Parliamentary involvement. On the latter 
issue the EP’s success can be attributed to a number of factors: in an open and reasoned 
debate, Parliaments’ arguments were bound to make an impact. External trade was the 
sole policy area in which the European Parliament had hardly any role. The Laeken 
declaration’s emphasis on legitimacy lent further weight to the EP’s case (interview 
2004; Presidency Conclusions 2001). Moreover, in view of the fact that public health and 
consumer issues were increasingly discussed at WTO level, the EP’s exclusion became 
harder to defend. Moreover, despite its side-lining from the making of the CCP, 
Parliament had shown an active interest in trade policy over many years and generally 
taken a constructive approach (Bender 2002). When the Convention President, Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing, sought to redraft the progressive CCP provisions of the Working Group 
report, it was the chairman of the Working Group Dehaene, decisively backed by the EP 
representatives in the Praesidium (Elmar Brok and Iñigo Méndez de Vigo) as well as 
Commissioner António Vitorino who prevented the external trade provisions from being 
(decisively) watered down (interview 2004). In the final days of the Convention, the EP 
emerged as the strongest supporter of the Convention text and thus contributed to its 
bonding strength with regard to the subsequent IGC negotiations (Beach 2005: 209). 
Due to the bonding strength of the Convention provisions (and the dynamics behind the 
extension of Article 133), the IGC negotiating infrastructure which facilitates defending 
the status quo and hampers enforcing change, for once, worked in the Commission’s 
(and EP’s) favour. To effect any changes to the provisions on the table would require 
substantial political impetus. Any such impetus was successfully diffused by the 
Commission, which cultivated relations with the German and Dutch governments in 
particular, who became allies in opposing the watering down of the CCP during the IGCs 
(interview 2004, 2009). The progressive outcome concerning the Common Commercial 
Policy in the Treaty of Lisbon is thus attributable in significant part to the contribution of 
supranational actors. 
 
Countervailing forces 
Having examined the potential dynamics of integration, we now turn to other side of the 
equation; the countervailing forces impacting the decision-making process. Before 
coming to the last Treaty revision, we will take a brief look at the Amsterdam and Nice 
IGCs (together, because the countervailing forces at play were very similar, both 
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substantively and in terms of intensity). Firstly, the (relatively) restrictive IGC outcomes 
can be partly explained by reference to domestic constraints. The new trade issues do 
not stop at the borders, such as issues of tariffs and quotas, but extend behind borders 
into the state and thus concern domestic laws (Smith and Woolcock 1999: 440-441; 
Rollo and Holmes 2001). As a result, these issues also tend to be more politicised, and 
the transfer of competences to the Community evokes greater resistance. For example, 
during both IGC negotiations France sought derogation on cultural services to safeguard 
the cultural diversity policy, behind which there is both significant public support and 
strong lobbies (Lequesne 2001; Le Monde 18 November 2000). Domestic constraints 
regarding some goods issues also affected the debate on the extension of Article 133. 
One way of avoiding QMV on agriculture or textiles – which are substantially politicised 
issues in France and Portugal respectively – in horizontal trade negotiations was to keep 
unanimity for the new trade issues, as one aspect decided by unanimity in horizontal 
trade negotiations leads to unanimity on the whole package (interview 1997, Krenzler 
1996). 
Secondly, there is the more diffuse issue of sovereignty-consciousness which constituted 
another strong countervailing pressure during the IGCs 1996-97 and 2000. The intrusion 
of the new trade issues into domestic spheres close to the heart of national sovereignty 
had increased the sensitivity in terms of delegating powers to the Community on these 
issues. Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (1999: 485-87) have shown that several 
countries, including France and the UK, came out against an extension of Community 
competence, contrary to their national interest, and joined the “sovereignty camp”, 
largely on ideological grounds. Both France and the UK are very competitive 
internationally in terms of trade in commercial services and have a positive trade 
balance in this sector. Their interest would have been best served by an exclusive 
Community competence for trade in services, since its collective negotiating position 
cannot be held up by the member state least ready to confront international competition 
(Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2000). The phenomenon of bureaucratic politics is also relevant 
here as officials in national ministries became agents of sovereignty-consciousness. This 
ideological basis for opposing a progressive reform of Article 133 has been strongly 
spurred by the distrust vis-à-vis the Commission (interview 2004).  
These countervailing forces were considerably less potent during the Convention than 
during an IGC. In the absence of any substantial inter-departmental coordination, 
government representatives were generally unconstrained by the influence of various 
functional ministries. Bureaucrats, who have been described as crucial agents of 
sovereignty consciousness and a principal source of domestic constraints, were thus 
largely excluded from the process. Secondly, although those arriving at the Convention 
doubtless brought with them certain domestic or institutional socialisations and frames 
guiding their behaviour, they were nonetheless largely able to negotiate freely without 
significant restrictions (Maurer 2003: 134-37). As a result, domestic factors – despite 
constituting important sources of information and feedback mechanisms – were 
considerably less of a hindrance to members of the Convention than for negotiators in an 
IGC. 
The consequences of this attenuation of countervailing pressures extended beyond the 
Convention itself, and could be recognised throughout Treaty revision exercise. Due to 
the above described bonding effects of the Convention, the results thereof carried a 
greater significance than normal IGC preparation exercises. They turned the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty into the default setting, which was easier to defend than to change 
(Beach 2005: 199). When the IGC formally began in October 2003, countervailing 
forces, for example through national ministries, gathered greater strength. In the case of 
the CCP however, these were of little consequence as the Convention text on external 
trade was, generally speaking, the result of a strong and genuine consensus, of which 
either Foreign Ministers (themselves) or representatives of Heads of State and 
Government had been part. Moreover, bureaucratic resistances were also less intense, 
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as the IGC was largely conducted on the political level and partly because of its relative 
short duration. Departments thus had little opportunity to shape national positions 
(interview 2004), and consequently the CCP package was not reopened during the IGC 
2007, which laid the groundwork for the Treaty of Lisbon (interview 2009). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Broadly speaking, the revised neofunctionalist framework seems to have provided a 
robust account for an analysis of the Treaty revision on the reform of the Common 
Commercial Policy leading to the Treaty of Lisbon. During the last Treaty revision the 
various spillover dynamics were considerably stronger than during the previous IGCs. 
The functional rationales, especially that stemming from the pressure of enlargement 
had gradually increased over time (with enlargement coming ever closer) and thus 
constituted a significant structural pressure. Stronger social spillover pressures in the 
form of socialisation, deliberation and learning processes ensured that the logic of such 
structural pressures would not be lost on actors. Such processes, which produced 
consensus among actors and agreement on outcomes, can also largely explain the 
bonding strength of the Convention text. The increased proactivity and assertiveness of 
supranational institutions in cultivating spillover reinforced these dynamics. Largely due 
to the Convention framework, countervailing forces were (substantially) weaker than at 
the Amsterdam and Nice IGCs. This facilitated the stronger ignition and dissemination of 
integrational dynamics. This explanation based on the largely endogenous (revised) 
neofunctionalist account gains even more plausibility due to the fact that the most 
prominent alternative explanation based on exogenous dynamics related to changing 
multilateral trade agenda does not make sense here, as explained in the analysis. 
This analysis shows that integrative developments in the area of EU commercial policy 
cannot exclusively be accounted for by rational choice dynamics, such as utility 
maximising actors with fixed preferences, but that socialisation through deliberative 
processes also needs to be taken seriously.
14
 In addition, the above inquiry suggests 
that it is not only the Treaty revision negotiations themselves that matter, but the 
broader EU (trade) policy-making process that impacts on, and feeds back into, the EU 
trade “polity” and thus into EU trade policy-making. Functional pressures and the roles 
that can be played by suprationational institutions develop over time, as do socialisation 
and learning processes (conditioned by several contextual factors).  
The revised neofunctionalist framework is likely to enhance our understanding of EU 
politics and policy-making more generally, i.e. beyond the explanation of the Lisbon 
Treaty changes with regard to the CCP. Arguably, due to the incorporation of 
countervailing factors and the shift from a dynamic to a dialectical account of integration 
the revised neofunctionalist account is more broadly generalizable than early 
neofunctionalism. The original neofunctionalist theory struggled to explain periods of 
stagnation or processes that did not lead to far-reaching integration. Hence, it is argued 
here that while predictive claims have been modified, extrapolative ability has been 
increased through the revisions. In that context, it is worth mentioning that the revised 
framework has been (successfully) employed to shed light on decision outcomes in other 
policy areas, such as EU migration policy or the PHARE programme (Niemann 2006).  
Although it is too early to definitively judge the effect of the Lisbon provisions on EU 
actorness in the field of trade policy (given how recently the Treaty came into force), it 
seems that the new arrangements will bolster the EU’s role as an actor in trade policy-
making, given that trade in services, commercial aspects of intellectual property rights, 
and foreign direct investment have become an exclusive Community competence 
(Dimopoulos 2008; see also Niemann 2012). However, much depends on the 
implementation of the Lisbon provisions, and especially the manner in which the 
European Parliament will choose to exercise its new powers. The EP’s traditionally 
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stronger concerns (relative to the Commission, and especially the Council) with regard to 
non-economic goals such as human rights or environmental and social standards, could 
contribute to a greater politicisation of EU external trade policy (Pollet-Fort 2010). It is 
difficult to foresee what impact this may have on the effectiveness of the CCP. On the 
one hand, such politicisation could lead to uncertainties and delays and more generally 
hamper policy-making processes within the EU (Fairbrother and Quisthoud-Rowohl 
2009). While withholding its consent for a large multilateral agreement, like that 
concluding the Doha Round, can be considered rather unlikely, the EP’s willingness and 
ability to do so has been considered a realistic scenario for bilateral agreements 
(Woolcock 2008: 5–6). On the other hand, the European Parliament could be 
conveniently used as a bargaining chip in two- or three-level games (Putnam 1988). The 
EU could strengthen its bargaining position in international negotiations by referring to 
the requirement of EP consent, as practiced by US negotiators with regard to Congress.  
 
*** 
 
                                                          
1 The next paragraph draws on Wiener and Diez (2004: 241).  
2 On the above methods, see George and Bennett (2005) and Ragin (1987). 
3 However, structure was arguably more important in (early) neofunctionalism than acknowledged by 
Haas (Haas 2001: 29), given the emphasis on functional-economic interdependencies. 
4 Article 113, after the renumbering of the Treaty of Amsterdam, became Article 133. With the Treaty of 
Lisbon this then became Article 207. I will refer to Article 113 for the time until the entering into force of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, and to Article 133 for the period during which the Treaties of Amsterdam and 
Nice applied, and also when referring to this Article more generally (in a less time-specific manner). 
5 The Laeken European Council of December 2001, departing from the standard method of preparing EU 
Treaty reforms, decided to form a Convention on the Future of Europe. Its purpose was to comprise the 
main stakeholders in order to examine key questions about the future direction of the European 
integration. The Convention produced a draft constitution, which became the basis for 
discussions/negotiations in the subsequent IGC.  
6 Most substantially, a rather narrow derogation on social, education and health services was 
(re)introduced. 
7 For a more detailed debate on exogenous pressures, also cf. Niemann (2011). 
8 However, in cases where the collective EU position is closer to the status quo than that of the 
negotiating partner, unanimity tends to increase the Community’s negotiating power (Meunier 2000). 
9 For example, the share of services as part of overall EU trade increased from approximately 26 per 
cent in 1995 to 30 per cent in 2002 (Krenzler 1996, Lamy 2002). 
10 Presidency Conclusions of the following European Councils: Cannes (point IV), Madrid (pages 1, 3), 
Helsinki (point I), Feira (point I) and Laeken. 
11 The IGC Representatives Group prepared and discussed IGC issues before they went to Foreign 
Ministers and/or Heads of State and Government for further discussion and negotiation. 
12 Also accounts of deliberation and socialisation characterising the Convention (Göler 2003; Maurer 
2003; Closa 2004). 
13 One example where this could be traced perhaps most thoroughly is the case of Pascal Lamy, who 
was not a member of the Convention, but was heard in the Working Group on External Action as an 
expert and participated in the discussion. See Lamy’s (2002) account in the Working Group and 
speeches in other forums (Lamy 2003). 
14 As a result, the revised neofunctionalist account has been situated about half-way between 
rationalism and reflectivism. 
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Going back to the Kuhnian debate about the assumed incommensurability of different paradigms, we point at the 
need for engaged pluralism in political science. We illustrate this by giving illustrations from the different 
paradigmatic perspectives included in the special issue and how they could speak to each other. While this analysis 
clearly shows the limits and difficulties encountered during such an endeavor, we hope to have laid the basis for a 
more reflexive dialogue within the literature. 
Paradigms; trade policy; IR; EU; trade; critical theories; pragmatism; engaged pluralism 
 
 
 
A discussion between people who share many views is unlikely to be fruitful, even though it 
may be pleasant; while a discussion between vastly different frameworks can be extremely 
fruitful, even though it may sometimes be extremely difficult, and perhaps not quite so 
pleasant (though we may learn to enjoy it). (Karl Popper, in Walker 2010: 439) 
The aim of this special issue is to take the first step towards an inter-paradigmatic debate in 
the study of European Union (EU) trade politics. This article will discuss the merits and limits 
of inter-paradigmatic dialogue and apply this to the different perspectives of the 
contributors to this special issue. The first section will assess the Kuhnian argument about 
the purported incommensurability of different paradigms and point to the need for a 
engaged pluralism among different ‘paradigmatic’ perspectives. The second section will look 
at how a reading of the articles in this special issue indicates that a confrontation among 
different paradigms as well as between different theories can be or become a learning 
experience. 
 
INTER-PARADIGMATIC DIALOGUE: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE? 
This section will address three different questions: is it possible to engage in inter-
paradigmatic dialogue, is such an exercise desirable, and if yes, how should this be 
achieved? The first question has often been answered negatively by referring to Thomas 
Kuhn’s famous ‘incommensurability thesis’. The concept of scientific paradigms dates back 
to Kuhn’s influential work entitled ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ (1962). Kuhn 
defines a paradigm as ‘a theoretical research stream that has reached vast consolidation as 
regards its scientific development and, even more important in the sociological vocabulary, 
the formation of a research community with a solid core of accepted values, methods, and 
analytical tools’ (see Padula and Battista Dagnino 2007: 49). Scientific evolution is 
characterized as a process whereby ‘normal science’ underpinned by a certain paradigm 
becomes challenged by ‘revolutionary science’ with fundamentally different assumptions and 
methods (e.g. the shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian paradigms in physics). Kuhns ‘normal 
scientists’ will typically turn a blind eye to anomalies, given their devotion to the further 
elaboration and specification of their own paradigm. Ultimately they will be discredited by a 
scientific revolution, usually initiated by young scholars or scholars new to the field, who 
propose a fundamentally different paradigm. What is important for our purpose is that 
Kuhn’s philosophy of science precludes meaningful interaction between different paradigms. 
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Different paradigms become incommensurable because they involve different theories, 
concepts and methods and because they are supported by different language-culture 
communities (Walker 2010: 435-6). This notion of incommensurability has strongly 
influenced political science and in particular international relations scholarship (Waever 
1996: 150-1; Walker 2010: 436).  
However, the incommensurability thesis could be disqualified or could at least be relaxed, 
especially when applied to social sciences. Kuhn essentially theorized about the natural 
sciences and never intended to apply his work to the social sciences. 1 Political science and 
international relations simply lack the background conditions of concrete, universally 
recognized, scientific achievements that are necessary to speak about paradigms along 
Kuhnian lines (Walker 2010: 435). For example, the so-called ‘paradigms’ in international 
relations – realism, liberalism and constructivism, or the divide between rationalism and 
constructivism (see Figure 1 in the introduction of this special issue) – have quite some 
common ground and cannot be seen as incommensurable.  
Various contributions to the literature have shown that even synthesis may be possible, for 
instance the neo-neo-synthesis following the so-called inter-paradigm debate between 
liberalism and realism that has taken place within international relations. A similar evolution 
has characterized EU studies since the early 1990s.2 It is true that radicalism has been less 
involved in this debate (Waever 1996: 150-1). Also between rationalists and reflectivists a 
dialogue has proven to be possible, as shown by moderate constructivist accounts in 
international relations (e.g. by Wendt) and EU studies (e.g. by Checkel; see also Checkel 
and Moravcsik 2001) which seek to bridge different ontological and epistemological 
assumptions.  
This dialogue may be extremely difficult and not always satisfying. It would certainly be 
more comfortable to remain locked within one’s own academic community and stick to 
paradigm mentalities. However, our point is that it would be exaggerated to speak of 
Kuhnian incommensurability. The obstacles confronted when trying to combine different 
meta-theoretical perspectives are often more related to resource scarcity in terms of limited 
time, energy and money, than to logical incompatibility (Jupille 2006: 213). After all, 
incommensurability can be seen as a ‘red herring’ in academic debates: ‘despite the 
plurality of approaches we use and despite our particular disagreements, we are usually 
quite able to talk to each other and discuss matters.’ (Kratochwil 2003: 126) The three –
isms, rationalists and reflectivists have more in common than Newtonian and Einsteinian 
physics. 
Then, why would an inter-paradigmatic dialogue be desirable? One reason is that 
paradigmatic insulation and related navel-gazing could undermine political scientists’ ability 
to engage in political problem-solving. It has contributed to their policy irrelevance and their 
role as ‘scholars on the sidelines’, as Joseph Nye has argued with respect to American 
political scientists: 
Scholars are paying less attention about how their work relates to the policy world, 
and in many departments a focus on policy can hurt one’s career. Advancement 
comes faster for those who develop mathematical models, new methodologies or 
theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to policymakers. (Nye 2009) 
As proponents of pragmatism have argued (e.g. Cornut 2009), specific paradigms in 
international relations are insufficient to capture the complexity of international politics (see 
also Walker 2010: 447). ‘Pragmatism’ is not a new paradigm as such, but implies a 
pluralistic openness to different paradigmatic approaches in conducting problem-driven and 
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complexity-sensitive research. It is not guided by specific theories or agnostic in terms of 
epistemological position (Cornut 2009). 
Diminished policy relevance may not come as a problem to many scholars however. 
Adhering to a ‘paradigm mentality’ is even tempting since it increases scholars’ scientific 
status and legitimacy (Walker 2010: 440) and since it helps them to play identity politics 
within academia (Jackson and Nexon 2009: 920). This leads to ‘eristic’ academic debates 
which are ‘first and foremost about arguing for the sake of conflict, fighting and seeing who 
can yell the loudest’ (Jørgensen and Valbjørn 2012: 9). As such, paradigm mentalities 
hinder scientific progress by encouraging hyper-specific ‘Balkanization’ and ‘tribalism’ 
(Walker 2010: 434; Rosamond 2006: 17). Paradigmatic insularity limits ‘scholarly vision, 
curiosity, and creativity’ and as such, becomes ‘detrimental to healthy inquiry’ (Walker 
2010: 434). That is indeed a high price to be paid. Scholarly curiosity and creativity may be 
undermined by the fact that paradigmatic insularity increases the chance that analyses will 
suffer from the blackboxing of causal mechanisms, the resulting endurance of blind spots in 
explanations, and the failure to see possible connections between analyses across different 
paradigms as a way to eliminate such blind spots (Sil and Katzenstein 2010).  The image of 
‘incommensurable’ paradigms, mistakenly applying Kuhnian insights on international 
relations, acts as ‘a block to scientific progress’ (Waever 1996: 150). 
The solution is however less obvious than seems at first sight. That inter-paradigmatic 
dialogue would somehow help scientific thinking is clear. It is much less clear what the 
exact purpose of such a dialogue should be. Should it limit its ambitions to the 
discouragement of the ‘facile ignoring and dogmatic rejection of other theories and 
perspectives’ (Lapid 2003: 131), or should it aim at a synthetic, unifying paradigm in the 
field?  
Targeting a synthesis has indeed a number of advantages (Moravcsik 2003). The kind of 
problems with which scholars as well as policy-makers are confronted are complex, and 
such complex issues require comprehensive rather than unicausal explanations. Such 
explanations may also lead to the development of overarching assumptions that indicate the 
relative position of the elements borrowed from different paradigms in a multi-theoretical 
synthesis without requiring however that each subtheory in the synthesis would make 
identical assumptions about fundamental ontological matters (Moravcsik 2003). In addition, 
such a synthesis challenges the false impression, nurtured by the idea of 
incommensurability, that any theoretical approach is ‘as valid and accurate as any other’ 
(Moravcsik 2003: 136).3 However, there are also risks involved. A multi-theoretical 
synthesis may ultimately lead to what it originally wanted to avoid: subsumption and the 
emergence of a hegemonic paradigm. In social sciences the notion of objective ‘truth’ is far 
from univocal. The scientific validity of knowledge is the subject of inter-subjective debate 
among scholars. It is precisely this pluralism in scientific interaction that may be lost 
through the emergence of a hegemonic paradigm that synthesizes previous contending 
perspectives. Thus, not surprisingly, there is a lot of suspicion about attempts for inter-
paradigmatic synthesis in the field (see e.g. Forum discussion in International Studies 
Review 2003: 5). An expressed intention to engage in multi-theoretical synthesis is easily 
seen as a hidden attempt by some to establish a new hegemonic paradigm. As such, the 
possibility of a real, reflexive dialogue among paradigms would be doomed even before it 
started yet.  
This is even more so because several authors claim that the aim of such a synthesis would 
be based on a false (empiricist) assumption (Kratochwil 2000, 2003): that there is one truth 
out there; a truth that can be revealed through pointed empirical research. Reflectivists 
especially reject this notion however. There is not one social world out there. There are only 
different views of different social worlds and as such, there is no neutral ground on which to 
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judge rival accounts about the social world. In such a context, aiming at synthesis would 
imply that ‘one theory gets protected by epistemological gatekeeping’ (Smith 2003: 143). 
As such, paradigmatic hegemony would be inherent to multi-theoretical synthesis. 
This does not mean that ‘anything goes’. Critics of paradigmatic synthesis are always quick 
to point out that pluralism should not be pursued for its own sake (see e.g. Cornut 2009; 
Jupille 2006: 213; Kratochwil 2003: 126). This is also true for reflectivists: even if they 
challenge the notion of an absolute truth waiting to be discovered, this does not mean that 
they reject the merits of scientific dialogue among different perspectives. Quite the 
contrary: total understanding never happens both among and within different paradigms. 
The notion of total commensurability within a scientific community rests on the problematic, 
romantic idea of an inner-culture where people understand each other while inter-cultural 
communication is impossible. Recognizing this should be a stimulus for dialogue, not an 
excuse for insularity. Otherwise we may fall back into the trap of incommensurability 
thinking, something which reflectivists seek to avoid (see Waever 1996: 171).  
Then, what is the alternative to paradigmatic synthesis and anything goes? Different 
authors have pointed to a pragmatic middle ground between ‘flabby pluralism’ on the one 
hand, and multi-theoretical synthesis on the other hand: engaged pluralism (Lapid 2003: 
128-131; Jackson and Nexon 2009: 921). In flabby pluralism (a term borrowed from 
Richard Bernstein), ‘anything goes’ as authors risk engaging in ‘glib superficial poaching’ 
(Johnson 2002: 245, citing Bernstein) or even worse, ‘tolerant indifference’ (Kratochwil 
2003: 126). In engaged pluralism, the objective is in the first place to promote empathy 
across different paradigms (Burbules 2000), but with a particular purpose in mind: the 
explicit objective to develop complimentary and multidimensional understandings of political 
phenomena by seeking and establishing points of connection among paradigms in the 
search for a broader understanding of causal chains on the one hand, and more refined 
specifications of causal mechanisms (including their scope conditions) in these chains on the 
other hand. As such, there is no place for tolerant indifference here. Each paradigm and 
each theory within a paradigm needs to be assessed on its merits with regard to the 
objective of broadening and specifying the causal chain. Engaged pluralism does not require 
that consensus will be reached on these merits but at least that a focused debate (or a 
disciplined dialogue) on them takes place (Sil and Katzenstein 2010). It is through such a 
debate that scholars need to explicitly engage with arguments and analyses developed in 
other paradigms than the ones in which they themselves tend to operate. Ultimately, the 
purpose is to reduce the distance between empirical complexity and theoretical parsimony, 
but with an eye for the fact that different explanations may be incommensurable or that 
such an endeavor may yield contradictory explanations.  
Specifically in the context of EU studies, Joseph Jupille (2006: 229) captures the delicate 
balance between sufficient search for synthesis and hesitance against hegemony through 
the metaphor of a parabola, speaking about ‘the fruitful parabolic function linking 
excessively low and excessively high levels of scholarly consensus with low levels of 
knowledge production, and interim ranges of consensus, yielding higher knowledge payoffs.’ 
This approach also corresponds with what Rosamond calls the ‘pluralistic school’ (as 
opposed to the ‘mainstream school’) in EU studies, where the solution is ‘to facilitate 
communication without imposing one tribe’s version of how research is justified and 
evaluated’ (Rosamond 2006: 17). Engaged pluralism involves a ‘reflexive dialogue’ based on 
the recognition of a plurality of different but equal perspectives with an aim to ‘promote a 
more advanced understanding of the other while at the same time catalyzing a self-
reflection process leading to a better, less parochial self-understanding’ (Jørgensen and 
Valbjørn 2012: 8). 
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This brings us back to Kuhn’s paradigms, which was the starting point of this analysis. The 
plea for engaged pluralism corresponds more with Karl Popper’s philosophy of science. 
According to Popper the Kuhnian perspective on paradigms and incommensurability leads to 
narrow specialization and uncritical thinking. Popper argues that only theoretical and 
methodological pluralism can foster the critical and innovative thinking that is necessary for 
scientific progress, and for the establishment of the open society that he had in mind (see 
Walker 2010: 438-440). 
 
PIECES OF A JIGSAW PUZZLE 
When it comes to the paradigms, this special issue uses the above-mentioned working 
definition and map as a heuristic devise. In most contributions, several paradigms are 
combined as the analyses skirt the limits of one paradigm by including elements of another. 
Across the special issue, there are then elements of material self-interests that are 
exogenous where utility maximization is central. There is also a strong attention for 
preferences that are endogenous as they are affected by ideas, cognitive beliefs, and power 
structures. There is equally attention for the interaction between structure and agency 
however, where preferences are supposed to be affected by ideas and cognitive beliefs, but 
where agents are considered to be able to actively affect such ideas and beliefs as well. As 
such, the combination of the different contributions points at a range of issues that have 
been dealt with extensively in IR in general and the study of EU trade policies in particular: 
the question of preferences, of institutions, and of power. The different accounts indicate 
that each of these three raises important questions, and that on top of this, the three may 
be mutually constitutive as well. 
The different articles can therefore, be seen as different pieces of a jigsaw puzzle through 
which the EU’s trade policies can be explained. Each piece tries to cover different elements 
in that explanation even if some overlap among the different contributions exists. Several 
contributions struggle with the realization that their explanation provides only part of the 
puzzle and that other complimentary explanations may be necessary. The question is then 
what the hierarchy between these explanations is. For some, additional explanations are 
just auxiliary but not really fundamental for understanding the EU’s external trade policies. 
For others, there is the ready recognition that the residual variance unaccounted for by their 
own explanation requires input from theories that are rooted in other paradigms. For still 
others, other paradigms are plainly wrong and need to be replaced. As such, they consider 
themselves not to be complimentary to the others but as competing with them. It is here 
that the metaphor of the jigsaw puzzle may reach its limits. It is not that we believe that 
there exists one ultimate truth about the EU’s external trade policies or about international 
political economy in general and that discovering the complementarities among existing 
paradigms will deliver such truth (the overall jigsaw puzzle). It is rather that not all pieces 
of puzzle are yet available on the one hand, and that some pieces cannot be considered (or 
don’t consider themselves) as neatly fitting into the others simply because they are not 
compatible with those others. But it is still interesting to look at each of them as that 
deepens our insight in EU external trade policies, confronts us with elements in our own 
thinking that we may miss, or with insights that contradict those of our own. 
When we try to foster a dialogue between these different accounts, we will consecutively 
discuss each author’s main argument and in doing so we gradually engage the different 
contributions to each other. An interesting starting point is then the question: what drives 
EU policymakers when they are dealing with trade policy? The different accounts touch upon 
this question, albeit with different degrees of explicitness, on the basis of different 
ontologies, and thus with attention for different factors that may matter here. Let us for the 
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sake of argument, start from the notion that policymakers are utility maximizers and thus 
with Gerry Alons’ article. 
Alons’ article deals with preference formation in (West) Germany on the agricultural 
negotiations during the Uruguay Round negotiations. In doing so, it shows how the notion of 
interests in such preference formation needs to be broader than just material interests. 
Preference formation is based on a combination of political, economic and ideational 
interests where the last refers to the ideas that are central to the state and that 
consequently, shape the beliefs of the state’s decision-making elites. As such, it is far from 
certain that material interests will always trump ideational ones. The article illustrates this 
through the impact that the preservation of the Franco-German axis had on Germany’s 
positions on the agricultural negotiations. Archival material shows indeed that Germany was 
prepared to support positions close to those of France, this for the sake of the Franco-
German friendship, and even when these went against the pressures exerted by the U.S. or 
domestic German industrial interests. 
Alons’ analysis struggles with the exact relationship between material and ideational drivers 
of political behavior. It also opens up the intriguing question of socialization versus 
bargaining in negotiations among countries. The article skirts against the limits of a purely 
rationalist account and tries to respond to this by cautiously getting into an ideational 
argument, although it is perhaps too cautious in this. What is considered as ‘ideational’ here 
– the preservation or promotion of the Franco-German axis – can be seen as being material. 
As such, the article raises an important problem for inter-paradigmatic dialogue: the 
problem of conceptualization. 
Maria Garcia provides a neo-realist perspective on the evolution of the EU’s external trade 
policies since the end of the Cold War. She shows how a mixture of material and ideational 
motives has affected such policies with an increasing impact however of typically realist 
concerns with relative market power, access to promising potential export markets before 
competitors gets it (or at least in an attempt to be on par with such competitors), and 
efforts to create a level-playing field for the EU based on the EU’s regulatory regimes. This 
increasing impact is explained by the EU’s declining self-confidence in light of the rise of 
new economic giants, increased U.S. and Chinese activism on bilateral free trade 
agreements, and the Great Recession. This does not mean however that ideational factors 
don’t matter anymore. They still do. The EU still prefers interregional approaches to strictly 
bilateral ones. And the EU continues to pursue normative values through trade agreements. 
In addition, its realist approach is also driven by the internalization of the conviction that 
development and competitiveness are served well by trade liberalization both in Europe and 
elsewhere. Overall therefore, continuity based on a mixture of realist and ideational factors 
explains EU trade policies since the end of the Cold War, even if realist concerns have 
always been prevalent over ideational ones, and even if this prevalence has become more 
outspoken as the EU feels less secure about itself. 
In comparison with Alons’ account, Garcia digs deeper into the preferences themselves, 
specifically with regard to the different roles that these may play. Preferences may be about 
the ends one wants to achieve, whether material (personal welfare, company market 
shares, a country’s relative economic power) or ideological (a world that reflects the mixture 
of values predominant at home). They may also be about the means to achieve these ends. 
In the latter case, causal beliefs are important and with it, the causal potential of ideas and 
ideologies. Garcia provides a number of examples of such preferences-on-means. One is the 
EU’s ideational belief in trade as a vehicle for development and in trade liberalization as a 
way to increase competitiveness inside the EU. Another is the EU’s belief in regional 
integration as a key element for stability, economic growth and eventually, democracy. The 
consequences for analyzing EU trade policy-making are clear. Even if we assume that 
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policy-makers engage in utility maximization and we know what their utility function 
consists of, what they will exactly target through their trade policies may remain 
indeterminate given that different means to reach an end are possible. We need to know 
more therefore about the factors that affect a policy-maker’s cognitive linking of ends with 
means, that is, with certain courses of action. 
If we accept that several means may lead to a similar end, or at least, that policy-makers 
can plausibly think about different means towards an end, the role of socialization and 
convincing becomes potentially larger. In addition, different degrees of causal uncertainty 
may matter here. It is where uncertainty about the best courses of action is highest that the 
potential for socialization and convincing – and for the entrepreneurs that drive socialization 
and engage in convincing – is largest. There may thus be issues that by their very nature 
lend themselves to causal uncertainty, and thus to a higher receptivity of trade policy-
makers for socialization and convincing. Several new trade issues are considered to belong 
to this category such as intellectual property rights protection and its exact effects on 
inequality, development and innovation, and investment regulation and its impact on FDI, 
technology spillovers and local development. 
Johan Adriaensen and Montserrat González-Garibay’s article tries to explain the EU’s 
reliance on different kinds of trade incentives (sanctions, rewards) for the 
promotion/enforcement of labour standards in developing countries. In doing so, the 
authors react to the normative power Europe argument that has been used to explain the 
trade-labour linkage in EU trade policies. By comparing the costs and levels of effectiveness 
of multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral approaches to the trade-labour linkage, they 
conclude that two factors explain the outcome: the institutional rules that apply to the EU 
Council and the related (in)ability of individual member states to block coercive provisions 
on the trade-labour linkage on the one hand, and the varying impact of systematic 
opposition from the (larger) developing countries and the resulting variance in the EU’s 
reluctance to go for coercion on the other hand. Overall, the article makes clear that an 
identity-based explanation of EU behaviour cannot solve the puzzle why in one case the EU 
acts coercively on the trade-labour linkage and why on other cases it doesn’t. Rational 
explanations seem to be able to do so however. 
Adriaensen and González-Garibay add an important element to the previously discussed 
articles. With respect to Alons’ article, it pays more explicit attention to the impact of the 
EU’s institutional rules on trade policy outcomes. When unanimity rules in the Council, the 
lowest common denominator becomes more probable than in case QMV applies. This may 
be assumed to be the case when the political sensitivity of an issue becomes more 
important for the most recalcitrant member states. The roots of that sensitivity may vary: 
they may be located in the strength of an ideological conviction, the fear of setting a 
precedent that can be used for politically more important issues, or the material 
consequences of a decision at home. 
An important question that is left open here is, what the conditions are under different 
rules, ie: unanimity and QMV; and when QMV as a last resort would not be politically 
acceptable. The Alons’ article raises this issue. Under what conditions is QMV as a last resort 
beyond reach even if formally available? As such, the combination of the Adriaensen-
González-Garibay’s and the Alons’ articles shows how the interplay between institutions and 
preferences – and specifically preference intensities – is fundamental. Options may be 
formally available. It remains a question whether they are available in practice. If they are 
not, the question needs to be answered why they aren’t. The logic of appropriateness, 
pointed at by Garcia, certainly enters the picture here but in a procedural sense. In case 
that it is considered to be inappropriate to isolate and outvote an individual member state, 
the EU outcome should be close to the lowest common denominator, despite a formal QMV.  
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Note that Adriaensen and González-Garibay claim that in case a denominator was generated 
on the trade-labor linkage, the outcome reflected the ‘underlying norms upon which the EU 
is built’. As we will see, the reference to such underlying norms opens the door to an 
analysis that takes such norms and their roots seriously. 
The Adriaensen-González-Garibay’s article engages with the article by Garcia in another way 
as well. Both have an interest in the external context of EU trade policy-making. Whereas 
Garcia’s analysis focuses on the strategic role that such a context plays in the preferences of 
the EU policy-makers, Adriaensen and González-Garibay pay attention to the cost that the 
external context may generate for the EU’s trade policy decisions, and for the extent to 
which this cost matters in the calculations that EU trade policy-makers make. The issue 
seems straightforward: with larger trading partners, the cost of trade policy decisions 
disliked by these partners is higher for the EU. But Adriaensen and González-Garibay add 
another element, perception; the external cost is affected by the perception that the EU’s 
partners have of the intentions behind its decisions. In this respect, Adriaensen and 
Gonzalez-Garibáy point to perceptions as a preliminary assumption of bounded rationality 
(Jervis 1976; Oddell 2009). Here, perceptions are regarded as causal variables that 
intervene between reality and the reactions to that reality. As such, the prisms through 
which policy-makers look at reality and the constitution of these prisms need to be taken 
seriously. Once again, a potential for critical theory, but also for constructivism, shows up 
here. 
In their article, David Bailey and Fabienne Bossuyt deal with a puzzle: scholars continue to 
be surprised by the recurrent discrepancy between the EU’s rhetoric as a ‘progressive force 
for good’ and its trade policy outcomes. They explain this by the insufficiently critical 
methodology that scholars tend to use when assessing the EU’s rhetoric and adopt a more 
thoroughgoing conceptualization of EU trade policy, applying a critical social science 
approach. The objective is to highlight mechanisms of domination and to reveal the illusions 
that enable the continuing existence of these mechanisms. The authors identify three such 
mechanisms and show how DG Trade uses these with respect to a range of free trade 
agreements. Moreover, DG Trade uses internal divisions in the EU to explain why significant 
redistributive policies fail to enter the FTAs that it negotiates and to lower public 
expectations with regard to them. As such the authors claim, the EU may be a conflicted 
trading power as Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (2006) once remarked, but then a 
conveniently conflicted one that presents itself as a counter-hegemon, but that conveniently 
claims to be inhibited here by its internal divisions. 
This analysis provides a way to deal with the gaps left in Alons’ and Garcia’s contributions, 
and deals with the perceptional issues that showed up in Adriaensen and González-Garibay’s 
contribution. Bailey and Bossuyt focus on the underlying mechanisms that direct the EU in 
its external trade policies and on the mechanisms that drive EU policymakers, either 
consciously or unconsciously, in this field. These mechanisms are defined as mechanisms of 
domination rooted in two internal characteristics of the EU: its internal neoliberal agenda 
(resulting in a growing dominance of capital over labor), and the EU’s democratic deficit. 
There are three such mechanisms of domination: the expansionary market mechanism, the 
othering of the target of expansion, and the de-politicization of policy-making. There is an 
interesting distinction that can be made between these three however, or rather, between 
the first one and the other two. The latter talk about strategies: what the EU’s political elites 
do to ensure their continued rule over (and domination of) the EU citizenry. The former 
deals with a mixture of motivation and strategy. The strategy consists of market expansion. 
The motivation derives from the Marxist argument on which such market expansion is 
based. It is through the equalizing effect of market competition combined with the capitalist 
requirement of profit realization that pressure is generated in favor of continuous market 
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expansion. Why policymakers respond to this pressure is the most intriguing question. They 
may do so because they politically depend on the beneficiaries of market expansion. It may 
also be the case that they themselves directly profit from this (which implies that political 
and economic elites largely overlap). But it may also be the case that they barely realize 
what is going on just like the many scholars that are criticized by critical social science. 
Despite the controversy that exists with regard to the substance of the argument put 
forward by Bailey and Bossuyt, the merit of their approach clearly is that it digs deeper into 
the preferences and resulting strategies of trade policymakers in Europe. The 
complementarity vis-à-vis Alons’ and Garcia’s approach is clear. Alons focuses on the 
actions of the different trade policymakers during trade negotiations and the kind of trade-
offs that guide these actions. Garcia does the same with more explicit attention to the role 
of preference orderings in these trade-offs. Bailey and Bossuyt shed light on the preferences 
behind these trade-offs and on the possible roots of these preferences. Both Alons, and 
Bailey and Bossuyt deal with strategies, with Alons’ argument about the tied-hands strategy 
conducted by France, and Bailey’s and Bossuyt argument about othering and de-
politicization. 
Lucy Ford focuses on the political and economic enclosures that underpin the EU’s trade 
policies. With enclosures, emphasis is put on the ‘universe of the undiscussed’ that guides 
such policies and that contains the mantra of ever faster economic growth as a solution to 
problems such as sustainable development and poverty reduction. Ford shows how these 
enclosures steer EU trade policies, and in doing so, maintain the existing bias in favour of 
the most globalized sections of European capital. Opposition to this approach is partly co-
opted by accommodative policies in favour of social and environmental protection and 
equity. But through this, the fundamentals have remained the same. Nature remains 
subordinate to growth, and liberalization policies are defended even when they generate 
destructive consequences on nature and society. 
Ford’s contribution is similar to the one of Bailey and Bossuyt but adds two important 
elements: it stresses the role played by enclosures, and looks at the added value of a global 
political ecology perspective. Both analyses start from the observation that ideas and 
conceptual frameworks are consequential for trade policy-making and trade policy, and the 
fact that these ideas and frameworks are created and sustained by particular social forces. 
As such, dominant preferences on trade policy-making in the EU are rooted in an economic 
orthodoxy of neoliberalism where trade liberalization is seen as the very engine of economic 
growth and where such growth is seen as an end in itself. Given the underlying power 
relations that generate this orthodoxy however, the orthodoxy itself serves the interests of 
those who dominate, that is, of the European capitalist class. This does not mean that the 
resulting trade policies cannot change. It does mean however that change is determined by 
shifts in the thinking of the European capitalist class, by the need of that class to 
accommodate the preferences of other social forces, or by its need to present its policies in 
terms of a universal or general interest. 
Fundamentally intriguing is the concept of enclosure, specifically where it gets close to the 
Neo-Gramscian notion of hegemony. Here, enclosure refers to the process in which 
knowledge is re-constituted and reformed in a way that preserves dominant power 
relations. The concept is intriguing because it raises the question about who the real 
deciders are in the case of EU trade policy-making. Do the formal players belong to the 
European capitalist class, or do they unconsciously act in a way that serves the interests of 
that class while not belonging to it? In the latter case, strategic behavior by these policy-
makers in the sense analyzed by Alons can be seen as a kind of blinded rationality. Such 
rationality is akin to bounded rationality but with the important distinction that the 
boundaries themselves stem from the fact that policy-makers are blinded in their thinking 
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by a knowledge that has been re-constituted by the European capitalist class. Rationality is 
then, not only severely constrained but also unconsciously directed at the preservation of 
dominant power relations. Then, representatives from different EU member states may act 
differently, as they are only different in the margins. Fundamentally, what they are doing 
serves the existing order. 
One does not need to go that far – in the sense of power-preserving knowledge re-
constitution – to see the potential validity of this argument. Policy-makers act on the basis 
of what they believe to be true. Part of that belief is based on the kind of socialization to 
which policy-makers – such as other human beings – are exposed. Part of that socialization 
is related to the kind of goals that we believe to be worthwhile and part to our causal 
beliefs, that is, to the kind of means that we believe are necessary for the attainment of our 
goals. In this sense, a full understanding of EU trade policy-making requires at a minimum 
that the roots of trade policy-makers’ preferences are scrutinized as much as the strategic 
choices they make in order to achieve these. The search for these roots must help in the 
identification of who the real deciders are and what the extent of their reach into trade 
policy-making really is. It must certainly help in answering the question: aren’t we looking 
at the wrong players in our attempts to understand EU trade policy-making? 
Gabriel Siles-Brügge deals with the question why the EU’s trade policy agenda continues to 
be neoliberal even if rationalist explanations such as collective action dynamics and 
institutional insulation would suggest otherwise. These latter approaches expect indeed a 
move in a more protectionist direction rather than a consistently neoliberal one. Siles-
Brügge seeks the explanation in ideas and the way in which they are used strategically by 
the European Commission’s DG Trade. He distinguishes between the internalization of 
neoliberal ideas by DG Trade, and the strategic use of a neoliberal discourse by the same 
agency. Both seem to be present. A study of DG Trade internal communication indicates 
that DG Trade officials are truly convinced that market liberalization is necessary for the 
future prosperity of the EU, but that given the political resistance that exists against it, the 
EU needs to carefully pursue such a policy by the strategic use of reciprocity as leverage. By 
offering to open the markets of its still protected (but politically highly sensitive) sectors, 
the EU can pry open the markets of its most rapidly growing trading partners. DG Trade’s 
outside communication stresses however much more that import-competing sectors in the 
EU need to be opened more to international competition. By referring to this need, DG 
Trade legitimizes market opening in the face of growing opposition to such moves. An 
ideational strategy, partly but not completely rooted in a sincere conviction, explains then 
why and how DG Trade is able to push a liberalizing agenda in times of severe economic 
crisis in Europe. 
Siles-Brügge’s argument relies on constructivism and its claim that ideas matter in 
international political economy because – following Hay (2004) – ‘they are treated by actors 
as though they were material straightjackets’. The relationship with critical approaches to 
the EU’s trade policies - such as those presented by Bailey and Bossuyt and by Ford – 
becomes strong with the observation that in the EU’s trade policy ‘neoliberal tenets are 
increasingly treated as “normalized”, that is, as reflections of a reality in which the rational 
homo economicus is the main determinant of social outcomes’. Such normalization does not 
happen spontaneously however. It is the consequence of strategic discursive behavior by 
actors irrespective of the question whether they themselves believe in the veracity of these 
tenets or not. Siles-Brügge’s analysis suggests however that in the case of the EU, officials 
from the Commission’s DG Trade did believe (or came to believe) in these tenets but that 
on top of that, they acted strategically in order to present policies based on these beliefs as 
necessary, given the claimed inexorability of globalization and its growing constraints on the 
EU economy. 
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The added value of Siles-Brügge’s work lays in his attention for both the internalization of 
ideas by policy-makers and the way in which discursive strategies are deployed to promote 
the internalization of these ideas by others. Ideas may be out there, but for them to play a 
role in policy-making, active and strategic deployment of discursive strategies is necessary. 
There are indeed not many ideas that are inherently so powerful that they become 
internalized and normalized spontaneously across a political system (although the idea of 
the homo economicus has proved to be relatively powerful). However, when these ideas are 
internalized across such a system, they are significantly empowered. What is still lacking is 
an account of the conditions under which internalization becomes likely. 
The strategic empowerment of ideas and the resulting power of such ideas, as discussed by 
Siles-Brügge, open the door to many of the other analyses in this special issue: the Franco-
German axis in Alons’ work and the internalization and normalization of the importance of 
that axis by former generations of West German politicians; and Adriaensen and Gonzalez’s 
analysis that can be equally studied from that perspective. In a multilateral context, the EU 
has until now lost its struggle to change developing countries’ perception about the 
relationship between the trade-labour linkage and protectionism. Their analysis provides a 
number of clues why this is the case. 
More importantly, Siles-Brügge’s analysis suggests that neoliberalism as a widely 
normalized ideational framework is not inexorable in itself. Ideas may have a life span that 
risks coming to an end when they are confronted with competing frames that are 
successfully normalized through discursive strategies. Even if they remain alive, it still 
needs to be addressed how these ideas continue to be resilient. 
Ferdi De Ville’s article builds on this question with his reliance on critical historical 
institutionalism. Based on this approach, ideas may be empowered by institutionalized 
decisions taken in the past. Such decisions create what historical institutionalists have called 
‘path dependencies’, and De Ville prefers to label as ‘reactive sequencing’. The 
institutionalized nature of these decisions benefits continuity over change, even if, as critical 
historical institutionalism stresses, unintended consequences may show up. Such 
consequences may not only steer policies in a different direction than the one intended by 
the original decision-makers, they may also trigger countermobilization against the original 
decisions and their current manifestations.  
Following Baastian van Apeldoorn, De Ville illustrates how the depoliticized nature of the 
new trade issues in the Uruguay Round enabled a limited number of EU players to direct the 
EU’s external trade policies in the direction of neoliberalism, and why this represented a 
decisive victory of neoliberalism over neomercantilism in the EU. Important is here however, 
that critical historical institutionalism relies on a social ontology, which means that 
perceptions and discursive strategies to affect these perceptions matter. It is not just a 
matter of biases that have been created by setting policies in stone in the past (or at least 
by trying to do so), but also by strategies aimed at what Siles-Brügge would call 
‘normalization’. As De Ville phrases it, ‘While structures empower and constrain agents, this 
influence is always dependent on how agents interpret structures, which is mediated by 
discourse.’ 
Arne Niemann’s article uses a revised neofunctionalist framework to explain the revision of 
the Treaty provisions on trade policy in the Lisbon Treaty. In doing so, the author deals with 
the puzzling observation that the negotiations leading to the Lisbon Treaty accomplished 
what the negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty, and the Nice 
Treaty failed to do, despite the fact that according to existing exogenous factors one would 
have expected stronger revisions in these treaties than in the Lisbon Treaty. A revised 
neofuncionalist framework provides the answer as it enables the author to take into account 
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functional spillover pressures from the pending enlargements, the cultivation of these 
pressures by the European Commission and the European Parliament by making use of the 
beneficial environment that the Constitutional Convention provided for that purpose, and 
the fact that this environment also enabled social learning and socialization to play a more 
prominent role. Countervailing forces that affected these revisions in the past – such as 
domestic constraints for the member state representatives, the sovereignty-consciousness 
of some member states, or the countervailing national bureaucratic pressures – were not 
able therefore, to overcome the pro-integrative dynamics that the convention method 
brought with it in the run-up to what ultimately became the Lisbon Treaty. 
Just like in critical historical institutionalism, Niemann’s revised neofunctionalism stresses 
the importance of diachronic analysis. Past decisions generate consequences – among which 
unintended ones – that affect the preferences that policy-makers develop later in the 
process. Preferences are thus partly endogenous to that process. But in their formation, 
both socialization through deliberation, and supranational entrepreneurship matter 
significantly. The role that these can play is however, contingent on a range of other factors 
such as the frequency and intensity of the interactions, the absence of a hierarchy among 
the participants in the deliberative process, and the informational advantages for the 
supranational players. 
There is an interesting complementarity between the analysis provided by Niemann, and the 
contributions by De Ville, and a critical theory approach (Bailey and Bossuyt; Ford). 
Niemann’s account seeks to focus on the micro- and meso-political mechanisms that affect 
changes in perceptions. It tries to define the conditions under which perceptions (and as a 
consequence, preferences) may move in a certain direction in an interactive-intensive and 
institutionalized context (deliberation). Bailey and Bossuyt, Ford, and De Ville use a macro-
political perspective. They look at the establishment of and eventual change in perceptions 
in a context that is not by definition interaction-intensive. Both are crucial for the 
understanding of the processes through which perceptions affect policies, and through which 
perceptional entrepreneurs may bias EU trade policy-making (or policy-making in any other 
field) one way or the other. 
 
CONCLUSION: ENGAGED PLURALISM THROUGH A CAUSAL CHAIN 
The different contributions allow us to depict a causal chain that may point us at the factors 
and causal mechanisms that together affect the EU’s external trade policies. That chain 
starts with the roots of the preferences that trade policy-makers entertain, and ends with 
the concrete choices they make when deciding on trade policies. The roots point at the role 
that normalized ideologies play, whether these serve existing power disparities or not. Such 
ideologies narrow the lens through which policy-makers identify problems and solutions to 
those problems. They blind them with respect to certain policy alternatives and with respect 
to the possible negative consequences of these for certain groups in society. They may also 
make them indifferent to such consequences even if they see them. 
The ideologies that affect the perceptions of policy-makers may also change. They may 
change in response to a major crisis and the proven inability to deal with it; or they may 
change because of countermobilization against the dominant policy paradigm; finally, they 
may change because the structural position of a country (or the EU as a whole) changes 
either in the international security system, in the international economy, or both. Policy-
makers’ perception may, however, also change as a consequence of intensive interaction, 
and the socialization through deliberation that it may entail. Problems may be seen in a 
different perspective, or new solutions may be discovered with regard to them. At the end 
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of the chain, policy-makers may be expected to want to maximize the utility as they define 
it. They may also be expected to target the means that they believe will help them best in 
reaching that utility. Nonetheless, an environment of intensive interaction may limit policy-
makers inclination to resort to any possible mean that could be available to them. This may 
be due to the iterated nature of their involvement with each other. It may also be due to 
beliefs about appropriate and inappropriate courses of action. 
By connecting the different paradigms used in this special issue through the idea of a causal 
chain, we have aimed to illustrate that a dialogue between diverse approaches can be 
fruitful to gain a deeper understanding of EU trade politics. Ours is not an attempt to 
develop a new paradigmatic synthesis on these politics, neither to establish a new 
hegemonic paradigm. Our intention is just to show how – despite the gaps among them – a 
constructive dialogue among analyses rooted in different and sometimes conflicting 
paradigms, may be fruitful for what we all have in mind as scholars: a better understanding 
of politics. 
 
*** 
 
                                           
1 In fact, Kuhn himself qualified the incommensurability thesis in his later work. 
2 The neo-neo-synthesis in international relations goes back to the 1970s. In the field of EU studies a similar 
rapprochement of liberal-oriented ‘supranationalist’ and realist-oriented ‘intergovernmentalist’ schools took 
place in the early 1990s, leading to ‘supranational institutionalism’ and ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’ 
respectively. 
3 Moravcsik’s own liberal-intergovernmentalist synthesis for studying European integration does combine 
different perspectives (theories of liberal preference formation, intergovernmental state bargaining, and 
delegation) in an innovative way, but all these are firmly rooted in rationalist social theory. 
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While economic diplomacy has gained an ever more important role in the international 
environment, the EU’s external action has simultaneously been changing tremendously 
over time, especially since the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. In the presence of 
these developments, questions regarding the EU’s actorness have also gained more 
importance. Although these aspects have been lively throughout the academic debate, 
discussion has been lacking the consideration of specific dimensions of the EU’s external 
action. Therefore this volume contributes to a better comprehension of the EU’s 
economic diplomacy and enriches the scholarly debate crucially by examining the 
decision-making process and negotiation in external economic policies. 
Stephen Woolcock has arranged the volume into seven well-structured chapters. He 
starts by offering a framework of analysis consisting of three distinct parts that further 
determine the structure of case studies. The framework analysis comprises a 
specification of EU decision-making and negotiation practices, an examination of decisive 
internal and external factors determining the role of the EU in economic diplomacy, and 
an overview of distinct phases of negotiation processes. The following chapters 
constitute reflections on case studies based on the framework of analysis previously 
explained. This ensures a well-rounded insight into four policy areas framing economic 
diplomacy of the EU. 
The case studies that the author has chosen are the EU External Trade and Investment 
policy-making, financial regulation, EU External Environmental Policy, and EU 
Development Policy. Each policy area is scrutinised thoroughly, starting by looking at its 
historical development, examining the inherent decision-making and negotiation 
processes, and continuing by considering the multiple factors shaping the policy, as well 
as its effectiveness. Additional example cases that are considered within each policy area 
fortify the empirical base of the research. 
One of the core findings of the book concerns the importance of competences and the 
crucial role of this concept when evaluating the actorness of the EU. Herein the author 
points out the basic causal relation that the more competences the EU has, the stronger 
and more effective it is. Further, an essential part of the volume is the variety of policy 
areas which are examined throughout. What makes the chosen mixture especially 
interesting is that the author compares policy areas where the EU has exclusive 
competence with those where it has shared competence. It is considered vital to 
distinguish between de facto and de iure competences of the EU, pointing out that in 
order to evaluate the role of the EU, it is not enough to solely consider the latter. 
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However, it seems that in certain aspects the diversity of cases tackled makes it difficult 
to draw general conclusions. For example, one of such questions is in how far is the EU a 
leader in economic diplomacy. The answer provided by the book is that it depends on the 
policy area one is considering. Nevertheless, the volume would definitely be appreciated 
by those who want to acquire a general insight into the EU’s role in economic diplomacy, 
as well as by those who look for more information about a specific policy area.  
The book is especially engaging due to its intriguing aim to determine the role of the EU. 
At the beginning Woolcock points out two options. One could view the EU either as a 
unified actor in its own right or as a forum for international economic negotiations. 
Therein it is possible to scrutinise the always present interplay between the EU and 
member states, which has been well depicted in the four case studies. The author states 
that the answer to the question regarding the role of the EU lies somewhere in between. 
It is highly dependent on the policy area in question, and, although the EU has 
developed as a significant actor in economic diplomacy, the role of member states is 
undoubted.  
The book is structured comprehensively building on three pillars that are based on an 
underlying question each. The first pillar explains the functioning of the EU economic 
diplomacy, the second pillar as previously mentioned concerns the determination of the 
EU’s role in economic diplomacy, and the final pillar concerns the preconditions of its 
effectiveness. Constructed around these three pillars, the analytical framework 
establishes the realm for the case studies. Beyond that, the clear descriptions of the 
different aspects of EU economic diplomacy are complemented by numerous tables. This 
assures that the somewhat complex relationships depicted in this volume are effectively 
clarified. 
A strength of this book is definitely the in-depth explanation of various aspects of EU 
economic diplomacy. The arguments are well illustrated not only by cases of the four 
policy areas mentioned above, but going even further into the analysis of specific 
decision making and negotiation processes in the past. Furthermore, the development 
and the changes that different treaties have brought to each policy area have been 
highlighted by offering explanations of different levels of decision making in various EU 
institutions, which in turn allow full understanding of the path of argumentation. 
Woolcock makes a reference to the complicated decision making process in the EU, as 
well as the inability to understand it, and therefore sets an aim of explaining it. This is a 
task that he has accomplished with success, as the volume is a valuable source of 
information about EU economic diplomacy, different actors involved and the decision 
making, as well as negotiations’ process. Moreover, with its in-depth analysis and 
thorough explanations of the background behind the decision making of EU’s economic 
diplomacy, the book can be appreciated by students new to the topic as well as scholars 
aiming to acquire a more profound knowledge. What has to be kept in mind when 
selecting this volume is that, as the author admits himself, the book was written nearing 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Accordingly, not all of the treaty changes were 
fully obvious at that point and therefore the role of the European External Action Service, 
among others, is not depicted exhaustively. Despite this aspect, the book provides a 
fundamental and extensive base for understanding the role of the EU in economic 
diplomacy as well as the different policies forming economic diplomacy. 
*** 
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When it comes to the European Union (EU) and the United States, the biggest trading 
partners, implications are rather grave. Not only for those that are directly involved in 
trade disputes (companies that produce products, such as bananas and hormone-treated 
meat), but also for those who have little to do with the trade dispute itself (producers of 
paper boxes, wallets or coffee among others).  
When the EU violates international trade agreements, retaliation measures of its trading 
partners hurt many businesses. The question is who is liable for damages triggered by 
the EU’s conduct? What are legal implications for such damages for natural and legal 
persons? And what are the consequences of the EU’s domestic system of rights and 
judicial protection rules (a so-called ‘pure’ EU law)? 
These are the issues that Anne Thies considers in her book. Thies takes a closer look at 
two main sets of questions in her work: (1) the legality of the EU’s conduct into a 
particular trade agreement and (2) the scope of the EU’s liability in cases when the EU’s 
own general principles are violated, or when the EU has no unlawful conduct when 
severe consequences of the international trade agreements follow.  
The author provides important background context of the EU and its liability in the 
context of international trade law (Chapter 1). She then discusses the EU liability for 
unlawful conduct within the EU legal order (Chapter 2), after which she analyses the EU 
courts’ current approach in cases when applicants tried to enforce the EU’s World Trade 
Organization (WTO) law obligations (Chapter 3). In Chapters 4 and 5, Thies evaluates 
each of the general principles of EU law in cases of compensation for infringements of 
such law. In Chapter 6, she provides some general approaches to policy suggestions, for 
example how the gap in judicial protection for the victims of retaliation should be filled in 
a context of international legal order and individual rights enforced by the EU law. 
What is important is that Thies first takes a look at the effect and enforceability of EU 
liability as defined in Article 340(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) in international trade law within the EU legal order. As the EU is a part of 
the WTO and has an exclusive competence in most trade matters (Article 207 TFEU), it 
represents all member states at the WTO and Dispute Settlement Body. This is a rather 
forceful enactment with significant consequences for the EU’s legal order.  
To make matters even more complicated, Article 340(2) of the TFEU makes the EU, 
which has a legal personality (Article 47 Treaty on European Union), liable for its conduct 
in the matters concerning international trade law. This means that – according to the 
Article 340(2) TFEU – any party that has experienced financial damages during a trade 
dispute is entitled to compensation from the EU. A number of such cases have been 
brought to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the recent years, and Thies reviews 
them in detail (for example, the Hormone and Bananas cases among others).  
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In reality, liability claims have been dismissed by the ECJ. According to Thies, the ECJ’s 
unwillingness to apply EU general principles to the cases that have been brought up to 
the court, has ‘probably been motivated by the courts’ general objective not to interfere 
with the scope for manoeuvre of other institutions at the international level in the 
context of international trade disputes’ (p. 188). In other words, the ECJ has refused to 
pry with the international trade law out of concern of political interference and potential 
financial costs for the EU as a whole. Thies correctly argues that the EU should find an 
appropriate balance between its own general principles and international trade law. In 
addition, the EU and its justice system should appropriately respect the rights and 
obligations of the EU on the world stage and individual rights as defined by EU 
constitutional law.  
Upon reading this book, it was clear that it is primarily intended for academics, policy 
makers and practitioners. It is a good reference book for anyone who is interested in the 
topic and would like to have a more detailed discussion of EU liability within the 
framework of international trade law. For anyone who is not too familiar with the topic 
and legal studies in general, the book might be a somewhat challenging read. It is filled 
with references to EU treaties and legal terms, which require prior knowledge for 
adequate comprehension.  
The book is an impressive analysis from a young academic to produce original research 
in the field of international trade law and the EU legal institutional approach. It is indeed 
a brave attempt to understand a rather difficult and complex topic. The book opens a 
door for further research and detailed policy recommendations and is a worthwhile read 
for those who are interested in reading about legal aspects of the famous ‘Bananas’ and 
‘Hormones’ cases.  
 
*** 
